diff --git a/.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml b/.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml index 67c69d3..d503028 100644 --- a/.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml @@ -7,14 +7,6 @@ jobs: test: runs-on: docker - strategy: - fail-fast: false - matrix: - include: - - distro: debian - image: docker.io/library/debian:13 - python: python3 - steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@v4 @@ -25,29 +17,13 @@ jobs: DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3-venv pipx - name: Install Poetry - env: - PYTHON_BIN: ${{ matrix.python }} - POETRY_VERSION: "2.4.1" run: | - set -eux - if ! command -v pipx >/dev/null 2>&1; then - "${PYTHON_BIN}" -m pip install --user pipx - fi - PIPX_BIN="$(command -v pipx || true)" - if [ -z "${PIPX_BIN}" ]; then - PIPX_BIN="${HOME}/.local/bin/pipx" - fi - "${PIPX_BIN}" install --python "${PYTHON_BIN}" "poetry==${POETRY_VERSION}" + pipx install poetry==1.8.3 + /root/.local/bin/poetry --version echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH" - export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" - poetry --version - poetry --version | grep -E "Poetry \(version 2\." - name: Install project deps (including test extras) - env: - PYTHON_BIN: ${{ matrix.python }} run: | - poetry env use "${PYTHON_BIN}" poetry install --with dev - name: Run test script diff --git a/Dockerfile.debbuild b/Dockerfile.debbuild index 35ffc7b..8d185b1 100644 --- a/Dockerfile.debbuild +++ b/Dockerfile.debbuild @@ -61,23 +61,6 @@ rsync -a --delete \ "${SRC}/" "${WORK}/" cd "${WORK}" - -# This project's pyproject.toml uses the PEP 621 [project] table, which needs -# poetry-core >= 2.0. Debian bookworm and Ubuntu jammy/noble ship an older -# poetry-core that cannot parse it. On those, swap in the legacy Poetry 1.x -# formatted metadata (kept in sync at pyproject.poetry1.toml) for the build. -# trixie and newer ship poetry-core 2.x and keep the PEP 621 file. -if [ -f pyproject.poetry1.toml ]; then - core_ver="$(python3 -c 'import poetry.core as c; print(c.__version__)' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" - core_major="${core_ver%%.*}" - if [ "${core_major:-0}" -lt 2 ]; then - echo "poetry-core ${core_ver} < 2.0: using legacy pyproject.poetry1.toml" - cp pyproject.poetry1.toml pyproject.toml - else - echo "poetry-core ${core_ver} >= 2.0: using PEP 621 pyproject.toml" - fi -fi - if [ -n "${SUITE:-}" ]; then export DEBEMAIL="mig@mig5.net" export DEBFULLNAME="Miguel Jacq" diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 5e104f3..0e0ad48 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -4,134 +4,55 @@ JinjaTurtle logo -JinjaTurtle is a command-line tool that helps turn existing native -configuration files into reusable configuration-management templates. - -By default it generates: - -- a **Jinja2** template; and -- an **Ansible defaults YAML** file containing the variables used by that - template. - -JinjaTurtle does not try to replace configuration-management tools. Its job is -to speed up the boring first pass: take a real config file, discover the values -inside it, replace those values with variables, and write the corresponding -variable data beside the template. +JinjaTurtle is a command-line tool to help you generate Jinja2 templates and +Ansible inventory from a native configuration file (or files) of a piece of +software. ## How it works -JinjaTurtle examines a source config file and keeps the original structure as -much as possible. + * The config file(s) is/are examined + * Parameter key names are generated based on the parameter names in the + config file. In keeping with Ansible best practices, you pass a prefix + for the key names, which should typically match the name of your Ansible + role. + * A Jinja2 file is generated from the file with those parameter key names + injected as the `{{ variable }}` names. + * An Ansible inventory YAML file is generated with those key names and the + *values* taken from the original config file as the default vars. -For the default Jinja2/Ansible mode: - -1. The config file is parsed. -2. Variable names are generated from the config keys and paths. -3. Those variable names are prefixed with `--role-name`, which should usually - match your Ansible role name. -4. A Jinja2 template is generated with values replaced by `{{ variable }}` - expressions. -5. An Ansible defaults YAML file is generated with those variables and the - original values. - -By default, the generated variable data and template are printed to stdout. Use -`--defaults-output` and `--template-output` to write them to files. - -## Jinja2 / Ansible example - -Say you have a `php.ini` file and you are inside an Ansible role with -`defaults/` and `templates/` directories: - -```shell -jinjaturtle php.ini \ - --role-name php \ - --defaults-output defaults/main.yml \ - --template-output templates/php.ini.j2 -``` - -Given a source value such as: - -```ini -memory_limit = 256M -``` - -JinjaTurtle will produce a template value like: - -```jinja2 -memory_limit = {{ php_memory_limit }} -``` - -and defaults data like: - -```yaml -php_memory_limit: 256M -``` +By default, the Jinja2 template and the Ansible inventory are printed to +stdout. However, it is possible to output the results to new files. ## What sort of config files can it handle? -JinjaTurtle supports common structured and semi-structured config formats: +TOML, YAML, INI, JSON and XML-style config files should be okay. There are always +going to be some edge cases in very complex files that are difficult to work +with, though, so you may still find that you need to tweak the results. -- TOML -- YAML -- INI-style files -- JSON -- XML -- Postfix `main.cf` -- systemd unit files, such as `*.service`, `*.socket`, `*.timer`, and related - unit types -- OpenSSH-style config files, including `ssh_config`, `sshd_config`, and common - `*.conf` snippets detected as SSH config +For XML and YAML files, JinjaTurtle will attempt to generate 'for' loops +and lists in the Ansible yaml if the config file looks homogenous enough to +support it. However, if it lacks the confidence in this, it will fall back to +using scalar-style flattened attributes. -For ambiguous extensions such as `*.conf`, JinjaTurtle uses lightweight content -sniffing. You can always force a handler with `--format`. +You may need or wish to tidy up the config to suit your needs. -For YAML, XML, TOML, INI-style, and other supported structured files, -JinjaTurtle will attempt to generate loops when a repeated structure looks -homogeneous enough. If it is not confident, it falls back to flattened scalar -variables. - -Some very complex files will still need manual cleanup. The goal is to speed up -conversion into Jinja2 templates, not to guarantee a perfect final module without -review. - -## JSON, quoting, and type preservation - -JinjaTurtle tries to preserve rendered config types. - -For JSON, it uses JSON-aware expressions rather than plain string substitution. -This avoids generating invalid JSON such as: - -```json -{"enabled": True} -``` - -when the correct rendered JSON should be: - -```json -{"enabled": true} -``` - -This uses Ansible-style JSON filters. +The goal here is really to *speed up* converting files into Ansible/Jinja2, +but not necessarily to make it perfect. ## Can I convert multiple files at once? -Yes. Pass a directory instead of a single file and JinjaTurtle will convert the -files it understands in that directory. +Certainly! Pass the folder name instead of a specific file name, and JinjaTurtle +will convert any files it understands in that folder, storing all the various +vars in the destination defaults yaml file, and converting each file into a +Jinja2 template per file type. -```shell -jinjaturtle ./config-dir \ - --role-name myrole \ - --defaults-output defaults/main.yml \ - --template-output templates/ -``` +If all the files had the same 'type', there'll be one Jinja2 template. -Use `--recursive` to recurse into subdirectories. +You can also pass `--recursive` to recurse into subfolders. -In folder mode, variables for multiple files of the same type are grouped under -an `items`-style structure in the generated YAML so that the resulting templates -can be used with loops in Ansible. - -For example: +Note: when using 'folder' mode and multiple files of the same type, their vars +will be listed under an 'items' parent key in the yaml, each with an `id` key. +You'll then want to use a `loop` in Ansible later, e.g: ```yaml - name: Render configs @@ -172,9 +93,9 @@ sudo dnf upgrade --refresh sudo dnf install jinjaturtle ``` -### From PyPI +### From PyPi -```bash +``` pip install jinjaturtle ``` @@ -182,97 +103,61 @@ pip install jinjaturtle Clone the repo and then run inside the clone: -```bash +``` poetry install ``` +### AppImage + +Download the AppImage from the Releases and make it executable, and put it +on your `$PATH`. + +## How to run it + +Say you have a `php.ini` file and you are in a directory structure like an +Ansible role (with subfolders `defaults` and `templates`): + +```shell +jinjaturtle php.ini \ + --role-name php \ + --defaults-output defaults/main.yml \ + --template-output templates/php.ini.j2 +``` + ## Full usage info -```text -usage: jinjaturtle [-h] [-r ROLE_NAME] [--recursive] - [-f {ini,json,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd,ssh}] - [-d DEFAULTS_OUTPUT] [-t TEMPLATE_OUTPUT] - config +``` +usage: jinjaturtle [-h] -r ROLE_NAME [-f {json,ini,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd}] [-d DEFAULTS_OUTPUT] [-t TEMPLATE_OUTPUT] config -Convert a config file into an Ansible defaults file and Jinja2 template. +Convert a config file into Ansible inventory and a Jinja2 template. positional arguments: - config Path to a config file OR a folder containing supported - config files. Supported: .toml, .yaml/.yml, .json, - .ini/.cfg/.conf, .xml, ssh_config/sshd_config + config Path to the source configuration file. options: -h, --help show this help message and exit -r, --role-name ROLE_NAME - Role name / variable prefix. In Jinja2 mode this is - usually the Ansible role name. Defaults to jinjaturtle. - --recursive When CONFIG is a folder, recurse into subfolders. - -f, --format {ini,json,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd,ssh} - Force config format instead of auto-detecting from - filename. + Ansible role name, used as variable prefix (e.g. cometbft). + -f, --format {ini,json,toml,xml} + Force config format instead of auto-detecting from filename. -d, --defaults-output DEFAULTS_OUTPUT - Path to write the generated variable YAML. If omitted, - it is printed to stdout. + Path to write defaults/main.yml. If omitted, default vars are printed to stdout. -t, --template-output TEMPLATE_OUTPUT - Path to write the generated config template. If omitted, - it is printed to stdout. + Path to write the Jinja2 config template. If omitted, template is printed to stdout. ``` ## Additional supported formats -JinjaTurtle also templates some common bespoke config formats: +JinjaTurtle can also template some common "bespoke" config formats: - **Postfix main.cf** (`main.cf`) → `--format postfix` - **systemd unit files** (`*.service`, `*.socket`, etc.) → `--format systemd` -- **OpenSSH config** (`ssh_config`, `sshd_config`, and detected snippets) → - `--format ssh` -For ambiguous extensions like `*.conf`, JinjaTurtle uses lightweight content -sniffing. You can always force a specific handler with `--format`. - -## Security model - -JinjaTurtle is frequently pointed at config files that were *harvested* from -real systems, where some content may be influenced by an untrusted party (a -hostname, a login banner, a `GECOS` comment, a "Managed by ..." note). It is -therefore designed so that source content cannot turn into executable template -code. - -Two guarantees matter: - -1. **Values are data, never code.