Avoid TOCTOU issues, stronger perms on manifest dir, don't allow harvesting to existing dir by default, scan whole file for potential secrets

DEVELOPMENT.md

@@ -1507,8 +1507,6 @@ Discovery order:
 1. `--no-config` disables config loading,
 2. `--config PATH` or `-c PATH`,
 3. `$ENROLL_CONFIG`,
-4. `./enroll.ini`,
-5. `./.enroll.ini`,
 6. `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/enroll/enroll.ini`,
 7. `~/.config/enroll/enroll.ini`.
 

enroll/capture.py

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
-import shutil
+import errno
 import stat
 from typing import List, Optional, Set
 
-from .fsutil import stat_triplet
+from .fsutil import stat_triplet, stat_triplet_from_stat
 from .harvest_types import ExcludedFile, ManagedFile, ManagedLink
 from .ignore import IgnorePolicy
 from .pathfilter import PathFilter
@@ -54,12 +54,69 @@ def files_differ(a: str, b: str, *, max_bytes: int = 2_000_000) -> bool:
         return True
 
 
-def copy_into_bundle(
-    bundle_dir: str, role_name: str, abs_path: str, src_rel: str
+def _open_no_follow_write(path: str, mode: int = 0o600) -> int:
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0)
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    return os.open(path, flags, mode)
+
+
+def write_bytes_into_bundle(
+    bundle_dir: str, role_name: str, src_rel: str, data: bytes
 ) -> None:
     dst = os.path.join(bundle_dir, "artifacts", role_name, src_rel)
     os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(dst), exist_ok=True)
-    shutil.copy2(abs_path, dst)
+
+    fd = -1
+    try:
+        fd = _open_no_follow_write(dst, 0o600)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as f:
+            fd = -1
+            f.write(data)
+        try:
+            os.chmod(dst, 0o600)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+    finally:
+        if fd >= 0:
+            os.close(fd)
+
+
+def copy_into_bundle(
+    bundle_dir: str, role_name: str, abs_path: str, src_rel: str
+) -> None:
+    """Legacy safe copy helper used by tests and non-IgnorePolicy callers.
+
+    Real harvests using IgnorePolicy copy the exact bytes read from the safely
+    opened source file in capture_file().  This helper still refuses source
+    symlinks at copy time and refuses destination symlink overwrites.
+    """
+
+    flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0)
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+
+    fd = -1
+    try:
+        try:
+            fd = os.open(abs_path, flags)
+        except OSError as e:
+            if e.errno in {errno.ELOOP, errno.ENOTDIR}:
+                raise OSError("refusing to copy symlink source") from e
+            raise
+        st = os.fstat(fd)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+            raise OSError("refusing to copy non-regular source")
+        chunks: list[bytes] = []
+        while True:
+            chunk = os.read(fd, 1024 * 1024)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            chunks.append(chunk)
+        write_bytes_into_bundle(bundle_dir, role_name, src_rel, b"".join(chunks))
+    finally:
+        if fd >= 0:
+            os.close(fd)
 
 
 def capture_file(
@@ -99,6 +156,18 @@ def capture_file(
         _mark_seen()
         return False
 
+    inspection = None
+    inspect_file = getattr(policy, "inspect_file", None)
+    if callable(inspect_file):
+        inspected = inspect_file(abs_path)
+        if isinstance(inspected, tuple) and len(inspected) == 2:
+            deny, inspection = inspected
+        else:
+            # Some tests and third-party callers use MagicMock/spec policies that
+            # expose inspect_file but have not configured it.  Fall back to the
+            # legacy deny_reason/copy path for those non-real policies.
+            deny = policy.deny_reason(abs_path)
+    else:
         deny = policy.deny_reason(abs_path)
     if deny:
         excluded_out.append(ExcludedFile(path=abs_path, reason=deny))
@@ -106,9 +175,12 @@ def capture_file(
         return False
 
     try:
-        owner, group, mode = (
-            metadata if metadata is not None else stat_triplet(abs_path)
-        )
+        if metadata is not None:
+            owner, group, mode = metadata
+        elif inspection is not None:
+            owner, group, mode = stat_triplet_from_stat(inspection.stat_result)
+        else:
+            owner, group, mode = stat_triplet(abs_path)
     except OSError:
         excluded_out.append(ExcludedFile(path=abs_path, reason="unreadable"))
         _mark_seen()
@@ -116,6 +188,9 @@ def capture_file(
 
