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This commit is contained in:
Miguel Jacq 2026-06-22 14:49:56 +10:00
parent ad019f6b09
commit 70525e52d8
Signed by: mig5
GPG key ID: 03906B4110AAD3B8
2 changed files with 3 additions and 0 deletions
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2
README.md
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@ -285,6 +285,8 @@ By default, `enroll` does **not** assume how you handle secrets in Ansible. It w
Safe-mode content scanning is intentionally conservative. It treats common assignment-style credential keys as sensitive, including names such as `password`, `client_secret`, `secret_key`, `auth_token`, `api_key`, `aws_access_key_id`, `aws_secret_access_key`, `azure_client_secret`, `GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`, and service-account key names.
**IMPORTANT**: Enroll ignores comments in files! If you have commented out *real secrets*, there's still a risk that Enroll could capture that data even without `--dangerous`. If you are in doubt, play it safe: use `--sops` and/or encrypt the output at rest in a way that makes sense to you.
Automatic harvesting of per-user shell dotfiles is also disabled by default, even when those files differ from `/etc/skel`, because `.bashrc`, `.profile`, `.bash_aliases`, and similar files commonly contain exported tokens, credentials, or aliases/functions with embedded secrets. Use `--dangerous` for automatic shell-dotfile capture, or use targeted `--include-path` patterns for narrower safe-mode review.
If you wish to opt in to collecting everything, use `--dangerous` mode, but be aware of what it means:

1
SECURITY.md
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@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ The following are generally out of scope and should not be reported as Enroll vu
* A user configuring a webhook, email target, SSH proxy command, SOPS binary, package manager, or configuration-management tool that they do not trust.
* A compromised system where an attacker already controls root-owned files, root’s shell, root’s configuration, or the privileged tools Enroll invokes.
* Reports that amount to “if root runs this tool with malicious options, root can make the system do dangerous things.”
* Enroll harvesting a file that has a *commented out* secret even with `--dangerous` disabled (it ignores comments so as to not be totally useless when it comes to harvesting config files). It is still the responsibility of the user to use `--sops` or appropriate at-rest encryption if in the slightest doubt about what might get harvested.
Enroll is a tool for administrators, not a sandbox for hostile local users. It cannot make unsafe local trust decisions safe if the operator’s own execution environment is already attacker-controlled.