** Every config *value* is replaced with a - `{{ variable }}` placeholder in the template, and the original value is stored - separately in the defaults data. When the template is later rendered, - the placeholder prints the value as a literal string; Jinja2 does not - recursively render the *contents* of a variable, so a payload sitting inside - a value is inert. - -2. **Verbatim text is neutralised.** To preserve formatting, JinjaTurtle copies - comments, blank lines, headers and any unrecognised lines from the source - into the template. Any template metacharacters in that copied text - (`{{ }}`, `{% %}`, `{# #}` ) are escaped so they render as the literal - characters the author wrote, rather than executing. - -### Consumer responsibilities - -The value guarantee above relies on the downstream renderer being single-pass, -which is the normal case: - -- **Ansible**: rendering a template with `template:`/`ansible.builtin.template` - is single-pass. For defence in depth, treat the generated defaults as - untrusted input — Ansible already does not re-template variable *contents* by - default. If you build your own var structures from this data and pass them - through additional templating, mark untrusted values with the `!unsafe` tag so - they are never re-evaluated. - -In short: render JinjaTurtle output exactly once. Do not feed it back through -another templating pass. - -**IMPORTANT**: Always review both the original config files, then the resulting -templates generated by JinjaTurtle, before integrating them into your config -management system! +For ambiguous extensions like `*.conf`, JinjaTurtle uses lightweight content sniffing; you can always force a specific handler via `--format`. ## Found a bug, have a suggestion? -You can e-mail me; see `pyproject.toml` for details. +You can e-mail me (see the pyproject.toml for details) or contact me on the Fediverse: + +https://goto.mig5.net/@mig5 diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog index be6b123..44d4e28 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@ -1,27 +1,3 @@ -jinjaturtle (0.7.0) unstable; urgency=medium - - * Much hardening. - - -- Miguel Jacq Sun, 5 Jul 2026 10:54:00 +1000 - -jinjaturtle (0.5.7) unstable; urgency=medium - - * More hardening measures - - -- Miguel Jacq Wed, 24 Jun 2026 16:13:00 +1000 - -jinjaturtle (0.5.6) unstable; urgency=medium - - * Try to prevent what could lead to execution of embedded jinja in original files when converting - - -- Miguel Jacq Tue, 23 Jun 2026 16:47:00 +1000 - -jinjaturtle (0.5.5) unstable; urgency=medium - - * erb support - - -- Miguel Jacq Sat, 20 Jun 2026 18:27:00 +1000 - jinjaturtle (0.5.4) unstable; urgency=medium * Make templates more faithful to the original file in terms of indentation, newlines, no deserialisation of things like < or >. diff --git a/poetry.lock b/poetry.lock index 9bfef74..bc7ba3d 100644 --- a/poetry.lock +++ b/poetry.lock @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# This file is automatically @generated by Poetry 2.4.1 and should not be changed by hand. +# This file is automatically @generated by Poetry 1.8.3 and should not be changed by hand. [[package]] name = "certifi" @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ version = "2026.6.17" description = "Python package for providing Mozilla's CA Bundle." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.7" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "certifi-2026.6.17-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:2227dcbaafe0d2f59279d1762ddddc37783ed4354594f194ffc31d20f41fc3db"}, {file = "certifi-2026.6.17.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:024c88eeec92ca068db80f02b8b07c9cef7b9fe261d1d535abfd5abd6f6af432"}, @@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ version = "3.4.7" description = "The Real First Universal Charset Detector. Open, modern and actively maintained alternative to Chardet." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.7" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "charset_normalizer-3.4.7-cp310-cp310-macosx_10_9_universal2.whl", hash = "sha256:cdd68a1fb318e290a2077696b7eb7a21a49163c455979c639bf5a5dcdc46617d"}, {file = "charset_normalizer-3.4.7-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:e17b8d5d6a8c47c85e68ca8379def1303fd360c3e22093a807cd34a71cd082b8"}, @@ -157,8 +155,6 @@ version = "0.4.6" description = "Cross-platform colored terminal text." optional = false python-versions = "!=3.0.*,!=3.1.*,!=3.2.*,!=3.3.*,!=3.4.*,!=3.5.*,!=3.6.*,>=2.7" -groups = ["dev"] -markers = "sys_platform == \"win32\"" files = [ {file = "colorama-0.4.6-py2.py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:4f1d9991f5acc0ca119f9d443620b77f9d6b33703e51011c16baf57afb285fc6"}, {file = "colorama-0.4.6.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:08695f5cb7ed6e0531a20572697297273c47b8cae5a63ffc6d6ed5c201be6e44"}, @@ -166,110 +162,124 @@ files = [ [[package]] name = "coverage" -version = "7.14.3" +version = "7.14.1" description = "Code coverage measurement for Python" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.10" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:360bec1f58e7243e3405d3bdf7a1a8115aa9b448d54dc7cd6f7b7e0e9406b62e"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:ed68faa5e85de2f3e400bc3f122e5c82735a58c8bb24b9f63a2215954ba17b2d"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:830c1fca669c572dec37ce9c838224ee45aac5be0f6961edf871e82e49d6537c"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:a64caee2193563601dbaaa55fe2dcf597debef04a2f8f1fa8a07aa4bb7ac7a1e"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:0096fd7559178f0cc9cf088f2dbd2a02ef85bacaa69732c633517286b4494610"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:6197e5a00183c11a8ce7c6abd18be1a9189fd8399084ffc95196f4f0db4f2137"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:7dfe427045520d6abca33687dfef767b4f635015893a1816c5decb12eb72ce18"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:9a3f142070eb7b82fc4085a55d887396f9c4e21250bccebe2ba22502c45b9647"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:64b2055bb6e0dc945af35cdeceb3633e6ed9273475ef3af85592410fd6803803"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:1551b4caac3e3ec9f2bfcec6bf3776e01c0edbdd2e240431a50ca1a1aac72c27"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:583d50d59142f8549470bd6390471d0fe8b8c8d69d6a0f28ac71e05380cef640"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:e0bb8a6bc7015efdf8a928753b25da1b9ca2d6f24ef04d2ee0688e486f32aae7"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:d48400185564042287dc487c1f016a3397f18ab4f4c5d5ec36edc218f7ffa35b"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp310-cp310-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:eadea7aba74e40adee867a8c0eec17b820b061d308a4b014f7a0e118c2b0aa61"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:e574801e1d643561594aa021206c46d80b257e9853087090ba97bed8b0a509d3"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:f82b6bb7d75a2613e85d07cefa3a8c973d0544a8993337f6e2728e4a1e94c305"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:a2335ea5fed26af2e831094964fa3f8fae60b45f7e37fcc2d3b615b2add3ad87"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:fbb8c3a98e779013786ae01d229662aeacbc77100efbd3f2f245219ace5af700"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:ac082660de8f429ba0ea363595abb838998570b9a7546777c60f413ab902bbde"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:8ac012839ff7e396030f1e94e10553a431d14e4de2ab65cb3acb72bbd5628ca2"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:5952f8c1bda2a5347154450379316e6dfa4d934d62ca35f6784451e6f55074fb"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:8cf0f2509acb4619e2471a1951089054dd58ebea7a912066d2ea56dd4c24ca4a"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:2e41fd3aab806770008279a93879b0924b16247e09ab537c043d08bbca53b4ab"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:f0a47095963cfe054e0df178daca95aec21e680d6076da807c3add28dfe920f7"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:a090cbf9521e78ffdb2fcf448b72902afe9f5923ff6a12d5c0d0120200348af9"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:4d310baf69a4fbe8a098ce727e4808a34866ac718a6f759ae659cbd3221358bc"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:74fdd718d88fe144f4579b8747873a07ec3f04cb837d5faec5a25d9e22fa31a8"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:cc96aa922e21d4bc5d5ed3c915cef27dfcbc13686f47d5e378d647fbfba655a2"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp311-cp311-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:c66f9f9d4f1e9712eb9b1de5310f881d4e2188cfcba5065e1a8490f38687f2c4"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-macosx_10_13_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:3d74ff26299c4879ce3a4d826f9d3d4d556fd285fde7bbce3c0ef5a8ab1cec24"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:96150a9cf3468ea20f0bc5d0e21b3df8972c31480ef90fa7614b773cc6429665"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:27d07a46500ba23515b838dbcf52512026af04090755cf6cc64166d88c9b9a1a"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:621e13c6108234d7960aaf5762ab5c3c00f33c30c15af06dcbff0c73bf112727"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:4b60ca6d8af70473491a15a343cbabab2e8f9ea66a4376e81c7aa24876a6f977"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:c90a7cdd5e380e1ce02f19792e2ac2fbfbf177e35a27e69fd3e873b30d895c0c"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:5d788e5fd55347eef06ca0732c77d04a264de67e8ff24631270cdff3767a60cf"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:62c7f79db2851c95ef020e5d28b97afde3daf9f7febcd35b53e05638f729063f"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:90f7608aeb5d9b60b523b9fb2a4ee1973867cc4865a3f26fe6c7577073b70205"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:1e3b91f9c4740aeb571ecf82e5e8d8e4ab62d34fcb5a5d4e5baa38c6f7d2857c"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:c946099774a7699de03cbd0ff0a64e21aed4525eed9d959adde4afe6d15758ef"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:16b206e521feb8b7133a45754643dead0538489cf8b783b90cf5f4e3299625fd"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:ea3169c7116eb6cdf7608c6c7da9ecfcb3da40688e3a510fac2d1d2bafd6dc35"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:7ea52fc08f007bcc494d4bb3df3851e95843d881860ba38fe2c64dc100db5e7d"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp312-cp312-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:8cec0ad652ec57790970d817490105bd917d783c2f7b38d6b58a0ca312e1a336"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-macosx_10_13_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:47968988b367990ae4ab17523790c38cd125e02c6bfd379b6022be2d40bdc38c"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:0ee68f5c34812780f3a7063382c0a9fcbb99985b7ddcdcaa626e4f3fb2e0783a"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:fa9e5c6857a7e80fa22ace5cf3550ae392bbfc322f1d8dd2d2d5a8be38cec027"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:98a0859b0e98e43e1178a9402e19c8127766b14f7109a374d976e5a62c0e5c73"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:69918344541ed9c8368566c2adc03c0e33d4550d7faa87d1b35e49b6a3286ea9"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:b7f300ac92cd4b570724c8ffbbd0c130fee298d2447f41d5a3abf58976fae1de"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:11a7ec9f97