enroll

History

Miguel Jacq 5bf247c485 All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 41s Details CI / test (almalinux, docker.io/library/almalinux:9, python3.11) (push) Successful in 9m2s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 13m39s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 39s Details * Security: keep sudo-created remote harvest bundles root-owned while root packages and hashes them, expose only the archive to the authenticated SSH uid, and verify the root-computed digest after download. This removes the post-harvest tampering window created by recursively chowning the bundle before packaging without making the plaintext archive world-readable. * Security: enforce tar member limits while lazily parsing untrusted archives rather than after `TarFile.getmembers()` has already indexed the entire archive; count repeated `.` entries and cap remote compressed downloads as well. * Security: apply aggregate byte and total filesystem-entry limits when freezing directory harvest bundles, reject symlinked bundle roots, and abort when files or discovered directories change during the copy, so direct directory inputs remain bounded and fail closed under mutation.		2026-07-13 10:15:43 +10:00
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source	Debian packaging	2025-12-15 13:33:56 +11:00
changelog	* Security: keep sudo-created remote harvest bundles root-owned while root packages and hashes them, expose only the archive to the authenticated SSH uid, and verify the root-computed digest after download. This removes the post-harvest tampering window created by recursively chowning the bundle before packaging without making the plaintext archive world-readable.	2026-07-13 10:15:43 +10:00
control	Introduce 'enroll validate' to check a harvest meets the schema spec and isn't lacking artifacts or contains orphaned ones	2026-01-05 21:17:50 +11:00
rules	Debian packaging	2025-12-15 13:33:56 +11:00