enroll/tests/test_markdown_sanitize.py
Miguel Jacq e72044b610
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Ensure markdown README gets sanitised
2026-06-30 12:11:48 +10:00

87 lines
3.2 KiB
Python

"""Security regression: harvested values embedded in the generated Ansible
``README.md`` must be neutralised so an attacker-influenceable host name, file
path, or note cannot inject Markdown structure (a forged heading, deceptive
link/command block) or a terminal escape sequence into the documentation.
Harvested values are not executed by Ansible, but the README is the
human-readable summary an operator reads before applying a manifest, so a value
that breaks out of its surrounding list item / inline code span and forges
document structure is misleading and must be prevented.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from enroll.cm import (
markdown_list,
sanitize_markdown_text,
snapshot_excluded_lines,
snapshot_note_lines,
)
def test_sanitize_collapses_newlines_and_strips_controls():
# A newline would let a value break out of its Markdown line; a backtick
# would close an inline code span; ESC/BEL are terminal escape vectors.
payload = "host`\n## Injected\n[x](http://evil)\n`y\x1b[31mRED\x07\ttab"
out = sanitize_markdown_text(payload)
assert "\n" not in out and "\r" not in out
assert "`" not in out # backticks replaced so a code span cannot be closed
assert "\x1b" not in out and "\x07" not in out # control bytes stripped
# The visible text is preserved on a single line (heading marker is now inert
# because it no longer starts a line).
assert "## Injected" in out
assert "http://evil" in out
def test_sanitize_is_idempotent_and_handles_non_str():
once = sanitize_markdown_text("a\nb")
assert sanitize_markdown_text(once) == once
assert sanitize_markdown_text(1234) == "1234"
assert sanitize_markdown_text(None) == "None"
def test_markdown_list_does_not_gain_extra_lines_from_payload():
# Even if a pre-composed line still contained a newline, markdown_list must
# not emit more bullets than it was given.
out = markdown_list(["clean line", "two\nlines should be one bullet"])
# Two input items -> at most two leading "- " bullets.
assert out.count("\n- ") <= 1
def test_snapshot_note_lines_neutralises_injected_note():
roles = {
"etc_custom": {
"role_name": "etc_custom",
"notes": ["benign`\n## PWNED\n- fake bullet\x1b[5m"],
}
}
lines = snapshot_note_lines(roles)
assert len(lines) == 1
line = lines[0]
# The role name code span is intact; the payload is folded onto one line
# with backticks and control bytes removed.
assert line.startswith("`etc_custom`: ")
assert "\n" not in line
assert "\x1b" not in line
# Only the (structural) backticks around the role name remain -- the
# payload's backtick was neutralised.
assert line.count("`") == 2
def test_snapshot_excluded_lines_neutralises_injected_path():
roles = {
"etc_custom": {
"role_name": "etc_custom",
"excluded": [
{"path": "/etc/`\n## fake-heading\nx", "reason": "denied_path"}
],
}
}
lines = snapshot_excluded_lines(roles)
assert len(lines) == 1
line = lines[0]
assert "\n" not in line
assert line.startswith("`etc_custom`: ")
assert line.count("`") == 2 # only the structural role-name span
assert "(denied_path)" in line