ab950f4c5af62229befc7faf208fdbc0116d3902d7e306cf2c5abd"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:a571bd889cd36c5922ce8e42e059f9d37d02301531d11374afa4c87a578625d5"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:de76caefc8deabb0dd1678b6a980be97d14c8d87e213ac194dbf8b09e96d63fb"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:d20a15c622194234161535459affa8f7905830391c9ccfa060d495dbfe3a1c7f"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:b488bd4b23397db62e7a9459129d01ff06a846582a732efd24834b24a6ada498"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:6a3693b4153394d265f44fb855fdc80e72403024d4d6f91c4871b334d028e4e0"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:338b19131ab1a6b767b462bfcbaa692e7ae22f24463e39d49b02a83410ff6b37"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:b3d77f7f196abdef7e01415de1bce09f216189e83e58159cfeef2b92d0464994"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp313-cp313-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:e6230e688c7c3e65cedd41a774eb4ec221adc6bfee13768231015b702d5e4150"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-macosx_10_15_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:605ab2b566a22bd94834529d66d295c364aba84afd3e5498285c7a524017b1fc"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:a3c2134809e80fac091bfed18a6991b5a5eb5df5ae32b17ac4f4f99864b73dd7"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:c02efd507227bde9969cab0db8f48890eb3b5dcad6afac57a4792df4133543ce"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:1bb93c2aa61d2a5b38f1526546d95cf4132cb681e541a337bf8dfd092be816e5"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:f502e948e03e866538048bba081c075caaa62e5bda6ea5b7432e45f587eb462a"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:9973ef2463f8e6cfb61a6324126bb3e17d67a85f22f58d856e583ea2e3ca6501"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:9be4e7d4c5ca0427889f8f9d614bd630c2be741b1de7699bca3b2b6c0e41003e"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:a574912f3bde4b0619f6e97d01aa590b70998859244793769eb3a6df78ee56d3"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:e343fb086c9cd780b38622fea7c369acd64c1a0724312149b5d769c387a2b1f5"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:3c68df8e61f1e09633fefc7538297145623957a048534368c9d212782aa5e845"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:3e5b550a128419373c2f6cec28a244207013ef15f5cbcff6a5ca09d1dfaaf027"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:2bfc4dd0a912329eccc7484a7d0b2a38032b38c40663b1e1ac595f10c457954b"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:0423d64c013057a06e70f070f073cec4b0cbc7d2b27f3c7007292f2ff1d52965"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:92c22e19ce64ca3f2ad751f16f14df1468b4c231bd6af97185063a9c292a0cb3"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:41de778bd41780586e2b04912079c73089ab5d839624e28db3bdb26de638da92"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-macosx_10_15_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:8427f370ca67db4c975d2a26acfc0e5783ca0b52444dbc50278ace0f35445949"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:d8e88f335544a47e22ae2e45b344772925ec65166555c958720d5ed971880891"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:beaab199b9e5ceaf5a225e16a9d4df136f2a1eae0a5c20de1e277c8a5225f388"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:b3ff255799f5a1676c71c1c32ec01fd043aa09d57b3d95764b24992757184784"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:878832eaac515b62decfa76965aed558775f86bf1fc8cca76993c0c84ae31aed"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:611e62cb9386096d81b63e0a05330750268617231e7bd598e1fe77482a2c58a5"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:02c41de2a88011b893050fc9830267d927a50a215f7ad5ec17349db7090ccf26"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:526ce9721116af23b1065089f0b75046fe521e7772ab94b641cd66b7a0421889"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:e4ed44705ca4bead6fc977a8b741f2145608289b33c8a9b42a95d0f15aedbf4d"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:2415902f385a23dcc4ccd26e0ba803249a169af6a930c003a4c715eeb9a5444e"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:b75ee850fc2d7c831e883220c445b035f2224de2ba6103f1e56dbd237ab913f7"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:dc9b4e35e7c3920e925ba7f14886fd5fbe481232754624e832ddba66c7535635"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:7b27c822a8161afbe48e99f1adfb098d270ae7e0f7d7b0555ce110529bdb69cc"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:39e1dbbb6ff2c338e0196a482558a792a1de3aa64261196f5cdb3da016ad9cda"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-cp314-cp314t-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:68520c90babfa2d560eca6d497921ed3a4f469623bd709733124491b2aa8ef3f"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:fb7e18afb6e903c1a92401a2f0501ac277dca527bb9ca6fe1f691a8a0026a0e8"}, - {file = "coverage-7.14.3.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:1a7563a443f3d53fdeb040ec8c9f7466aed7ca3dc5891aa09d3ca3625fa4387f"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:3e3680291c4a1d0dadfa84a2c459576a4af5133abb617905714339a0c73138cf"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:a5274669f37f2343635a347b91a60777621341ab3378e9c6ac9335eee704bddf"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:cfe5a5fec635799ef33428f1e5e61bafa45a92a96190ba731561ba558ccc214d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:62a9f70b52e0b5a95cfef4a5c5641b06983cadc5e538a3feeb5c00211f523ac2"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:3c18ebc343e15be53049b3a2dce38fe82d58f37e20ab9094b3a39c0aa4f6bb47"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:b84ffdf877644e7096aa936991efeed873f7f3df57b9cd001312b7668ab08550"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:e854312c4103f2ad4c0dc023b69b77ebfd2c89db5f86c4c94dc2353f9a92167e"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:c643734307300234fafa36bf2a040a7235f8f177ea1fd6ec1423aea6fb7b929f"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:84ac9499e48700399a5dd0ea7085b5091961fec52c68d66b4ec0d3cf7f4441b1"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:7f02d09f70776579b926d889a4c9c235070a1f47c40458aeaca563fae5acfdb5"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:ce66d8e46da2bb5ee313a745cbd2e391d319176c1f7a9451bfcd3a2fb920859b"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:c912c259304cfb5ee584481cfb7ce1ff932b4d61e6c9140b8f19cb7b5ed82332"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:1238cb94638e610e972c60dac68e813f868dc7d6e982535270558443058d9d59"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:fc459e5d73be2d6332fcfe8dbf3d8994671fe33c700f4565988ecfa511547253"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:478b5bcd63c2e1357c5c7e16c070690df7b07f676b1c114d7b93e533c664309f"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:a24a81f9715ee42ef59a316cc11611c98fe23920f7c81861315c9f3ff4a230f4"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:196a13319ad88d6d8ef5ab489ec4f44ddde2143c0c7d5b27786f6c3ffd56a7e1"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:3d452fd08b5c72c5167c93e6867b5c08500bd40f2a21e1e854a500550b6cc36f"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:23bf7fa51ac02e07fc7c96849b82946da47ae862dc8f86d183b2a4864fc38129"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:bcaa50684dcaadfa599ac48f81103c756d791cfd85c97203d2217c593d48b860"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:4ea1c034f95c9b056e856b794630b17f9fa3d57e4800ff1e503d3be0f9c9078c"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:c7e057326434e441306226fbeb5d1aaf14a2637efe97ba668306635835f32ad7"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:59baf88468dbc8d63b1887afd92bda52e40bb1561696e5819670601403810cec"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:d34d75f892b3ab73ba11cab5442cce7b3e168fd64162b16f0e1e0d09c508edef"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:3a56abc20a472baf0304c455721bc601477440d28ecfde8a03dde79ede07e0df"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:6a3cb83d1552c0cd1b4906655b6a33fd4a8473229633a901c6b73bf86914dee9"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:10274a1fbeb8ec5d72966e17bb198a3104257aca4ac09d98667c5f8aca8c8548"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:87ebdf787d4888e3f3f2d523eadc6e18c6d18c6d0eb173801a189641627fb37e"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp311-cp311-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:dd34767fa19848d35659ffc0a75314f58c7af3f1cd87ec521e8292a1238398a3"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-macosx_10_13_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:a06c76364a9360e33d6d23769aefdf7f66f38e2ffb60ceb1baaa4989d83b695c"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:fad54e871165f6ec2f536063ac74c3104508a12963e64072ba44bd822de52b0c"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:84b535f00655ecafe1d929d1fb00ed5d6fa3051ea643ab2c161a3887b86f294b"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:6b6b0853b895fe0e98cbfc580d1ec3393d9302b4b1e96a77b3f5c91fdab899e6"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:442cc9c952b2df400cda54bb04ab87330cf2cd08a8692cbbea36773531eb6f37"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:8270544c361ed405a27a060dbc9ed2c124b084d96dfdc2d9a2510482aef981ad"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:48b283b1dd6372e8de2a7a9a4c4d5dc06f4d4fd209b876f3c88a7a205a0c8f84"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:5b0c99ba93a07d56f6df340bb79be53202a082b2fdb81bfe6190b741a3470d54"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:e471bc5769ff073b058cfadb0d736b56ce067c8560eabeb0da88462df98c23e7"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:f497a1ea81d4cd7c10ddcaa685135b9aabd291af3d55775a9ddf3cb7a364cdd9"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:2222be86d0b54f5dd5a38f45f17f315f737245e857bf0bdedc70734f84a13c02"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:85e85586565842f6932abebd4c18bcb1074223dc0b3576e7d173ca710622813a"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:4a28fd227808366b196a75476dced2eb35b351d6766ba9c858dc93319e87f4f1"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:54acdb6674a4661768d7bf7db32dfb9f46ab1d764f8aba6df75ce1a6a088724e"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp312-cp312-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:99cd41ff91afd94896fea3bc002706b6ae4ce95727d06e4a0f39c0a8d8bd8b1a"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-macosx_10_13_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:be9f2c802dcfce3f71298303aa5dad0dce440a76c52f2f60dacd8656dab78793"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:6223a72fd0e4c7156353ec0f08a5f93623e1d3034d0e2683b9bb8ea674131b1d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:7279d2110a28cebc738b6459ecda2771735a4c18465fbbd36b3288fe5ed92247"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:9eeb3fcbc13ba40dfbdb22d01d196a28e9cef9ed4c29b60061a1e0e823a9929d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:5f0cfc27c539f07cf5c0a4cfe211d0b6cae039f8f40526dbaa71944e64b50a7b"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:221c70f316241a78e77e607c227cefc8808d4e08f28d99c04f35694690e940be"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:da028256b04ec30e5e0114b6f76172938c313991f0a2d3d894271315cf5d5e43"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:76a085d7005236a767e3426148b2c407e53ad61695c562f8a81da2d373324901"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:b553d04b5e778a8e56d57eb134aff42a92718ecba45e79c4764ecfa40efd92ff"