     src_rel = abs_path.lstrip("/")
     try:
+        if inspection is not None:
+            write_bytes_into_bundle(bundle_dir, role_name, src_rel, inspection.data)
+        else:
             copy_into_bundle(bundle_dir, role_name, abs_path, src_rel)
     except OSError:
         excluded_out.append(ExcludedFile(path=abs_path, reason="unreadable"))

enroll/cli.py

@@ -928,6 +928,7 @@ def main() -> None:
                             no_sudo=bool(args.no_sudo),
                             include_paths=list(getattr(args, "include_path", []) or []),
                             exclude_paths=list(getattr(args, "exclude_path", []) or []),
+                            allow_existing_output=True,
                         )
                         _encrypt_harvest_dir_to_sops(
                             tmp_bundle, out_file, list(sops_fps)
@@ -954,6 +955,7 @@ def main() -> None:
                         no_sudo=bool(args.no_sudo),
                         include_paths=list(getattr(args, "include_path", []) or []),
                         exclude_paths=list(getattr(args, "exclude_path", []) or []),
+                        allow_existing_output=not bool(args.out),
                     )
                     print(str(state))
             else:
@@ -971,6 +973,7 @@ def main() -> None:
                             dangerous=bool(args.dangerous),
                             include_paths=list(getattr(args, "include_path", []) or []),
                             exclude_paths=list(getattr(args, "exclude_path", []) or []),
+                            allow_existing_output=True,
                         )
                         _encrypt_harvest_dir_to_sops(
                             tmp_bundle, out_file, list(sops_fps)
@@ -990,6 +993,7 @@ def main() -> None:
                         dangerous=bool(args.dangerous),
                         include_paths=list(getattr(args, "include_path", []) or []),
                         exclude_paths=list(getattr(args, "exclude_path", []) or []),
+                        allow_existing_output=not bool(args.out),
                     )
                     print(path)
         elif args.cmd == "explain":
@@ -1164,6 +1168,7 @@ def main() -> None:
                             no_sudo=bool(args.no_sudo),
                             include_paths=list(getattr(args, "include_path", []) or []),
                             exclude_paths=list(getattr(args, "exclude_path", []) or []),
+                            allow_existing_output=True,
                         )
                         _encrypt_harvest_dir_to_sops(
                             tmp_bundle, out_file, list(sops_fps)
@@ -1201,6 +1206,7 @@ def main() -> None:
                         no_sudo=bool(args.no_sudo),
                         include_paths=list(getattr(args, "include_path", []) or []),
                         exclude_paths=list(getattr(args, "exclude_path", []) or []),
+                        allow_existing_output=not bool(args.harvest),
                     )
                     manifest(
                         str(harvest_dir),
@@ -1228,6 +1234,7 @@ def main() -> None:
                             dangerous=bool(args.dangerous),
                             include_paths=list(getattr(args, "include_path", []) or []),
                             exclude_paths=list(getattr(args, "exclude_path", []) or []),
+                            allow_existing_output=True,
                         )
                         _encrypt_harvest_dir_to_sops(
                             tmp_bundle, out_file, list(sops_fps)

enroll/fsutil.py

@@ -5,6 +5,25 @@ import os
 from typing import Tuple
 
 
+def stat_triplet_from_stat(st: os.stat_result) -> Tuple[str, str, str]:
+    """Return (owner, group, mode) for an existing stat result."""
+
+    mode = oct(st.st_mode & 0o7777)[2:].zfill(4)
+
+    import grp
+    import pwd
+
+    try:
+        owner = pwd.getpwuid(st.st_uid).pw_name
+    except KeyError:
+        owner = str(st.st_uid)
+    try:
+        group = grp.getgrgid(st.st_gid).gr_name
+    except KeyError:
+        group = str(st.st_gid)
+    return owner, group, mode
+
+
 def file_md5(path: str) -> str:
     """Return hex MD5 of a file.
 
