More hardening
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This commit is contained in:
Miguel Jacq 2026-07-03 12:24:08 +10:00
parent 40bff49815
commit d2a46394fe
Signed by: mig5
GPG key ID: 03906B4110AAD3B8
5 changed files with 314 additions and 18 deletions

View file

@ -323,3 +323,51 @@ def test_whitespace_separated_non_credentials_still_allowed():
]
for data in allowed:
assert pol._content_deny_reason("/etc/app/app.conf", data) is None, data
def test_binary_keyring_allowlist_still_scans_for_private_key_material():
"""A binary file on the keyring allow-list must still be refused in safe
mode if it embeds private-key material.
``DEFAULT_ALLOW_BINARY_GLOBS`` exists so genuinely-binary *public* keyrings
(APT/RPM GPG keyrings) survive the ``binary_like`` denial. It must not
become a hole through which a keybox/keyring carrying *private* key material
is captured unscanned. The high-confidence secret-material scan therefore
runs on the raw bytes before the binary allow-list decision.
"""
pol = IgnorePolicy(dangerous=False)
private_binary = (
b"\x99\x01\x0d\x04"
+ b"\x00" * 20
+ b"-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\nsecret\n"
+ b"-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----"
+ b"\x00" * 8
)
for path in (
"/etc/apt/trusted.gpg",
"/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/mykey.gpg",
"/etc/apt/keyrings/mykey.gpg",
"/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-mine",
"/usr/share/keyrings/mykey.gpg",
):
assert (
pol._content_deny_reason(path, private_binary) == "sensitive_content"
), path
# A genuinely non-secret binary keyring at those same paths is still allowed
# (the allow-list still exempts it from the binary_like denial).
public_binary = b"\x99\x01\x0d\x04" + b"\x00" * 40 + b"public key packet data"
for path in (
"/etc/apt/keyrings/pub.gpg",
"/usr/share/keyrings/pub.gpg",
"/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-pub",
):
assert pol._content_deny_reason(path, public_binary) is None, path
# --dangerous still collects everything.
dangerous = IgnorePolicy(dangerous=True)
assert (
dangerous._content_deny_reason("/etc/apt/keyrings/mykey.gpg", private_binary)
is None
)