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:46f714d2fb8ae2f4f29f23ada7f1e79b759fff5a70f94a1dac23af204c3ec9e4"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:1896f5e19ff3f0431c7ce2172adc54890fd97f86b59ced8ca1649145d9ffe35d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:62fd185ef9df3c33d1c8178c5af105f762afbad96038de9a4ae100aa6297ca33"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:ab4af6352741a604c431c6072fce5bee33bf0f20dc7a56618d6bf6bb89e9810c"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:7af486dabe8954d03b087f0021540897afe084f04e16ff5579e08cc46f871416"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:2224f89ffd0c5605ccce1ed7a584da162bc7c55f601ab1c946bc9de31a486b42"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-macosx_10_13_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:de286598cc65d2b489411174b1faec2f5a7775fb3201fd925db2a76b4030f37d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:042c46ded7c288aeb07cf14a28b6c1e10b78fcba40171c3fa1e939377eeef0b5"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:f4ddbe407477f04c45115d1a4e5bc480f753553b534d338d4c3358b1cdd0ea52"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:d13e6725992e2d2fd7d81d4f5241952d13740121dfd501da09201be39b2c003a"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:f747dc8edcfe740130f28f32f3995e955494285717e86ee25af51db2219df08a"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:ced2f09ef276fd58611a1ef502164ad266d2b75174e5a40cabbdb4033f9f6cf2"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:b84800013769a78ccb9ef4659402e26d06867e337b61ec365f77ad008adea80e"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:ea8cd6ca0ee9f616aaef3afc6882e32c2cbf18b00d96313ffd76af650574034d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:aa5e304a873fabddc11e484e9b6b738bd38bd7bed17b09aa84eecf5332e8b8bb"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:5a1c5215be81035e629d5bc756650634d0bf31991038db7a0eccb90f025ce16d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:79058c47dae6788504b5effb319961bcd72d7240551464b91d474bc0ed186d69"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:370c5afae3fa0658e11694a32b24c2778f6bc2d17718121f94ee185e69f26b54"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:3758dd0a7f1fa57365ef2e781df0f0731d38b6e3772259d13dae4bd8a958d4b1"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:6ff665fb023a77386fe11685190cee1f60a7d635994a30d9b0a061533d470fce"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp313-cp313t-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:17a5a241e5997621a956a7f402a7433ef4221e5152809b785bec79e2323799f1"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-macosx_10_15_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:d5ed429d0b8edaac649e889b4ffcedb6c80b06629a3f93050e3dddfb99235bee"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:8011224a62280e50dab346960c03cf47aca1a1e09e608c0fb33fd6e0cc8e9500"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:12c42ec1e14f553c4f817e989365982e646e27211f10a0f717855b94a79c8906"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:06144cd511cf2624873a035c5069cf297144f6e77a73ee3d7a55b605ec5efb42"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:a311d8e1da24be5c1ccf85cbfb06315dbaa1703d5a1eab3f6432c72b837917c8"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:c79cead5b5bc584d9c71451cb984d0e3a84e0c0937379c8efcbf27c8d661b851"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:dcbf65f1f66a26cdd88c35cf68fb4729c5d1cd2e88added72420541dfb212034"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:fd86572566fb40189a8260446158235159bc7a82dfbc87a3b39cf4fb57fcec1c"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:7771b601718fdde84832c3a434ca9bbf4ae9adbc49d84198b4110700c3c77c36"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:39b21e212c55af06fa375e3dbf90a8a8e38792f3a910c580066d23563830ddd5"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:f2302660e32562a532b442480121aef8aa61a5bdb20b30bf0adab29f10a5a4b4"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:03a6f93c1ec3b7f2e77b5dbcc5573a2c21f12529a5c6bbe0f16f72303cc2fa4d"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:8a3ce026d73290f42f08dafecbd82c193a74df280461fbf97300fec51fd133ee"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:114c95ef29302423b87d159075805f4ab973254a2638a5d7d046c94887cc87d7"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:a07891c3f4805442b31b71e84ba3cf29ed1aa9a428284e06deeb4b23e5b46343"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-macosx_10_15_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:1101a5ebb083aecb625ebb6209d4105b58f647b093cb2dc8122d7b33f743cfe1"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:851b9e1e4e8a4608e77c79714b2e77c0970d2ed7202a05e92ae407817481887b"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:d5b89cdfb2ee051b71e8c3c70bd81a9eff81100f736a269136fe1a68efe00474"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:0177614a0370f227888b4e436a7c55686d6a9f90eb1ade2b624ba685a1686e86"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:2d69af5dea2de76fc485a83032a630523f985198b7e25be901ec60181587b01e"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:35ab22d91de736e8966b980dc355cbcdd2c6dbbcfe275f9a2991bc8a91b3df65"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-manylinux_2_31_riscv64.manylinux_2_39_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:357d4e32935c36588aaba057d734fa32428c360c9fc2e4442afbf1b646beee6e"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:51bd64741cc6fa065abd300ede1afe5a5291ece9c31da8b24884deda48bcc3f8"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:9132cd363a68a4c3daa7c8704a654b1e39d3360f6f5b8ddd470608a945236c07"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:07c6290b1697b862c0478eab545eec949a0d0e4d6d03497f446d706da3b4f2de"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_riscv64.whl", hash = "sha256:5ea0c297e27133853b4d8a3eb799bff5a2dbd9f2f41537a240d337ac9b4df890"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:01b7733daad0237daa01ef80fe2dfceffc911e6a17fa7b55d14aa8214eaaaecd"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-win32.whl", hash = "sha256:6adc5a36984624a70bf11d7184e20fa0a49aa7c47ffab43804106a1a695ea22e"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-win_amd64.whl", hash = "sha256:ddf799247318f34dbcd2efa8c95a8d0642674e926bb1774cf9b63dfd2a389d1c"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp314-cp314t-win_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:145986fe66647eb489f18d9a997567a3fd358584c4b5a808769113abc07466af"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:a252f21c27e38347e60111a3266b03827422a7d5525951aceee313aa68bab1d2"}, + {file = "coverage-7.14.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:30c08f7d90415aa98b3c990385dea2939b0da55f38515e5b369b83655f8523be"}, ] [package.dependencies] tomli = {version = "*", optional = true, markers = "python_full_version <= \"3.11.0a6\" and extra == \"toml\""} [package.extras] -toml = ["tomli ; python_full_version <= \"3.11.0a6\""] +toml = ["tomli"] [[package]] name = "defusedxml" @@ -277,7 +287,6 @@ version = "0.7.1" description = "XML bomb protection for Python stdlib modules" optional = false python-versions = ">=2.7, !=3.0.*, !=3.1.*, !=3.2.*, !=3.3.*, !=3.4.*" -groups = ["main"] files = [ {file = "defusedxml-0.7.1-py2.py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:a352e7e428770286cc899e2542b6cdaedb2b4953ff269a210103ec58f6198a61"}, {file = "defusedxml-0.7.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:1bb3032db185915b62d7c6209c5a8792be6a32ab2fedacc84e01b52c51aa3e69"}, @@ -289,7 +298,6 @@ version = "5.0" description = "A library for working with .desktop files" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.10" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "desktop_entry_lib-5.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:e60a0c2c5e42492dbe5378e596b1de87d1b1c4dc74d1f41998a164ee27a1226f"}, {file = "desktop_entry_lib-5.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:9a621bac1819fe21021356e41fec0ac096ed56e6eb5dcfe0639cd8654914b864"}, @@ -304,8 +312,6 @@ version = "1.3.1" description = "Backport of PEP 654 (exception groups)" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.7" -groups = ["dev"] -markers = "python_version == \"3.10\"" files = [ {file = "exceptiongroup-1.3.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:a7a39a3bd276781e98394987d3a5701d0c4edffb633bb7a5144577f82c773598"}, {file = "exceptiongroup-1.3.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:8b412432c6055b0b7d14c310000ae93352ed6754f70fa8f7c34141f91c4e3219"}, @@ -323,7 +329,6 @@ version = "3.18" description = "Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.9" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "idna-3.18-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:7f952cbe720b688055e3f87de14f5c3e5fdaa8bc3928985c4077ca689de849a2"}, {file = "idna-3.18.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:ffb385a7e039654cef1ab9ef32c6fafe283c0c0467bba1d9029738ce4a14a848"}, @@ -338,7 +343,6 @@ version = "2.3.0" description = "brain-dead simple config-ini parsing" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.10" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "iniconfig-2.3.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:f631c04d2c48c52b84d0d0549c99ff3859c98df65b3101406327ecc7d53fbf12"}, {file = "iniconfig-2.3.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:c76315c77db068650d49c5b56314774a7804df16fee4402c1f19d6d15d8c4730"}, @@ -350,7 +354,6 @@ version = "3.1.6" description = "A very fast and expressive template engine." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.7" -groups = ["main"] files = [ {file = "jinja2-3.1.6-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:85ece4451f492d0c13c5dd7c13a64681a86afae63a5f347908daf103ce6d2f67"}, {file = "jinja2-3.1.6.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:0137fb05990d35f1275a587e9aee6d56da821fc83491a0fb838183be43f66d6d"}, @@ -368,7 +371,6 @@ version = "3.0.3" description = "Safely add untrusted strings to HTML/XML markup." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.9" -groups = ["main"] files = [ {file = "markupsafe-3.0.3-cp310-cp310-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:2f981d352f04553a7171b8e44369f2af4055f888dfb147d55e42d29e29e74559"}, {file = "markupsafe-3.0.3-cp310-cp310-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:e1c1493fb6e50ab01d20a22826e57520f1284df32f2d8601fdd90b6304601419"}, @@ -467,7 +469,6 @@ version = "26.2" description = "Core utilities for Python packages" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.8" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "packaging-26.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:5fc45236b9446107ff2415ce77c807cee2862cb6fac22b8a73826d0693b0980e"}, {file = "packaging-26.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:ff452ff5a3e828ce110190feff1178bb1f2ea2281fa2075aadb987c2fb221661"}, @@ -479,7 +480,6 @@ version = "1.6.0" description = "plugin and hook calling mechanisms for python" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.9" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "pluggy-1.6.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:e920276dd6813095e9377c0bc5566d94c932c33b27a3e3945d8389c374dd4746"}, {file = "pluggy-1.6.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:7dcc130b76258d33b90f61b658791dede3486c3e6bfb003ee5c9bfb396dd22f3"}, @@ -495,7 +495,6 @@ version = "2.20.0" description = "Pygments is a syntax highlighting package written in Python." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.9" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "pygments-2.20.