@@ -23,18 +42,4 @@ def stat_triplet(path: str) -> Tuple[str, str, str]:
     owner/group are usernames/group names when resolvable, otherwise numeric ids.
     mode is a zero-padded octal string (e.g. "0644").
     """
-    st = os.stat(path, follow_symlinks=True)
-    mode = oct(st.st_mode & 0o7777)[2:].zfill(4)
-
-    import grp
-    import pwd
-
-    try:
-        owner = pwd.getpwuid(st.st_uid).pw_name
-    except KeyError:
-        owner = str(st.st_uid)
-    try:
-        group = grp.getgrgid(st.st_gid).gr_name
-    except KeyError:
-        group = str(st.st_gid)
-    return owner, group, mode
+    return stat_triplet_from_stat(os.stat(path, follow_symlinks=True))

enroll/harvest.py

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from . import systemd as _systemd
 from .fsutil import stat_triplet
 from .platform import detect_platform, get_backend
 from .ignore import IgnorePolicy
+from .harvest_safety import ensure_private_empty_dir, prepare_new_private_dir
 from .pathfilter import PathFilter
 from .version import get_enroll_version
 from .state import write_state
@@ -527,6 +528,7 @@ def harvest(
     dangerous: bool = False,
     include_paths: Optional[List[str]] = None,
     exclude_paths: Optional[List[str]] = None,
+    allow_existing_output: bool = False,
 ) -> str:
     # If a policy is not supplied, build one. `--dangerous` relaxes secret
     # detection and deny-glob skipping.
@@ -536,7 +538,12 @@ def harvest(
         # If callers explicitly provided a policy but also requested
         # dangerous behaviour, honour the CLI intent.
         policy.dangerous = True
-    os.makedirs(bundle_dir, exist_ok=True)
+    bundle_path = (
+        ensure_private_empty_dir(bundle_dir, label="harvest output")
+        if allow_existing_output
+        else prepare_new_private_dir(bundle_dir, label="harvest output")
+    )
+    bundle_dir = str(bundle_path)
 
     # User-provided includes/excludes. Excludes apply to all harvesting;
     # includes are harvested into an extra role.

enroll/harvest_safety.py

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import stat
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+class OutputSafetyError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when an output path is unsafe for root-run plaintext output."""
+
+
+def _chmod_private(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        os.chmod(path, 0o700)
+    except OSError:
+        # Best-effort; callers still benefit from mkdir(mode=0o700) on normal FSes.
+        pass
+
+
+def _assert_no_existing_symlink_components(path: Path, *, label: str) -> None:
+    """Reject symlinks in existing parent components of an output path."""
+
+    parts = path.parts
+    if not parts:
+        return
+
+    if path.is_absolute():
+        cur = Path(parts[0])
+        rest = parts[1:-1]
+    else:
+        cur = Path.cwd()
+        rest = parts[:-1]
+
+    for part in rest:
+        cur = cur / part
+        if not os.path.lexists(cur):
+            return
+        try:
+            st = cur.lstat()
+        except OSError as e:
+            raise OutputSafetyError(f"unable to inspect {label} parent: {cur}") from e
+        if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+            raise OutputSafetyError(
+                f"{label} parent path contains a symlink; refusing: {cur}"
+            )
+
+
+def prepare_new_private_dir(path: str | Path, *, label: str = "output") -> Path:
+    """Create a brand-new private output directory.
+
+    Refuse existing paths, including symlinks.  This prevents root-run harvests
+    from writing into attacker-precreated directories in shared locations such
+    as /tmp, and keeps plaintext bundles private by default.
+    """
+
+    out = Path(path).expanduser()
+    _assert_no_existing_symlink_components(out, label=label)
+    if os.path.lexists(out):
+        raise OutputSafetyError(
+            f"{label} path already exists; refusing to overwrite or merge: {out}"
+        )
+
+    out.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=False, mode=0o700)
+    _chmod_private(out)
+
+    try:
+        st = out.lstat()
+    except OSError as e:
+        raise OutputSafetyError(f"unable to inspect {label} path: {out}") from e
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputSafetyError(f"{label} path is not a real directory: {out}")
+    return out
+
+
+def ensure_private_empty_dir(path: str | Path, *, label: str = "output") -> Path:
+    """Create or validate a private empty directory.
+
+    This is for internally-generated random cache/temp directories.  User-facing
+    --out paths should normally use prepare_new_private_dir() instead.
+    """
+
+    out = Path(path).expanduser()
+    _assert_no_existing_symlink_components(out, label=label)
+    if os.path.lexists(out):
+        try:
+            st = out.lstat()
+        except OSError as e:
+            raise OutputSafetyError(f"unable to inspect {label} path: {out}") from e
+        if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+            raise OutputSafetyError(f"{label} path is a symlink; refusing: {out}")
+        if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
+            raise OutputSafetyError(
+                f"{label} path exists but is not a directory: {out}"
+            )
+        if any(out.iterdir()):
+            raise OutputSafetyError(
+                f"{label} path is not empty; refusing to merge: {out}"
+            )
+        _chmod_private(out)
+        return out
+
+    out.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=False, mode=0o700)
+    _chmod_private(out)
+    return out

enroll/ignore.py

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import fnmatch
+import errno
 import os
 import re
+import stat
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import Optional
 
