from __future__ import annotations

import os
from pathlib import Path

import pytest

from enroll.manifest_safety import (
    ArtifactSafetyError,
    ManifestOutputError,
    copy_safe_artifact_file,
    freeze_directory_bundle,
    iter_safe_artifact_files,
    prepare_manifest_output_dir,
    safe_artifact_file,
    validate_site_fqdn,
)


def test_validate_site_fqdn_accepts_and_normalises_simple_values():
    assert validate_site_fqdn(None) is None
    assert validate_site_fqdn("  ") is None
    assert validate_site_fqdn("host_1.example") == "host_1.example"


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "value", ["../host", "host/name", "host\\name", "host\nname", "-bad", ".", ".."]
)
def test_validate_site_fqdn_rejects_path_or_inventory_injection(value: str):
    with pytest.raises(ManifestOutputError):
        validate_site_fqdn(value)


def test_prepare_manifest_output_dir_allows_existing_clean_tree_in_site_mode(
    tmp_path: Path,
):
    out = tmp_path / "site"
    out.mkdir()
    # Match Enroll's root-run output safety expectations regardless of the
    # ambient CI/container umask.
    out.chmod(0o700)
    (out / ".git").mkdir()
    (out / ".git").chmod(0o700)
    (out / ".git" / "ignored-link").symlink_to(tmp_path, target_is_directory=True)

    assert prepare_manifest_output_dir(out, allow_existing=True) == out


def test_prepare_manifest_output_dir_rejects_existing_tree_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
    out = tmp_path / "site"
    out.mkdir()
    # Keep the root-safety check from masking the specific symlink assertion on
    # Forgejo/Docker hosts that run with umask 0002.
    out.chmod(0o700)
    (out / "bad-link").symlink_to(tmp_path, target_is_directory=True)

    with pytest.raises(ManifestOutputError, match="contains a symlink"):
        prepare_manifest_output_dir(out, allow_existing=True)


def test_safe_artifact_file_accepts_regular_file_and_copy(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
    artifact = bundle / "artifacts" / "role" / "etc" / "app.conf"
    artifact.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
    artifact.write_text("managed=true\n", encoding="utf-8")

    assert safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "etc/app.conf") == artifact

    dst = tmp_path / "copy.conf"
    copy_safe_artifact_file(artifact, dst)
    assert dst.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "managed=true\n"


def test_safe_artifact_file_rejects_unsafe_role_and_src(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="must be relative"):
        safe_artifact_file(bundle, "/role", "file")
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="unsafe path component"):
        safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "../file")
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="NUL"):
        safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "bad\x00file")


def test_safe_artifact_file_rejects_artifacts_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
    bundle.mkdir()
    (bundle / "artifacts").symlink_to(tmp_path, target_is_directory=True)

    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="artifacts directory is a symlink"):
        safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "file")


def test_safe_artifact_file_rejects_bad_artifact_kinds(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
    role_dir = bundle / "artifacts" / "role"
    role_dir.mkdir(parents=True)

    target = role_dir / "target"
    target.write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
    (role_dir / "link").symlink_to(target)
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="symlink"):
        safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "link")

    (role_dir / "dir-artifact").mkdir()
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="not a regular file"):
        safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "dir-artifact")

    hardlink = role_dir / "hardlink"
    os.link(target, hardlink)
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="hardlinked"):
        safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "target")


def test_iter_safe_artifact_files_handles_missing_and_bad_role_dirs(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
    assert list(iter_safe_artifact_files(bundle, "missing")) == []

    role_file = bundle / "artifacts" / "role"
    role_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
    role_file.write_text("not a dir", encoding="utf-8")
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="not a directory"):
        list(iter_safe_artifact_files(bundle, "role"))


def test_iter_safe_artifact_files_rejects_symlink_subdir(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
    role_dir = bundle / "artifacts" / "role"
    role_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
    real = tmp_path / "real"
    real.mkdir()
    (role_dir / "linkdir").symlink_to(real, target_is_directory=True)

    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="directory is a symlink"):
        list(iter_safe_artifact_files(bundle, "role"))


def _write_bundle(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
    bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
    art = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app"
    art.mkdir(parents=True)
    (art / "app.conf").write_text("original-content\n", encoding="utf-8")
    (bundle / "state.json").write_text("{}\n", encoding="utf-8")
    return bundle


def test_freeze_directory_bundle_copies_content(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
    frozen_dir, td = freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
    try:
        frozen = Path(frozen_dir)
        assert frozen != bundle
        assert (frozen / "state.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "{}\n"
        assert (frozen / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "app.conf").read_text(
            encoding="utf-8"
        ) == "original-content\n"
        # The frozen copy is a private directory.
        mode = (Path(frozen_dir)).stat().st_mode & 0o777
        assert mode == 0o700
    finally:
        td.cleanup()


def test_freeze_directory_bundle_is_immutable_after_source_swap(tmp_path: Path):
    """The core TOCTOU regression: mutating the source after freezing must not
    change what a consumer reads, and must not let a post-freeze symlink redirect
    reads to a secret."""
    bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
    art_file = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "app.conf"

    frozen_dir, td = freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
    try:
        secret = tmp_path / "secret"
        secret.write_text("TOP-SECRET\n", encoding="utf-8")