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:81a9e26dd42fd28a23a2d169d86d7ac03b46e2f8b59ed4698fb4785f946d0176"}, {file = "pygments-2.20.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:6757cd03768053ff99f3039c1a36d6c0aa0b263438fcab17520b30a303a82b5f"}, @@ -510,7 +509,6 @@ version = "4.2" description = "Generate AppImages from your Python projects" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.9" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "pyproject_appimage-4.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:d6892643db5759dc06531a4546bdab404a519c63814c060f8749979a8625d9cc"}, {file = "pyproject_appimage-4.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:6b6387250cb1e6ecbb08a13f5810749396ebe8637f2f35bf2296bfdd5e65cd6e"}, @@ -527,7 +525,6 @@ version = "8.4.2" description = "pytest: simple powerful testing with Python" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.9" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "pytest-8.4.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:872f880de3fc3a5bdc88a11b39c9710c3497a547cfa9320bc3c5e62fbf272e79"}, {file = "pytest-8.4.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:86c0d0b93306b961d58d62a4db4879f27fe25513d4b969df351abdddb3c30e01"}, @@ -551,7 +548,6 @@ version = "5.0.0" description = "Pytest plugin for measuring coverage." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.8" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "pytest-cov-5.0.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:5837b58e9f6ebd335b0f8060eecce69b662415b16dc503883a02f45dfeb14857"}, {file = "pytest_cov-5.0.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:4f0764a1219df53214206bf1feea4633c3b558a2925c8b59f144f682861ce652"}, @@ -570,7 +566,6 @@ version = "6.0.3" description = "YAML parser and emitter for Python" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.8" -groups = ["main"] files = [ {file = "PyYAML-6.0.3-cp38-cp38-macosx_10_13_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:c2514fceb77bc5e7a2f7adfaa1feb2fb311607c9cb518dbc378688ec73d8292f"}, {file = "PyYAML-6.0.3-cp38-cp38-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:9c57bb8c96f6d1808c030b1687b9b5fb476abaa47f0db9c0101f5e9f394e97f4"}, @@ -653,7 +648,6 @@ version = "2.34.2" description = "Python HTTP for Humans." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.10" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "requests-2.34.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:2a0d60c172f83ac6ab31e4554906c0f3b3588d37b5cb939b1c061f4907e278e0"}, {file = "requests-2.34.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:f288924cae4e29463698d6d60bc6a4da69c89185ad1e0bcc4104f584e960b9ed"}, @@ -675,7 +669,6 @@ version = "2.4.1" description = "A lil' TOML parser" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.8" -groups = ["main", "dev"] files = [ {file = "tomli-2.4.1-cp311-cp311-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:f8f0fc26ec2cc2b965b7a3b87cd19c5c6b8c5e5f436b984e85f486d652285c30"}, {file = "tomli-2.4.1-cp311-cp311-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:4ab97e64ccda8756376892c53a72bd1f964e519c77236368527f758fbc36a53a"}, @@ -725,7 +718,6 @@ files = [ {file = "tomli-2.4.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:0d85819802132122da43cb86656f8d1f8c6587d54ae7dcaf30e90533028b49fe"}, {file = "tomli-2.4.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:7c7e1a961a0b2f2472c1ac5b69affa0ae1132c39adcb67aba98568702b9cc23f"}, ] -markers = {main = "python_version == \"3.10\"", dev = "python_full_version <= \"3.11.0a6\""} [[package]] name = "typing-extensions" @@ -733,8 +725,6 @@ version = "4.15.0" description = "Backported and Experimental Type Hints for Python 3.9+" optional = false python-versions = ">=3.9" -groups = ["dev"] -markers = "python_version == \"3.10\"" files = [ {file = "typing_extensions-4.15.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:f0fa19c6845758ab08074a0cfa8b7aecb71c999ca73d62883bc25cc018c4e548"}, {file = "typing_extensions-4.15.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:0cea48d173cc12fa28ecabc3b837ea3cf6f38c6d1136f85cbaaf598984861466"}, @@ -746,19 +736,18 @@ version = "2.7.0" description = "HTTP library with thread-safe connection pooling, file post, and more." optional = false python-versions = ">=3.10" -groups = ["dev"] files = [ {file = "urllib3-2.7.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:9fb4c81ebbb1ce9531cce37674bbc6f1360472bc18ca9a553ede278ef7276897"}, {file = "urllib3-2.7.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:231e0ec3b63ceb14667c67be60f2f2c40a518cb38b03af60abc813da26505f4c"}, ] [package.extras] -brotli = ["brotli (>=1.2.0) ; platform_python_implementation == \"CPython\"", "brotlicffi (>=1.2.0.0) ; platform_python_implementation != \"CPython\""] +brotli = ["brotli (>=1.2.0)", "brotlicffi (>=1.2.0.0)"] h2 = ["h2 (>=4,<5)"] socks = ["pysocks (>=1.5.6,!=1.5.7,<2.0)"] -zstd = ["backports-zstd (>=1.0.0) ; python_version < \"3.14\""] +zstd = ["backports-zstd (>=1.0.0)"] [metadata] -lock-version = "2.1" -python-versions = ">=3.10,<4.0" -content-hash = "161dfd9b44e1063656bacea8e8fb08a2614361a8262d8f665240e4f391732e1b" +lock-version = "2.0" +python-versions = "^3.10" +content-hash = "026c4acd254e889b70bb8c25ffb5e6323eee86380f54f2d8ef02f59ae9307529" diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml index 7751303..1279f81 100644 --- a/pyproject.toml +++ b/pyproject.toml @@ -1,40 +1,36 @@ -[project] +[tool.poetry] name = "jinjaturtle" -version = "0.7.0" +version = "0.5.4" description = "Convert config files into Ansible defaults and Jinja2 templates." -authors = [ - { name = "Miguel Jacq", email = "mig@mig5.net" }, -] +authors = ["Miguel Jacq "] license = "GPL-3.0-or-later" readme = "README.md" -requires-python = ">=3.10,<4.0" -keywords = ["ansible", "jinja2", "config", "toml", "ini", "yaml", "json", "devops"] -dependencies = [ - "PyYAML (>=6.0,<7.0)", - "defusedxml (>=0.7.1,<0.8.0)", - "jinja2 (>=3.1.6,<4.0.0)", - "tomli (>=2.0.0,<3.0.0) ; python_version < '3.11'", -] +packages = [{ include = "jinjaturtle", from = "src" }] + +keywords = ["ansible", "jinja2", "config", "toml", "ini", "yaml", "json", "devops"] -[project.urls] homepage = "https://git.mig5.net/mig5/jinjaturtle" repository = "https://git.mig5.net/mig5/jinjaturtle" -[project.scripts] +[tool.poetry.dependencies] +python = "^3.10" +PyYAML = "^6.0" +tomli = { version = "^2.0.0", python = "<3.11" } +defusedxml = "^0.7.1" +jinja2 = "^3.1.6" + +[tool.poetry.scripts] jinjaturtle = "jinjaturtle.cli:main" -[tool.poetry] -packages = [{ include = "jinjaturtle", from = "src" }] - -[tool.poetry.group.dev.dependencies] -pytest = "^8" -pytest-cov = "^5" -pyproject-appimage = "^4.2" - [build-system] -requires = ["poetry-core>=2.0.0"] +requires = ["poetry-core>=1.0.0"] build-backend = "poetry.core.masonry.api" [tool.pyproject-appimage] script = "jinjaturtle" output = "JinjaTurtle.AppImage" + +[tool.poetry.dev-dependencies] +pytest = "^8" +pytest-cov = "^5" +pyproject-appimage = "^4.2" diff --git a/release.sh b/release.sh index e221cef..2cdb868 100755 --- a/release.sh +++ b/release.sh @@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ filedust -y . # Publish to Pypi poetry build +poetry publish + +# Make AppImage +poetry run pyproject-appimage +mv JinjaTurtle.AppImage dist/ # Sign packages for file in `ls -1 dist/`; do qubes-gpg-client --batch --armor --detach-sign dist/$file > dist/$file.asc; done @@ -47,6 +52,7 @@ REMOTE="ashpool.mig5.net:/opt/repo_rpm" DISTS=( fedora:43 + fedora:42 ) for dist in ${DISTS[@]}; do @@ -81,9 +87,6 @@ for dist in ${DISTS[@]}; do qubes-gpg-client --local-user "$KEYID" --detach-sign --armor "$RPM_REPO/repodata/repomd.xml" > "$RPM_REPO/repodata/repomd.xml.asc" done -# If we got this far, we can publish to PyPI -poetry publish - echo "==> Syncing repo to server..." rsync -aHPvz --exclude=.git --delete "$REPO_ROOT/" "$REMOTE/" diff --git a/rpm/jinjaturtle.spec b/rpm/jinjaturtle.spec index 8c8d845..a303b15 100644 --- a/rpm/jinjaturtle.spec +++ b/rpm/jinjaturtle.spec @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -%global upstream_version 0.7.0 +%global upstream_version 0.5.4 Name: jinjaturtle Version: %{upstream_version} @@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ Convert config files into Ansible defaults and Jinja2 templates. %{_bindir}/jinjaturtle %changelog -* Sun Jul 05 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} -- Much hardening -* Wed Jun 24 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} -- More hardening -* Tue Jun 23 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} -- Try to prevent what could lead to execution of embedded jinja in original files when converting -* Sat Jun 20 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} -- erb support * Sat Jun 20 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} - Make templates more faithful to the original file in terms of indentation, newlines, no deserialisation of things like < or >. - More test coverage @@ -59,7 +51,7 @@ Convert config files into Ansible defaults and Jinja2 templates. - Fix indentation problems with nested dicts * Fri Jun 19 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} - Empty dicts and lists are now emitted as leaf defaults. -* Mon May 11 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} +* Tue May 11 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} - Support ssh configs * Tue Jan 06 2026 Miguel Jacq - %{version}-%{release} - Support converting systemd files and postfix main.cf diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/cli.py b/src/jinjaturtle/cli.py index d901606..7658bfb 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/cli.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/cli.py @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import sys from defusedxml import defuse_stdlib -from defusedxml.common import DefusedXmlException from pathlib import Path from . import j2 @@ -13,12 +12,11 @@ from .core import ( flatten_config, generate_ansible_yaml, generate_jinja2_template, - ConfigParseError, + generate_puppet_hiera_yaml, + generate_erb_template, ) from .multi import process_directory -from .safety import TemplateSafetyError -from .output_safety import OutputPathError, ensure_safe_directory, write_text_safely def _build_arg_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: @@ -60,47 +58,24 @@ def _build_arg_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: "--template-output", help="Path to write the generated config template. If omitted, template is printed to stdout.", ) + ap.add_argument( + "--template-engine", + choices=[j2.NAME, "erb"], + default=j2.NAME, + help="Template syntax to generate (default: jinja2). Use erb for Puppet templates.", + ) + ap.add_argument( + "--puppet-class", + help=( + "Puppet class/Hiera namespace to use with --template-engine erb. " + "Defaults to --role-name. This lets tools use a file-specific " + "variable prefix while writing Hiera keys under the real Puppet class." + ), + ) return ap def _main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: - try: - return _run(argv) - except TemplateSafetyError as exc: - # The output safety gate refused to emit a template because it contained - # a construct JinjaTurtle never produces -- i.e. attacker-influenced - # source text became live template code. Fail closed with a clear - # message and a non-zero exit code; never write the unsafe template. - print( - f"jinjaturtle: refusing to generate unsafe template: {exc}", file=sys.stderr - ) - return 2 - except OutputPathError as exc: - print(f"jinjaturtle: refusing unsafe output path: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) - return 2 - except DefusedXmlException as exc: - # defusedxml rejected the XML because it attempted a DTD, entity - # expansion, or external reference (XXE / billion-laughs class attack). - # This is a deliberately-blocked attack, not a benign malformed file, so - # core.parse_config lets it propagate unchanged rather than folding it - # into ConfigParseError. Report it as a refused unsafe input with a - # non-zero exit code instead of leaking an internal traceback. - print( - "jinjaturtle: refusing unsafe XML input: the document uses a DTD, " - f"entity expansion, or external reference ({exc.