@@ -57,7 +59,13 @@ DEFAULT_ALLOW_BINARY_GLOBS = [
 #   aws_secret_access_key = ...
 #   GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS=/path/to/key.json
 SENSITIVE_CONTENT_PATTERNS = [
-    re.compile(rb"-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |)PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+    re.compile(
+        rb"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |ENCRYPTED |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY(?: BLOCK)?-----"
+    ),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)AGE-SECRET-KEY-[A-Z0-9]+"),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY"),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK"),
     re.compile(
         rb"""(?ix)
         (^|[^A-Za-z0-9])
@@ -89,6 +97,14 @@ BLOCK_START = b"/*"
 BLOCK_END = b"*/"
 
 
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FileInspection:
+    """Bytes and metadata captured from one safely-opened source file."""
+
+    data: bytes
+    stat_result: os.stat_result
+
+
 @dataclass
 class IgnorePolicy:
     deny_globs: Optional[list[str]] = None
@@ -128,7 +144,7 @@ class IgnorePolicy:
 
             yield raw
 
-    def deny_reason(self, path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    def _path_deny_reason(self, path: str) -> Optional[str]:
         # Always ignore plain *.log files (rarely useful as config, often noisy).
         if path.endswith(".log"):
             return "log_file"
@@ -143,24 +159,9 @@ class IgnorePolicy:
             for g in self.deny_globs or []:
                 if fnmatch.fnmatch(path, g):
                     return "denied_path"
+        return None
 
-        try:
-            st = os.stat(path, follow_symlinks=True)
-        except OSError:
-            return "unreadable"
-
-        if st.st_size > self.max_file_bytes:
-            return "too_large"
-
-        if not os.path.isfile(path) or os.path.islink(path):
-            return "not_regular_file"
-
-        try:
-            with open(path, "rb") as f:
-                data = f.read(min(self.sample_bytes, st.st_size))
-        except OSError:
-            return "unreadable"
-
+    def _content_deny_reason(self, path: str, data: bytes) -> Optional[str]:
         if b"\x00" in data:
             for g in self.allow_binary_globs or []:
                 if fnmatch.fnmatch(path, g):
@@ -176,6 +177,67 @@ class IgnorePolicy:
 
         return None
 
+    def inspect_file(self, path: str) -> tuple[Optional[str], Optional[FileInspection]]:
+        """Safely inspect a regular file and return the exact bytes to copy.
+
+        The source is opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available, fstat() is taken
+        from that file descriptor, and the whole file is read only after the
+        size cap passes.  With the default 256 KiB cap this avoids a memory DoS
+        while ensuring secret scanning covers every byte that may be copied.
+        """
+
+        deny = self._path_deny_reason(path)
+        if deny:
+            return deny, None
+
+        flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0)
+        if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+            flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+
+        fd: Optional[int] = None
+        try:
+            try:
+                fd = os.open(path, flags)
+            except OSError as e:
+                if e.errno in {errno.ELOOP, errno.ENOTDIR}:
+                    return "not_regular_file", None
+                return "unreadable", None
+
+            try:
+                st = os.fstat(fd)
+            except OSError:
+                return "unreadable", None
+
+            if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+                return "not_regular_file", None
+            if st.st_size > self.max_file_bytes:
+                return "too_large", None
+
+            chunks: list[bytes] = []
+            remaining = int(st.st_size)
+            while remaining > 0:
+                chunk = os.read(fd, min(1024 * 1024, remaining))
+                if not chunk:
+                    break
+                chunks.append(chunk)
+                remaining -= len(chunk)
+            data = b"".join(chunks)
+
+            deny = self._content_deny_reason(path, data)
+            if deny:
+                return deny, None
+            return None, FileInspection(data=data, stat_result=st)
+        finally:
+            if fd is not None:
+                try:
+                    os.close(fd)
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
+
+    def deny_reason(self, path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+        deny, _inspection = self.inspect_file(path)
+        return deny
+
     def deny_reason_dir(self, path: str) -> Optional[str]:
         """Directory-specific deny logic.
 

