* Security: keep sudo-created remote harvest bundles root-owned while root packages and hashes them, expose only the archive to the authenticated SSH uid, and verify the root-computed digest after download. This removes the post-harvest tampering window created by recursively chowning the bundle before packaging without making the plaintext archive world-readable.
* Security: enforce tar member limits while lazily parsing untrusted archives rather than after `TarFile.getmembers()` has already indexed the entire archive; count repeated `.` entries and cap remote compressed downloads as well.
* Security: apply aggregate byte and total filesystem-entry limits when freezing directory harvest bundles, reject symlinked bundle roots, and abort when files or discovered directories change during the copy, so direct directory inputs remain bounded and fail closed under mutation.
* BREAKING CHANGE: Remove the `enroll diff --enforce` option. Enroll no longer applies the old harvest state locally to repair drift; this avoids the risk of enforcing a potentially malicious or tampered harvest. To restore baseline state, regenerate a manifest from the trusted harvest and apply it yourself, or compare two `enroll diff` runs and act on the result.
* BREAKING CHANGE: Group all package and systemd-unit roles into Debian Section/RPM Group roles by default, including managed config files and unit state. This mode is not used if `--fqdn` or `--no-common-roles` is set, in which case, the traditional behaviour of preserving one role per package/unit is used instead.
* BREAKING CHANGE: Don't allow reading `.enroll.ini` in the CWD. Use only the ENROLL_CONFIG env var, an explicit `--config` path or else the XDG default location (or `~/.config/enroll/enroll.ini` if `XDG_CONFIG_HOME` is not set).
* Stricter validation of harvests to ensure that they meet the schema and don't contain unsafe artifacts (e.g symlinks pointing outside the artifact tree)
* Stricter validation on FQDN name in multisite mode.
* Strict check of `$PATH` when running harvest as root, in case it could lead to execution of unsafe binaries during harvest. Override with `--assume-safe-path` for non-interactive or CI purposes.
* Stricter validation of the destination dirs that harvest or manifest write to, to prevent writing to a different user-controlled area. Stricter permissions on the output dirs too.
* Add capability to handle passphrases on encrypted SSH private keys. Prompting can be forced with `--ask-key-passphrase` or automated (e.g for CI) with `--ssh-key-passphrase env SOMEVAR`
* Support `--remote-ssh-config [path-to-ssh-config]` as an argument in case extra params are required beyond `--remote-port` or `--remote-user`. Note: `--remote-host` must still be set, but it can be an 'alias' represented by the 'Host' value in the ssh config.
* Introduce `enroll validate` - a tool to validate a harvest against the state schema, or check for missing or orphaned obsolete artifacts in a harvest.
* Add `--exclude-path` to `enroll diff` command, so that you can ignore certain churn from the diff (stuff you still wanted to harvest as a baseline but don't care if it changes day to day)
* Add `--ignore-package-versions` to `enroll diff` command, to optionally ignore package upgrades (e.g due to patching) from the diff.
* Add tags to the playbook for each role, to allow easier targeting of specific roles during play later.
* Add `--enforce` mode to `enroll diff`. If there is diff detected between the two harvests, and it can enforce restoring the state from the older harvest, it will manifest the state and apply it with ansible. Only the specific roles that had diffed will be applied (via the new tags capability)
* Introduce --ask-become-pass or -K to support password-required sudo on remote hosts, just like Ansible. It will also fall back to this prompt if a password is required but the arg wasn't passed in.
* Ensure directories in the tree of anything included with --include are defined in the state and manifest so we make dirs before we try to create files