        # Attacker swaps the validated regular file for a symlink to a secret and
        # also rewrites another path's content. None of this may affect the frozen
        # copy the consumer actually uses.
        art_file.unlink()
        art_file.symlink_to(secret)

        frozen_file = (
            Path(frozen_dir) / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "app.conf"
        )
        assert not frozen_file.is_symlink()
        assert frozen_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "original-content\n"
        assert "TOP-SECRET" not in frozen_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
    finally:
        td.cleanup()


def test_freeze_directory_bundle_rejects_symlinked_file(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
    secret = tmp_path / "secret"
    secret.write_text("secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
    # A bundle that already contains a symlinked artifact at freeze time is
    # rejected outright rather than silently following it.
    link = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "link.conf"
    link.symlink_to(secret)
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="symlink"):
        freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)


def test_freeze_directory_bundle_rejects_symlinked_subdir(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
    outside = tmp_path / "outside"
    outside.mkdir()
    (outside / "x.conf").write_text("x\n", encoding="utf-8")
    (bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "linkdir").symlink_to(
        outside, target_is_directory=True
    )
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="symlink"):
        freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)


def test_freeze_directory_bundle_rejects_hardlinked_file(tmp_path: Path):
    bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
    secret = tmp_path / "secret"
    secret.write_text("secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
    hard = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "hard.conf"
    os.link(secret, hard)
    with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="hardlink"):
        freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)


def test_freeze_directory_bundle_fails_loudly_on_unreadable_subdir(tmp_path: Path):
    """An unreadable subtree must abort the freeze, not silently truncate it.

    Regression test: os.walk() defaults to swallowing directory-listing errors,
    which previously produced a partial frozen bundle with no error. The freeze
    now passes onerror= so a PermissionError aborts with ArtifactSafetyError.
    """
    if os.geteuid() == 0:
        pytest.skip("root can read 0000 directories; cannot simulate the case")

    bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
    locked = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app"
    assert locked.is_dir()
    os.chmod(locked, 0o000)
    try:
        with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="could not be fully read"):
            freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
    finally:
        # Restore perms so tmp_path cleanup can remove the tree.
        os.chmod(locked, 0o755)


class _FakeStat:
    """Minimal stat_result stand-in so interior-dir tests can control uid/mode
    independently of the CI runner's real uid and umask."""

    def __init__(self, real_st, *, uid: int, mode_bits: int | None = None):
        self.st_mode = real_st.st_mode if mode_bits is None else mode_bits
        self.st_uid = uid
        self.st_gid = getattr(real_st, "st_gid", 0)


def _patch_lstat(monkeypatch, ms, *, uid_for, mode_for=None):
    """Patch Path.lstat so directories report a chosen uid / mode.

    ``uid_for(path) -> int`` and optional ``mode_for(path) -> int|None`` let a
    test simulate a non-root-owned or writable interior directory without
    needing real root privileges.
    """
    real_lstat = ms.Path.lstat

    def fake_lstat(self):
        st = real_lstat(self)
        mode = None
        if mode_for is not None:
            mode = mode_for(self)
        return _FakeStat(st, uid=uid_for(self), mode_bits=mode)

    monkeypatch.setattr(ms.Path, "lstat", fake_lstat)


def test_existing_site_tree_rejects_world_writable_interior_dir_as_root(
    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
):
    """Root-run site merge must refuse an attacker-writable interior directory.

    A symlink-only scan is insufficient: an unprivileged owner of a
    group/other-writable directory inside the output tree can plant files or a
    symlink after the scan and race the merge. Under root, such a directory is
    rejected up front.
    """
    import enroll.manifest_safety as ms

    out = tmp_path / "site"
    out.mkdir()
    (out / "roles").mkdir()

    interior = (out / "roles").resolve()

    monkeypatch.setattr(ms, "_effective_uid", lambda: 0)
    # Everything root-owned; the interior "roles" dir is world-writable.
    _patch_lstat(
        monkeypatch,
        ms,
        uid_for=lambda p: 0,
        mode_for=lambda p: (0o40777 if Path(p).resolve() == interior else 0o40700),
    )
    with pytest.raises(ManifestOutputError, match="group/other-writable"):
        ms._assert_no_output_symlinks(out)


def test_existing_site_tree_rejects_non_root_owned_interior_dir_as_root(
    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
):
    """Root-run site merge must refuse an interior directory owned by another
    (unprivileged) user, even if it is not itself writable by group/other."""
    import enroll.manifest_safety as ms

    out = tmp_path / "site"
    out.mkdir()
    (out / "roles").mkdir()

    interior = (out / "roles").resolve()

    monkeypatch.setattr(ms, "_effective_uid", lambda: 0)
    _patch_lstat(
        monkeypatch,
        ms,
        uid_for=lambda p: (1000 if Path(p).resolve() == interior else 0),
        mode_for=lambda p: 0o40755,
    )
    with pytest.raises(ManifestOutputError, match="not owned by root"):
        ms._assert_no_output_symlinks(out)


def test_existing_site_tree_allows_clean_root_owned_interior_as_root(
    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
):
    """A clean, root-owned, non-writable interior tree passes the merge check."""
    import enroll.manifest_safety as ms

    out = tmp_path / "site"
    out.mkdir()
    (out / "roles").mkdir()
    (out / "roles" / "svc").mkdir()

    monkeypatch.setattr(ms, "_effective_uid", lambda: 0)
    _patch_lstat(
        monkeypatch,
        ms,
        uid_for=lambda p: 0,
        mode_for=lambda p: 0o40755,
    )
    # No exception: root-owned, not group/other-writable.
    ms._assert_no_output_symlinks(out)


def test_existing_site_tree_interior_check_is_noop_for_non_root(
    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
):
    """Non-root runs keep the original symlink-only semantics (no ownership or
    writability enforcement), so ordinary user workflows are unaffected."""
    import enroll.manifest_safety as ms

    out = tmp_path / "site"
    out.mkdir()
    (out / "roles").mkdir()
    (out / "roles").chmod(0o777)

    monkeypatch.setattr(ms, "_effective_uid", lambda: 1000)
    # No exception: interior writability is irrelevant when not running as root.
    ms._assert_no_output_symlinks(out)