enroll/manifest_safety.py

@@ -131,7 +131,11 @@ def prepare_manifest_output_dir(
             )
         _assert_no_output_symlinks(out)
         return out
-    out.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=False)
+    out.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=False, mode=0o700)
+    try:
+        os.chmod(out, 0o700)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
     return out
 
 

enroll/remote.py

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from pathlib import PurePosixPath
 from typing import Optional, Callable, TextIO
 
+from .harvest_safety import ensure_private_empty_dir, prepare_new_private_dir
+
 
 class RemoteSudoPasswordRequired(RuntimeError):
     """Raised when sudo requires a password but none was provided."""
@@ -139,12 +141,16 @@ def remote_harvest(
         getpass_fn=getpass_fn,
     )
 
+    allow_existing_output = bool(kwargs.pop("allow_existing_output", False))
+    output_prepared = False
+
     while True:
         try:
             return _remote_harvest(
                 sudo_password=sudo_password,
                 no_sudo=no_sudo,
                 ssh_key_passphrase=ssh_key_passphrase,
+                allow_existing_output=allow_existing_output or output_prepared,
                 **kwargs,
             )
         except RemoteSSHKeyPassphraseRequired:
@@ -158,6 +164,7 @@ def remote_harvest(
             # Fallback prompt if interactive.
             if stdin is not None and getattr(stdin, "isatty", lambda: False)():
                 ssh_key_passphrase = getpass_fn(key_prompt)
+                output_prepared = True
                 continue
 
             raise RemoteSSHKeyPassphraseRequired(
@@ -173,6 +180,7 @@ def remote_harvest(
             # Fallback prompt if interactive.
             if stdin is not None and getattr(stdin, "isatty", lambda: False)():
                 sudo_password = getpass_fn(prompt)
+                output_prepared = True
                 continue
 
             raise RemoteSudoPasswordRequired(
@@ -413,6 +421,7 @@ def _remote_harvest(
     ssh_key_passphrase: Optional[str] = None,
     include_paths: Optional[list[str]] = None,
     exclude_paths: Optional[list[str]] = None,
+    allow_existing_output: bool = False,
 ) -> Path:
     """Run enroll harvest on a remote host via SSH and pull the bundle locally.
 
@@ -426,12 +435,11 @@ def _remote_harvest(
             "Install it with: pip install paramiko"
         ) from e
 
-    local_out_dir = Path(local_out_dir)
-    local_out_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    try:
-        os.chmod(local_out_dir, 0o700)
-    except OSError:
-        pass
+    local_out_dir = (
+        ensure_private_empty_dir(local_out_dir, label="remote harvest output")
+        if allow_existing_output
+        else prepare_new_private_dir(local_out_dir, label="remote harvest output")
+    )
 
     # Build a zipapp locally and upload it to the remote.
     with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="enroll-remote-") as td:

enroll/state.py

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
+import os
+import tempfile
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Dict, Mapping, Union
 
@@ -31,8 +33,34 @@ def write_state(
     """Write state.json to a harvest bundle directory and return its path."""
 
     path = state_path(bundle_dir)
-    with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    fd = -1
+    tmp_name = ""
+    try:
+        fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix=f".{path.name}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=str(path.parent), text=True
+        )
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+            fd = -1
             json.dump(state, f, indent=indent, sort_keys=sort_keys)
+        os.replace(tmp_name, path)
+        try:
+            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+    finally:
+        if fd >= 0:
+            os.close(fd)
+        if tmp_name:
+            try:
+                os.unlink(tmp_name)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
     return path
 
