237 lines
8.7 KiB
Python
237 lines
8.7 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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from enroll.manifest_safety import (
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ArtifactSafetyError,
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ManifestOutputError,
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copy_safe_artifact_file,
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freeze_directory_bundle,
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iter_safe_artifact_files,
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prepare_manifest_output_dir,
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safe_artifact_file,
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validate_site_fqdn,
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)
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def test_validate_site_fqdn_accepts_and_normalises_simple_values():
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assert validate_site_fqdn(None) is None
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assert validate_site_fqdn(" ") is None
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assert validate_site_fqdn("host_1.example") == "host_1.example"
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"value", ["../host", "host/name", "host\\name", "host\nname", "-bad", ".", ".."]
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)
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def test_validate_site_fqdn_rejects_path_or_inventory_injection(value: str):
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with pytest.raises(ManifestOutputError):
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validate_site_fqdn(value)
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def test_prepare_manifest_output_dir_allows_existing_clean_tree_in_site_mode(
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tmp_path: Path,
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):
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out = tmp_path / "site"
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out.mkdir()
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(out / ".git").mkdir()
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(out / ".git" / "ignored-link").symlink_to(tmp_path, target_is_directory=True)
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assert prepare_manifest_output_dir(out, allow_existing=True) == out
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def test_prepare_manifest_output_dir_rejects_existing_tree_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
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out = tmp_path / "site"
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out.mkdir()
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(out / "bad-link").symlink_to(tmp_path, target_is_directory=True)
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with pytest.raises(ManifestOutputError, match="contains a symlink"):
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prepare_manifest_output_dir(out, allow_existing=True)
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def test_safe_artifact_file_accepts_regular_file_and_copy(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
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artifact = bundle / "artifacts" / "role" / "etc" / "app.conf"
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artifact.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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artifact.write_text("managed=true\n", encoding="utf-8")
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assert safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "etc/app.conf") == artifact
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dst = tmp_path / "copy.conf"
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copy_safe_artifact_file(artifact, dst)
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assert dst.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "managed=true\n"
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def test_safe_artifact_file_rejects_unsafe_role_and_src(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="must be relative"):
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safe_artifact_file(bundle, "/role", "file")
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="unsafe path component"):
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safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "../file")
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="NUL"):
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safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "bad\x00file")
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def test_safe_artifact_file_rejects_artifacts_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
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bundle.mkdir()
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(bundle / "artifacts").symlink_to(tmp_path, target_is_directory=True)
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="artifacts directory is a symlink"):
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safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "file")
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def test_safe_artifact_file_rejects_bad_artifact_kinds(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
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role_dir = bundle / "artifacts" / "role"
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role_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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target = role_dir / "target"
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target.write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
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(role_dir / "link").symlink_to(target)
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="symlink"):
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safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "link")
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(role_dir / "dir-artifact").mkdir()
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="not a regular file"):
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safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "dir-artifact")
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hardlink = role_dir / "hardlink"
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os.link(target, hardlink)
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="hardlinked"):
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safe_artifact_file(bundle, "role", "target")
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def test_iter_safe_artifact_files_handles_missing_and_bad_role_dirs(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
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assert list(iter_safe_artifact_files(bundle, "missing")) == []
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role_file = bundle / "artifacts" / "role"
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role_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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role_file.write_text("not a dir", encoding="utf-8")
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="not a directory"):
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list(iter_safe_artifact_files(bundle, "role"))
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def test_iter_safe_artifact_files_rejects_symlink_subdir(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
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role_dir = bundle / "artifacts" / "role"
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role_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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real = tmp_path / "real"
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real.mkdir()
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(role_dir / "linkdir").symlink_to(real, target_is_directory=True)
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="directory is a symlink"):
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list(iter_safe_artifact_files(bundle, "role"))
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def _write_bundle(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
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bundle = tmp_path / "bundle"
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art = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app"
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art.mkdir(parents=True)
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(art / "app.conf").write_text("original-content\n", encoding="utf-8")
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(bundle / "state.json").write_text("{}\n", encoding="utf-8")
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return bundle
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def test_freeze_directory_bundle_copies_content(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
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frozen_dir, td = freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
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try:
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frozen = Path(frozen_dir)
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assert frozen != bundle
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assert (frozen / "state.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "{}\n"
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assert (frozen / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "app.conf").read_text(
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encoding="utf-8"
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) == "original-content\n"
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# The frozen copy is a private directory.
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mode = (Path(frozen_dir)).stat().st_mode & 0o777
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assert mode == 0o700
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finally:
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td.cleanup()
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def test_freeze_directory_bundle_is_immutable_after_source_swap(tmp_path: Path):
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"""The core TOCTOU regression: mutating the source after freezing must not
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change what a consumer reads, and must not let a post-freeze symlink redirect
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reads to a secret."""
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bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
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art_file = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "app.conf"
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frozen_dir, td = freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
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try:
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secret = tmp_path / "secret"
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secret.write_text("TOP-SECRET\n", encoding="utf-8")
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# Attacker swaps the validated regular file for a symlink to a secret and
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# also rewrites another path's content. None of this may affect the frozen
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# copy the consumer actually uses.
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art_file.unlink()
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art_file.symlink_to(secret)
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frozen_file = (
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Path(frozen_dir) / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "app.conf"
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)
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assert not frozen_file.is_symlink()
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assert frozen_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "original-content\n"
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assert "TOP-SECRET" not in frozen_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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finally:
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td.cleanup()
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def test_freeze_directory_bundle_rejects_symlinked_file(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
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secret = tmp_path / "secret"
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secret.write_text("secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
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# A bundle that already contains a symlinked artifact at freeze time is
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# rejected outright rather than silently following it.
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link = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "link.conf"
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link.symlink_to(secret)
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="symlink"):
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freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
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def test_freeze_directory_bundle_rejects_symlinked_subdir(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
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outside = tmp_path / "outside"
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outside.mkdir()
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(outside / "x.conf").write_text("x\n", encoding="utf-8")
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(bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "linkdir").symlink_to(
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outside, target_is_directory=True
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)
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="symlink"):
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freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
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def test_freeze_directory_bundle_rejects_hardlinked_file(tmp_path: Path):
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bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
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secret = tmp_path / "secret"
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secret.write_text("secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
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hard = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app" / "hard.conf"
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os.link(secret, hard)
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="hardlink"):
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freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
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def test_freeze_directory_bundle_fails_loudly_on_unreadable_subdir(tmp_path: Path):
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"""An unreadable subtree must abort the freeze, not silently truncate it.
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Regression test: os.walk() defaults to swallowing directory-listing errors,
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which previously produced a partial frozen bundle with no error. The freeze
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now passes onerror= so a PermissionError aborts with ArtifactSafetyError.
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"""
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if os.geteuid() == 0:
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pytest.skip("root can read 0000 directories; cannot simulate the case")
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bundle = _write_bundle(tmp_path)
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locked = bundle / "artifacts" / "app" / "etc" / "app"
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assert locked.is_dir()
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os.chmod(locked, 0o000)
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try:
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with pytest.raises(ArtifactSafetyError, match="could not be fully read"):
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freeze_directory_bundle(bundle)
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finally:
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# Restore perms so tmp_path cleanup can remove the tree.
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os.chmod(locked, 0o755)
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