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jinjaturtle tests can run on rpm via git
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Miguel Jacq 2026-06-30 09:26:34 +10:00
parent 0fd722281e
commit 6d55ac6cc5
Signed by: mig5
GPG key ID: 03906B4110AAD3B8
2 changed files with 1 additions and 6 deletions
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SECURITY.md
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@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ These measures are defense-in-depth. They are intended to reduce the chance of a
The following are generally out of scope and should not be reported as Enroll vulnerabilities unless they also bypass one of Enroll’s explicit hardening mechanisms:
* A malicious local user who can already control the root user’s command line, shell environment, config file, `PATH`, SSH config, working directory, or invoked binaries.
* A malicious local user who can already control the root user’s command line, shell environment, config file, `PATH`, `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, SSH config, working directory, or invoked binaries.
* A root user loading an `enroll.ini` file whose contents intentionally request dangerous behavior.
* A root user passing `--dangerous` and then observing that Enroll may collect sensitive information.
* A root user passing `--assume-safe-path` and then observing that Enroll does not prompt about `PATH` safety.