diff --git a/enroll/ignore.py b/enroll/ignore.py
index d7c4198..563a9ee 100644
--- a/enroll/ignore.py
+++ b/enroll/ignore.py
@@ -129,6 +129,55 @@ HIGH_CONFIDENCE_SECRET_PATTERNS = [
     # Credentials embedded in connection-string URIs, e.g.
     #   postgres://user:pass@host, redis://:pass@host, amqp://u:p@host
     re.compile(rb"(?i)[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*://[^/\s:@]*:[^/\s@]+@[^/\s]"),
+    # Whitespace-separated credential assignments for COMPOUND credential keys.
+    #
+    # The assignment pattern above only recognises a value when the key and value
+    # are joined by ':' or '='. Some real config styles (.netrc-like files, a
+    # number of daemon configs) instead separate a key from its value with one or
+    # more spaces/tabs, e.g.
+    #   aws_secret_access_key wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG...
+    #   client_secret  hunter2value
+    #   oauth_token ya29.aRealLookingToken
+    # The comment-aware soft tier below would not catch these because its keyword
+    # boundary (\b) is defeated by the leading underscore in a compound key
+    # (e.g. the 'secret' in 'client_secret' has a '_' -- a word char -- before it,
+    # so \bsecret\b does not match). This pattern closes that gap.
+    #
+    # It is deliberately restricted to *compound* keys -- a credential keyword that
+    # is joined to a prefix (case 1) or is itself a multi-word credential name
+    # (case 2). Standalone English words ('password', 'token', 'secret') are NOT
+    # matched here: they are already handled, comment-aware, by the soft tier, and
+    # matching them with a whitespace separator would false-positive on prose and
+    # on PAM 'password <verb> ...' stack directives. The trailing value test
+    # requires a value-like token (>=6 chars, or one containing a digit/secret-ish
+    # character) so a short config value such as 'yes'/'no' does not trip it.
+    re.compile(
+        rb"""(?ixm)
+        (?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.-])
+        [\"']?
+        (?:
+            (?:[A-Za-z0-9]+[_.-])+
+            (?:password|passwd|passphrase|pwd|pw|token|secret|credential|credentials)
+            |
+            (?:[A-Za-z0-9]+[_.-])*
+            (?:
+                auth[_.-]token|access[_.-]token|refresh[_.-]token|
+                client[_.-]secret|secret[_.-]key|
+                api[_.-]key|access[_.-]key|private[_.-]key|
+                aws[_.-]access[_.-]key[_.-]id|aws[_.-]secret[_.-]access[_.-]key|
+                azure[_.-]client[_.-]secret|
+                google[_.-]application[_.-]credentials|gcp[_.-]service[_.-]account|
+                service[_.-]account[_.-]key|
+                session[_.-]key
+            )
+        )
+        (?:[_.-][A-Za-z0-9]+)*
+        [\"']?
+        [ \t]+
+        (?=\S)
+        (?:\S{6,}|\S*[0-9/+=._-]\S*)
+        """
+    ),
     # HTTP(S) Authorization / Proxy-Authorization header values carrying a
     # bearer/basic/digest credential.
     re.compile(
diff --git a/tests/test_secret_detection.py b/tests/test_secret_detection.py
index 607d059..3c98d64 100644
--- a/tests/test_secret_detection.py
+++ b/tests/test_secret_detection.py
@@ -221,3 +221,65 @@ def test_commented_out_credential_values_require_dangerous():
         ), data
         # ...but --dangerous still collects it (operator's explicit choice).
         assert dangerous._content_deny_reason("/etc/app/app.conf", data) is None, data
+
+
+def test_whitespace_separated_compound_credentials_denied():
+    """Security regression (audit finding): a populated credential assignment
+    that uses whitespace (space/tab) instead of ':'/'=' as the separator must
+    still be refused in safe mode when the key is a *compound* credential name.
+
+    The soft keyword tier cannot catch these because its ``\\b`` boundary is
+    defeated by the leading underscore in a compound key (e.g. the ``secret`` in
+    ``client_secret`` is preceded by ``_``, a word character), and the
+    assignment tier only recognised ``:``/``=`` separators. Some real config
+    styles (.netrc-like files, some daemon configs) use whitespace separators,
+    so a value such as ``aws_secret_access_key wJalr...`` would previously leak.
+    """
+    safe = IgnorePolicy(dangerous=False)
+    dangerous = IgnorePolicy(dangerous=True)
+    leaking = [
+        b"aws_secret_access_key wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\n",
+        b"aws_access_key_id AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\n",
+        b"client_secret hunter2deadbeef\n",
+        b"oauth_token ya29.A0ARrdaReALlOOkINgToKeN\n",
+        b"refresh_token 1//0longrefreshvalue\n",
+        b"my_token deadbeef1234\n",
+        b"app_password s3cr3tValue\n",
+        b"db_pw s3cr3tvalue\n",
+        b"private_key /etc/ssl/private/app.pem\n",
+        b"session_key 0xDEADBEEFCAFE\n",
+        b"\tapi_key   AKIA12345678\n",
+    ]
+    for data in leaking:
+        assert (
+            safe._content_deny_reason("/root/.netrc", data) == "sensitive_content"
+        ), data
+        # --dangerous remains the explicit opt-in to collect such material.
+        assert dangerous._content_deny_reason("/root/.netrc", data) is None, data
+
+
+def test_whitespace_separated_non_credentials_still_allowed():
+    """The whitespace-separated credential rule must not false-positive on
+    ordinary config or PAM directives. It is intentionally restricted to
+    *compound* credential keys with a value-like token, so standalone words and
+    common config lines are not affected by it.
+
+    (Standalone ``password``/``token``/``secret`` words on a non-comment line
+    are still caught by the comment-aware soft tier; that is unchanged. The
+    cases here are ones that must remain collectable: PAM stack directives, SSH
+    key-file path directives, and plain settings.)
+    """
+    pol = IgnorePolicy(dangerous=False)
+    allowed = [
+        # SSH key-file path directives (key material is denied by path globs,
+        # not by content here).
+        b"HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key\n",
+        b"host_key /etc/ssh/known\n",
+        b"public_key /home/u/.ssh/id_rsa.pub\n",
+        # Plain numeric / boolean settings.
+        b"max_connections 1024\n",
+        b"PermitRootLogin no\n",
+        b"PasswordAuthentication yes\n",
+    ]
+    for data in allowed:
+        assert pol._content_deny_reason("/etc/app/app.conf", data) is None, data