 

tests/test_harvest_safety.py

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from enroll.capture import capture_file
+from enroll.harvest import harvest
+from enroll.harvest_types import ExcludedFile, ManagedFile
+from enroll.ignore import FileInspection, IgnorePolicy
+from enroll.manifest_safety import prepare_manifest_output_dir
+from enroll.harvest_safety import OutputSafetyError, prepare_new_private_dir
+from enroll.pathfilter import PathFilter
+
+
+class _RacePolicy(IgnorePolicy):
+    def inspect_file(self, path: str):
+        fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0))
+        try:
+            st = os.fstat(fd)
+            data = os.read(fd, st.st_size)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+        Path(path).write_bytes(b"changed-after-inspection")
+        return None, FileInspection(data=data, stat_result=st)
+
+
+def test_prepare_new_private_dir_refuses_existing_path(tmp_path: Path):
+    out = tmp_path / "bundle"
+    out.mkdir()
+    with pytest.raises(OutputSafetyError, match="already exists"):
+        prepare_new_private_dir(out, label="harvest output")
+
+
+def test_prepare_new_private_dir_creates_0700(tmp_path: Path):
+    out = prepare_new_private_dir(tmp_path / "bundle", label="harvest output")
+    assert out.exists()
+    assert (out.stat().st_mode & 0o777) == 0o700
+
+
+def test_harvest_refuses_existing_plaintext_output_dir(tmp_path: Path):
+    out = tmp_path / "bundle"
+    out.mkdir()
+    with pytest.raises(OutputSafetyError, match="already exists"):
+        harvest(str(out))
+
+
+def test_manifest_output_dir_is_private_by_default(tmp_path: Path):
+    out = prepare_manifest_output_dir(tmp_path / "manifest")
+    assert (out.stat().st_mode & 0o777) == 0o700
+
+
+def test_capture_file_writes_inspected_bytes_not_later_source(tmp_path: Path):
+    source = tmp_path / "source.conf"
+    source.write_bytes(b"safe-original")
+    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
+    bundle.mkdir()
+
+    managed: list[ManagedFile] = []
+    excluded: list[ExcludedFile] = []
+    ok = capture_file(
+        bundle_dir=str(bundle),
+        role_name="role",
+        abs_path=str(source),
+        reason="test",
+        policy=_RacePolicy(),
+        path_filter=PathFilter(),
+        managed_out=managed,
+        excluded_out=excluded,
+    )
+
+    assert ok is True
+    artifact = bundle / "artifacts" / "role" / str(source).lstrip("/")
+    assert artifact.read_bytes() == b"safe-original"
+    assert source.read_bytes() == b"changed-after-inspection"
+
+
+def test_capture_file_rejects_symlink_source_with_ignore_policy(tmp_path: Path):
+    target = tmp_path / "target.conf"
+    target.write_text("safe=true\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    link = tmp_path / "link.conf"
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
+    bundle.mkdir()
+
+    managed: list[ManagedFile] = []
+    excluded: list[ExcludedFile] = []
+    ok = capture_file(
+        bundle_dir=str(bundle),
+        role_name="role",
+        abs_path=str(link),
+        reason="test",
+        policy=IgnorePolicy(),
+        path_filter=PathFilter(),
+        managed_out=managed,
+        excluded_out=excluded,
+    )
+
+    assert ok is False
+    assert managed == []
+    assert excluded and excluded[0].reason == "not_regular_file"
+
+
+def test_prepare_new_private_dir_rejects_symlink_parent(tmp_path: Path):
+    real = tmp_path / "real"
+    real.mkdir()
+    link = tmp_path / "link"
+    link.symlink_to(real, target_is_directory=True)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OutputSafetyError, match="parent path contains a symlink"):
+        prepare_new_private_dir(link / "bundle", label="harvest output")

tests/test_ignore.py

@@ -282,3 +282,27 @@ def test_deny_reason_shadow_backup():
     pol = IgnorePolicy()
     assert pol.deny_reason("/etc/shadow-") == "backup_file"
     assert pol.deny_reason("/etc/passwd-") == "backup_file"
+
+
+def test_detects_encrypted_private_key_marker(tmp_path):
+    p = tmp_path / "key.pem"
+    p.write_text(
+        "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\nabc\n-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    assert IgnorePolicy().deny_reason(str(p)) == "sensitive_content"
+
+
+def test_detects_pgp_private_key_marker(tmp_path):
+    p = tmp_path / "pgp.asc"
+    p.write_text(
+        "-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\nabc\n-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    assert IgnorePolicy().deny_reason(str(p)) == "sensitive_content"
+
+
+def test_secret_scan_reads_whole_file_under_size_cap(tmp_path):
+    p = tmp_path / "large.conf"
+    p.write_bytes(b"A" * 70_000 + b"\nlate_token = abc123\n")
+    assert IgnorePolicy().deny_reason(str(p)) == "sensitive_content"