__class__.__name__}). " - "This is blocked to prevent XXE / entity-expansion attacks.", - file=sys.stderr, - ) - return 2 - except ConfigParseError as exc: - # The source file could not be parsed as its (detected or forced) - # format. This is expected for malformed/attacker-influenced input; - # fail cleanly with a non-zero exit code instead of a traceback. - print(f"jinjaturtle: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) - return 1 - - -def _run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: defuse_stdlib() parser = _build_arg_parser() args = parser.parse_args(argv) @@ -115,23 +90,36 @@ def _run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: # Write defaults if args.defaults_output: - write_text_safely(Path(args.defaults_output), defaults_yaml) + Path(args.defaults_output).write_text(defaults_yaml, encoding="utf-8") else: print("# defaults/main.yml") print(defaults_yaml, end="") - template_ext = j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION + # Optionally translate folder-mode templates to ERB. Folder mode keeps + # the existing data shape; single-file mode below is the preferred + # Puppet path because it can produce class-parameter Hiera keys. + if args.template_engine == "erb": + from .erb import translate_jinja2_to_erb + + for o in outputs: + o.template = translate_jinja2_to_erb( + o.template, + role_prefix=args.role_name, + puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name, + ) + + template_ext = "erb" if args.template_engine == "erb" else j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION # Write templates if args.template_output: out_path = Path(args.template_output) if len(outputs) == 1 and not out_path.is_dir(): - write_text_safely(out_path, outputs[0].template) + out_path.write_text(outputs[0].template, encoding="utf-8") else: - ensure_safe_directory(out_path) + out_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) for o in outputs: - write_text_safely( - out_path / f"config.{o.fmt}.{template_ext}", o.template + (out_path / f"config.{o.fmt}.{template_ext}").write_text( + o.template, encoding="utf-8" ) else: for o in outputs: @@ -157,28 +145,51 @@ def _run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: # Flatten config (excluding loop paths if loops are detected) flat_items = flatten_config(fmt, parsed, loop_candidates) - # Generate defaults YAML (with loop collections if detected) - ansible_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml(args.role_name, flat_items, loop_candidates) + if args.template_engine == "erb": + ansible_yaml = generate_puppet_hiera_yaml( + args.role_name, + flat_items, + loop_candidates, + puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name, + ) + template_str = generate_erb_template( + fmt, + parsed, + args.role_name, + original_text=config_text, + loop_candidates=loop_candidates, + flat_items=flat_items, + puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name, + ) + else: + # Generate defaults YAML (with loop collections if detected) + ansible_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml( + args.role_name, flat_items, loop_candidates + ) - # Generate template (with loops if detected) - template_str = generate_jinja2_template( - fmt, - parsed, - args.role_name, - original_text=config_text, - loop_candidates=loop_candidates, - ) + # Generate template (with loops if detected) + template_str = generate_jinja2_template( + fmt, + parsed, + args.role_name, + original_text=config_text, + loop_candidates=loop_candidates, + ) if args.defaults_output: - write_text_safely(Path(args.defaults_output), ansible_yaml) + Path(args.defaults_output).write_text(ansible_yaml, encoding="utf-8") else: print("# defaults/main.yml") print(ansible_yaml, end="") if args.template_output: - write_text_safely(Path(args.template_output), template_str) + Path(args.template_output).write_text(template_str, encoding="utf-8") else: - print(f"# config.{j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION}") + print( + "# config.erb" + if args.template_engine == "erb" + else f"# config.{j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION}" + ) print(template_str, end="") return 0 @@ -188,8 +199,4 @@ def main() -> None: """ Console-script entry point. """ - sys.exit(_main(sys.argv[1:])) - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main() + _main(sys.argv[1:]) diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/core.py b/src/jinjaturtle/core.py index de7b552..673aad0 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/core.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/core.py @@ -8,10 +8,7 @@ import re import yaml from .loop_analyzer import LoopAnalyzer, LoopCandidate -from .safety import ( - verify_jinja2_template_safe, - verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys, -) +from .erb import puppet_class_name, puppet_local_var_name, translate_jinja2_to_erb from .handlers import ( BaseHandler, IniHandler, @@ -33,22 +30,6 @@ class QuotedString(str): pass -class AnsibleUnsafeString(str): - """Marker type emitted with Ansible's !unsafe YAML tag. - - Ansible recursively templates string values by default. Source-derived - config values that contain Jinja delimiters must therefore be marked - unsafe in defaults/main.yml, otherwise a harvested value such as - ``{{ lookup('pipe', 'id') }}`` becomes executable on the Ansible - controller when the generated role is applied. - """ - - pass - - -_JINJA_STARTS = ("{{", "{%", "{#") - - def _fallback_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: Any): """ Fallback for objects the dumper doesn't know about. @@ -68,33 +49,7 @@ def _quoted_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: QuotedString): return dumper.represent_scalar("tag:yaml.org,2002:str", str(data), style='"') -def _ansible_unsafe_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: AnsibleUnsafeString): - return dumper.represent_scalar("!unsafe", str(data), style="'") - - -def _needs_ansible_unsafe(value: str) -> bool: - return any(marker in value for marker in _JINJA_STARTS) - - -def _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(obj: Any) -> Any: - """Recursively mark mapping/list values containing Jinja as !unsafe. - - Mapping keys are intentionally left alone: they are variable names or YAML - structure, not Ansible-templated values. Values nested in folder-mode item - lists, including source-derived ``id`` values, are protected. - """ - - if isinstance(obj, dict): - return {k: _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(v) for k, v in obj.items()} - if isinstance(obj, list): - return [_mark_ansible_unsafe_values(v) for v in obj] - if isinstance(obj, str) and _needs_ansible_unsafe(obj): - return AnsibleUnsafeString(obj) - return obj - - _TurtleDumper.add_representer(QuotedString, _quoted_str_representer) -_TurtleDumper.add_representer(AnsibleUnsafeString, _ansible_unsafe_str_representer) # Use our fallback for any unknown object types _TurtleDumper.add_representer(None, _fallback_str_representer) @@ -126,9 +81,8 @@ def dump_yaml(data: Any, *, sort_keys: bool = True) -> str: This is used by both the single-file and multi-file code paths. """ - safe_data = _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(data) return yaml.dump( - safe_data, + data, Dumper=_TurtleDumper, sort_keys=sort_keys, default_flow_style=False, @@ -305,66 +259,6 @@ def detect_format(path: Path, explicit: str | None = None) -> str: return "ini" -class ConfigParseError(Exception): - """Raised when a source config file cannot be parsed as its format. - - Each underlying parser (json, tomllib, PyYAML, defusedxml/ElementTree, - configparser) raises its own exception type on malformed input. Without a - single normalised error, a malformed file -- which is entirely expected when - JinjaTurtle is pointed at harvested, attacker-influenceable config -- would - escape as an unhandled traceback (e.g. ``xml.etree.ElementTree.ParseError`` - on an XML file whose element name is not well-formed). ``parse_config`` - converts every such failure into this one type so the CLI can fail closed - with a clean message and a non-zero exit code, and so library callers (such - as Enroll, which falls back to copying the raw file) have a single, stable - exception to catch. - - Note: defusedxml's *security* exceptions (``EntitiesForbidden``, - ``DTDForbidden``, ...) are intentionally NOT folded into this type. They - signal an attempted XXE/entity-expansion attack rather than a benign - malformed file, and must propagate unchanged so callers can tell the two - apart. - """ - - -def _build_malformed_config_errors() -> tuple[type[BaseException], ...]: - """Return the concrete "this file is malformed" exception types to catch. - - Deliberately specific. In particular we must avoid catching plain - ``ValueError``: defusedxml's ``EntitiesForbidden``/``DTDForbidden`` subclass - ``ValueError``, and those are security signals that must NOT be swallowed. - """ - - import configparser - import json - from xml.etree.ElementTree import ParseError as _XMLParseError # nosec - - import yaml as _yaml - - errs: list[type[BaseException]] = [ - _XMLParseError, - json.JSONDecodeError, - configparser.Error, - _yaml.YAMLError, - UnicodeDecodeError, - ] - try: - import tomllib - - errs.append(tomllib.TOMLDecodeError) - except ModuleNotFoundError: # pragma: no cover - Python < 3.11 fallback - try: - import tomli # type: ignore - - errs.append(tomli.TOMLDecodeError) - except ModuleNotFoundError: - pass - return tuple(errs) - - -_MALFORMED_CONFIG_ERRORS = _build_malformed_config_errors() - - def parse_config(path: Path, fmt: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, Any]: """ Parse config file into a Python object. @@ -373,38 +267,9 @@ def parse_config(path: Path, fmt: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, Any]: handler = _HANDLERS.get(fmt) if handler is None: raise ValueError(f"Unsupported config format: {fmt}") - try: - parsed = handler.parse(path) - # Make sure datetime objects are treated as strings (TOML, YAML). This - # walks the parsed object recursively, so keep it inside the try where a - # RecursionError from a pathological structure is normalised below. - parsed = _stringify_timestamps(parsed) - except ConfigParseError: - raise - except _MALFORMED_CONFIG_ERRORS as exc: - # Normalise the per-parser "this file is malformed" errors into one - # json.JSONDecodeError / tomllib.TOMLDecodeError (ValueError - # subclasses), PyYAML's YAMLError, configparser.Error, and - # xml.etree.ElementTree.ParseError (raised by defusedxml on XML whose - # structure/element name is not well-formed). A bad input file is - # expected when parsing harvested config, so fail closed with a clean - # error instead of an unhandled traceback. - # - # IMPORTANT: this deliberately does NOT catch defusedxml's security - # exceptions (EntitiesForbidden, DTDForbidden, ...). Those signal an - # attempted XXE/entity-expansion attack and must propagate unchanged so - # callers (and tests) can distinguish "malformed" from "malicious". - raise ConfigParseError(f"could not parse {path} as {fmt}: {exc}") from exc - except RecursionError as exc: - # A deeply-nested or self-referential structure (e.g. a recursive YAML - # anchor) can exhaust the Python stack while walking the parsed object. - # The YAML handler already rejects reference cycles up front; this is a - # format-agnostic backstop so any such input fails closed with a clean - # message instead of a stack-overflow traceback. - raise ConfigParseError( - f"could not parse {path} as {fmt}: input is too deeply nested " - "or self-referential" - ) from exc + parsed = handler.parse(path) + # Make sure datetime objects are treated as strings (TOML, YAML) + parsed = _stringify_timestamps(parsed) return fmt, parsed @@ -513,28 +378,93 @@ def generate_jinja2_template( # Check if handler supports loop-aware generation if hasattr(handler, "generate_jinja2_template_with_loops") and loop_candidates: - template = handler.generate_jinja2_template_with_loops( + return handler.generate_jinja2_template_with_loops( parsed, role_prefix, original_text, loop_candidates ) - else: - # Fallback to original scalar-only generation - template = handler.generate_jinja2_template( - parsed, role_prefix, original_text=original_text - ) - # Defence in depth: independently verify that the finished template contains - # only JinjaTurtle-emitted constructs. If any handler failed to neutralise - # verbatim source text, the un-escaped payload shows up here as a live tag - # and generation aborts instead of emitting an injectable template. - verify_jinja2_template_safe(template) + # Fallback to original scalar-only generation + return handler.generate_jinja2_template( + parsed, role_prefix, original_text=original_text + ) - # Format-specific backstop: JinjaTurtle never emits Jinja inside a JSON object - # key, so a live construct in key position means source key text leaked into - # the template unescaped. This is independent of per-handler escaping. - if fmt == "json": - verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(template) - return template +def _template_variable_names( + role_prefix: str, + flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]], + loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None, +) -> set[str]: + names = {make_var_name(role_prefix, path) for path, _value in flat_items} + if loop_candidates: + for candidate in loop_candidates: + names.add(make_var_name(role_prefix, candidate.path)) + return names + + +def generate_puppet_hiera_yaml( + role_prefix: str, + flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]], + loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None, + *, + puppet_class: str | None = None, +) -> str: + """Create Puppet Hiera data suitable for Automatic Parameter Lookup. + + ``role_prefix`` remains the source variable prefix used by JinjaTurtle while + ``puppet_class`` is the Puppet class/Hiera namespace. In the normal case + they are the same, so ``php_memory_limit`` becomes ``php::memory_limit``. + Enroll may pass a file-specific role prefix and a separate Puppet class to + avoid parameter-name collisions inside one generated Puppet module. + """ + + klass = puppet_class_name(puppet_class or role_prefix) + data: dict[str, Any] = {} + + for path, value in flat_items: + generated = make_var_name(role_prefix, path) + local = puppet_local_var_name(role_prefix, generated, puppet_class=klass) + data[f"{klass}::{local}"] = value + + if loop_candidates: + for candidate in loop_candidates: + generated = make_var_name(role_prefix, candidate.path) + local = puppet_local_var_name(role_prefix, generated, puppet_class=klass) + data[f"{klass}::{local}"] = candidate.items + + return dump_yaml(data, sort_keys=True) + + +def generate_erb_template( + fmt: str, + parsed: Any, + role_prefix: str, + *, + original_text: str | None = None, + loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None, + flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]] | None = None, + puppet_class: str | None = None, +) -> str: + """Generate a Puppet ERB template from JinjaTurtle's renderer-neutral data. + + The first implementation intentionally translates the Jinja2 subset emitted + by JinjaTurtle's existing format handlers. This keeps parsing, formatting + preservation, and loop detection identical between Jinja2 and ERB output + while still producing Puppet-native ``@parameter`` references. + """ + + jinja_template = generate_jinja2_template( + fmt, + parsed, + role_prefix, + original_text=original_text, + loop_candidates=loop_candidates, + ) + names = _template_variable_names(role_prefix, flat_items or [], loop_candidates) + return translate_jinja2_to_erb( + jinja_template, + role_prefix=role_prefix, + puppet_class=puppet_class or role_prefix, + variable_names=names, + ) def _stringify_timestamps(obj: Any) -> Any: diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/erb.py b/src/jinjaturtle/erb.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c5788e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/erb.py @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +from __future__ import annotations + +import re + + +def _safe_name(raw: str, *, fallback: str = "var") -> str: + text = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]+", "_", str(raw or fallback)).strip("_").lower() + text = re.sub(r"_+", "_", text) + if not text: + text = fallback + if not re.match(r"^[a-z_]", text): + text = f"{fallback}_{text}" + return text + + +def puppet_class_name(raw: str) -> str: + """Return a conservative Puppet class/Hiera namespace name.""" + + text = _safe_name(raw, fallback="jinjaturtle") + if not re.match(r"^[a-z]", text): + text = f"jinjaturtle_{text}" + return text + + +def _role_prefix_name(raw: str) -> str: + return _safe_name(raw, fallback="jinjaturtle") + + +def puppet_local_var_name( + role_prefix: str, + jinja_var_name: str, + *, + puppet_class: str | None = None, +) -> str: + """Map a generated JinjaTurtle variable to a Puppet class parameter. + + For the common case where ``--role-name php`` also means class ``php``, a + generated Jinja variable such as ``php_memory_limit`` becomes Puppet local + parameter ``memory_limit`` and Hiera key ``php::memory_limit``. + + Enroll sometimes needs a file-specific variable prefix to avoid collisions + inside a generated module. When ``puppet_class`` differs from + ``role_prefix`` we keep the full generated variable name as the local + parameter and only use ``puppet_class`` as the Hiera namespace. + """ + + var_name = _safe_name(jinja_var_name, fallback="value") + prefix = _role_prefix_name(role_prefix) + klass = puppet_class_name(puppet_class or role_prefix) + if klass == prefix and var_name.startswith(prefix + "_"): + stripped = var_name[len(prefix) + 1 :] + return stripped or var_name + return var_name + + +class ErbTranslator: + """Translate the Jinja2 subset emitted by JinjaTurtle into Puppet ERB.""" + + _TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"({{.*?}}|{%.*?%})", re.S) + + def __init__( + self, + *, + role_prefix: str, + puppet_class: str | None = None, + variable_names: set[str] | None = None, + ) -> None: + self.role_prefix = role_prefix + self.puppet_class = puppet_class or role_prefix + self.variable_names = set(variable_names or set()) + self.loop_stack: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = [] + self.needs_json = False + + def translate(self, template_text: str) -> str: + parts = self._TOKEN_RE.split(template_text) + out: list[str] = [] + for token in parts: + if not token: + continue + if token.startswith("{{") and token.endswith("}}"): + expr = token[2:-2].strip() + out.append(f"<%= {self.expr_to_ruby(expr)} %>") + continue + if token.startswith("{%") and token.endswith("%}"): + stmt = token[2:-2].strip() + out.append(self.statement_to_erb(stmt)) + continue + out.append(token) + + rendered = "".join(out) + if self.needs_json and "require 'json'" not in rendered: + rendered = "<% require 'json' -%>\n" + rendered + return rendered + + def local_var(self, name: str) -> str: + return puppet_local_var_name( + self.role_prefix, name, puppet_class=self.puppet_class + ) + + def ruby_value(self, expr: str) -> str: + expr = expr.strip() + if expr in {"true", "True"}: + return "true" + if expr in {"false", "False"}: + return "false" + if expr in {"none", "None", "null"}: + return "nil" + if re.match(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$", expr): + if any(expr == loop_var for loop_var, _idx, _coll in self.loop_stack): + return expr + return f"@{self.local_var(expr)}" + m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$", expr) + if m: + base, key = m.groups() + if any(base == loop_var for loop_var, _idx, _coll in self.loop_stack): + return f"{base}[{key!r}]" + return f"@{self.local_var(base)}[{key!r}]" + return expr + + def expr_to_ruby(self, expr: str) -> str: + expr = expr.strip() + + # JinjaTurtle emits these YAML-preserving ternaries for booleans/nulls. + m = re.match( + r"^(['\"])(true|false)\1\s+if\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+else\s+(['\"])(true|false)\4$", + expr, + ) + if m: + truthy = m.group(2) + cond = self.ruby_value(m.group(3)) + falsy = m.group(5) + return f"{cond} ? {truthy!r} : {falsy!r}" + + m = re.match( + r"^(['\"])(null)\1\s+if\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+none\s+else\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)$", + expr, + ) + if m: + value = self.ruby_value(m.group(3)) + fallback = self.ruby_value(m.group(4)) + return f"{value}.nil? ? 'null' : {fallback}" + + if "|" in expr: + base, *filters = [part.strip() for part in expr.split("|")] + ruby = self.ruby_value(base) + for filt in filters: + if filt.startswith("lower"): + ruby = f"{ruby}.to_s.downcase" + elif filt.startswith("to_json") or filt.startswith("tojson"): + self.needs_json = True + if "indent" in filt: + ruby = f"JSON.pretty_generate({ruby})" + else: + ruby = f"JSON.generate({ruby})" + return ruby + + return self.ruby_value(expr) + + def statement_to_erb(self, stmt: str) -> str: + if stmt.endswith("-"): + stmt = stmt[:-1].rstrip() + + if stmt.startswith("for "): + m = re.match( + r"^for\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s+in\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$", + stmt, + ) + if m: + loop_var, collection = m.groups() + idx_var = f"__jt_idx_{len(self.loop_stack)}" + collection_ruby = self.ruby_value(collection) + self.loop_stack.append((loop_var, idx_var, collection_ruby)) + return f"<% {collection_ruby}.each_with_index do |{loop_var}, {idx_var}| -%>" + + if stmt == "endfor": + if self.loop_stack: + self.loop_stack.pop() + return "<% end %>" + + if stmt.startswith("if "): + cond = stmt[3:].strip() + if cond == "not loop.last" and self.loop_stack: + _loop_var, idx_var, collection_ruby = self.loop_stack[-1] + return f"<% if {idx_var} < ({collection_ruby}.length - 1) -%>" + m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+defined$", cond) + if m: + return f"<% unless {self.ruby_value(m.group(1))}.nil? -%>" + m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+none$", cond) + if m: + return f"<% if {self.ruby_value(m.group(1))}.nil? -%>" + return f"<% if {self.expr_to_ruby(cond)} -%>" + + if stmt == "else": + return "<% else -%>" + + if stmt.startswith("elif "): + return f"<% elsif {self.expr_to_ruby(stmt[5:].strip())} -%>" + + if stmt == "endif": + return "<% end -%>" + + # Preserve unknown Jinja statements visibly as an ERB comment so the + # generated template does not contain invalid Jinja syntax. + return f"<%# Unsupported JinjaTurtle statement: {stmt} %>" + + +def translate_jinja2_to_erb( + template_text: str, + *, + role_prefix: str, + puppet_class: str | None = None, + variable_names: set[str] | None = None, +) -> str: + return ErbTranslator( + role_prefix=role_prefix, + puppet_class=puppet_class, + variable_names=variable_names, + ).translate(template_text) diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/escape.py b/src/jinjaturtle/escape.py deleted file mode 100644 index e55f416..0000000 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/escape.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@ -from __future__ import annotations - -"""Neutralise template metacharacters in text copied verbatim from source files. - -JinjaTurtle preserves formatting by copying parts of the *original* config file -straight into the generated template: comments, blank lines, section headers, -and any line it does not recognise as ``key = value``. Config *values* are -always replaced with ``{{ var }}`` placeholders and parked in the defaults data, -so a payload inside a value is inert. Verbatim text is different: if the source -contains ``{{ ... }}``, ``{% ... %}`` or ``{# ... #}`` (Jinja2), or ``<%= %>`` / -``<% %>`` (ERB), that text becomes *live template code* in the output and is -executed when Ansible later renders the template. - -Because JinjaTurtle is frequently fed harvested, attacker-influenceable config -(hostnames, banners, GECOS-derived comments, "Managed by" notes), this is a -template-injection / SSTI vector that can lead to remote code execution on the -configuration-management control node. - -The functions here render those metacharacters as literal text so they survive a -later template render as the characters the source author actually wrote, rather -than as executable template syntax. - -Design notes: - * We only ever escape text that originates from the *source file*. We never - pass JinjaTurtle's own generated placeholders (``{{ role_var }}``) through - these helpers, so the placeholders keep working. - * Jinja2 literal text is wrapped in a single ``{% raw %} ... {% endraw %}`` - block. ``raw`` disables *all* tag interpretation inside it -- expressions, - statements and ``{# #}`` comments alike -- so one wrap neutralises every - Jinja construct. The only way to break out of a raw block is a literal - ``{% endraw %}`` in the source, so we defang the token ``endraw`` (in any - internal spacing) before wrapping. -""" - -import re - -# Jinja2 delimiters we must neutralise. Engine-default; JinjaTurtle never -# configures custom delimiters. -_JINJA_MARKERS = ("{{", "}}", "{%", "%}", "{#", "#}") - -# ERB delimiters. Longer markers first so "<%=" matches before "<%". -_ERB_OPEN_MARKERS = ("<%=", "<%-", "<%#", "<%") -_ERB_CLOSE_MARKERS = ("-%>", "%>") - -# Matches a Jinja2 endraw tag in any internal spacing and with any -# whitespace-control marker on either side. Jinja2 accepts "-", "+", or no -# marker adjacent to the "%}"/"{%" of a block tag (e.g. "{%endraw%}", -# "{% endraw %}", "{%- endraw -%}", "{%+ endraw +%}"), and ALL of these close -# a raw block. The control marker must be matched so a "{%+ endraw %}" in -# attacker-influenced source text cannot survive defanging and break out of our -# {% raw %} wrapper. [-+]? appears on both sides accordingly. -_ENDRAW_RE = re.compile(r"{%[-+]?\s*endraw\s*[-+]?%}") - -# Sentinel inserted between "end" and "raw" to break the endraw keyword without -# changing the visible characters. We use a Jinja comment-free approach: insert -# the two halves across a raw boundary so the literal text still reads "endraw" -# to a human but is never a valid tag. See escape_jinja_literal for usage. - - -def contains_jinja_markup(text: str) -> bool: - """Return True if *text* contains any Jinja2 delimiter.""" - return any(m in text for m in _JINJA_MARKERS) - - -def _defang_endraw(text: str) -> str: - """Rewrite any literal ``{% endraw %}`` so it cannot close our raw wrapper. - - We turn each endraw tag into ``{% endraw %}{{ '{% endraw %}' }}{% raw %}``... - no -- that would re-introduce live tags. Instead we keep everything literal: - we break the keyword by emitting the tag's text in two raw segments split - inside the word ``endraw``. The result, when later rendered, reproduces the - exact original characters ``{% endraw %}`` while never being a parseable tag. - """ - - def _replace(match: re.Match[str]) -> str: - tag = match.group(0) - # Split the keyword "endraw" as "end" + "raw"; close and reopen the raw - # block between them. Each half is plain text inside a raw block, so the - # reconstructed output is byte-identical to the original tag, but at no - # point does the token "{% endraw %}" exist contiguously to close raw. - idx = tag.lower().index("endraw") - head = tag[: idx + 3] # up to and including "end" - tail = tag[idx + 3 :] # "raw...%}" - return f"{head}{{% endraw %}}{{% raw %}}{tail}" - - return _ENDRAW_RE.sub(_replace, text) - - -def escape_jinja_literal(text: str) -> str: - """Make *text* render as literal characters under a later Jinja2 render. - - Text with no Jinja metacharacters is returned unchanged so the common case - stays byte-for-byte identical to the source. Otherwise the text is wrapped - in a single ``{% raw %}`` block, with any embedded ``endraw`` defanged. - """ - if not text or not contains_jinja_markup(text): - return text - return "{% raw %}" + _defang_endraw(text) + "{% endraw %}" diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/base.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/base.py index 6be91f0..14aaec7 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/base.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/base.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ from __future__ import annotations -import re from pathlib import Path from typing import Any, Iterable @@ -58,20 +57,8 @@ class BaseHandler: role_prefix_section_subsection_key Sanitises parts to lowercase [a-z0-9_] and strips extras. - - Consecutive separators are collapsed to a single underscore. This is - required for correctness, not just aesthetics: a source key such as - ``log..level`` or ``cache--size`` would otherwise sanitise to a name - containing a double underscore (``log__level``). The output safety gate - in ``safety.py`` deliberately rejects *any* ``__`` in a generated - identifier because ``__`` is the gateway to every Jinja2 SSTI gadget - (``__class__``/``__globals__``/...). Emitting a dunder here would make - JinjaTurtle's own gate reject JinjaTurtle's own placeholder, aborting - generation on entirely benign config. Collapsing runs keeps every - generated name a plain single-underscore-delimited identifier that the - gate accepts. """ - role_prefix = re.sub(r"_+", "_", role_prefix.strip().lower()) + role_prefix = role_prefix.strip().lower() clean_parts: list[str] = [] for part in path: @@ -83,9 +70,7 @@ class BaseHandler: cleaned_chars.append(c.lower()) else: cleaned_chars.append("_") - # Collapse runs of underscores (from adjacent separators) to a - # single "_" so the result can never contain a forbidden "__". - cleaned_part = re.sub(r"_+", "_", "".join(cleaned_chars)).strip("_") + cleaned_part = "".join(cleaned_chars).strip("_") if cleaned_part: clean_parts.append(cleaned_part) diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ini.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ini.py index 9f50839..1aa5e22 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ini.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ini.py @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ from typing import Any from . import BaseHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal class IniHandler(BaseHandler): @@ -85,18 +84,16 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler): line = raw_line stripped = line.lstrip() - # Blank or pure comment: keep formatting, but neutralise any - # template metacharacters so attacker-controlled comment text cannot - # become live template code in the output. + # Blank or pure comment: keep as-is if not stripped or stripped[0] in {"#", ";"}: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Section header if stripped.startswith("[") and "]" in stripped: header_inner = stripped[1 : stripped.index("]")] current_section = header_inner.strip() - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Work without newline so we can re-attach it exactly @@ -111,9 +108,8 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler): eq_index = content.find("=") if eq_index == -1: - # Not a simple key=value line: leave content intact but escape - # any template metacharacters. - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + # Not a simple key=value line: leave untouched + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue before_eq = content[:eq_index] @@ -121,7 +117,7 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler): key = before_eq.strip() if not key: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Whitespace after '=' @@ -150,16 +146,8 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler): else: replacement_value = j2.variable(var_name) - # ``before_eq`` (key + surrounding whitespace) and ``comment_part`` - # both originate from the source file and may carry template - # metacharacters; escape each independently so the safe - # ``replacement_value`` placeholder between them is preserved. new_content = ( - escape_jinja_literal(before_eq) - + "=" - + leading_ws - + replacement_value - + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part) + before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part ) out_lines.append(new_content + newline) diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/json.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/json.py index 41699c9..064535a 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/json.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/json.py @@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ from typing import Any from . import DictLikeHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal -from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate, is_safe_loop_field_key +from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler): @@ -110,18 +109,10 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler): chunks: list[str] = [] pos = 0 for path, start, end in spans: - # Text between scalar values (object keys, structural punctuation, - # whitespace, and any comment-like trailing text) is copied verbatim - # from the source file. Like every other text-emitting handler, this - # verbatim text must be neutralised: if it contains Jinja2 markup it - # would otherwise become live template code at apply time. The value - # itself is replaced with a safe placeholder below. ``escape_jinja_literal`` - # is a no-op on text without Jinja markers, so benign JSON is unchanged - # byte-for-byte and a later render reproduces the original characters. - chunks.append(escape_jinja_literal(text[pos:start])) + chunks.append(text[pos:start]) chunks.append(self._json_value_expr(self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path))) pos = end - chunks.append(escape_jinja_literal(text[pos:])) + chunks.append(text[pos:]) return "".join(chunks) def _collect_json_scalar_spans( @@ -222,12 +213,7 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler): def _walk(obj: Any, path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> Any: if isinstance(obj, dict): - # Keys are emitted verbatim into the template, so neutralise any - # Jinja markup in them (see _generate_json_template_from_text). - return { - escape_jinja_literal(str(k)): _walk(v, path + (str(k),)) - for k, v in obj.items() - } + return {k: _walk(v, path + (str(k),)) for k, v in obj.items()} if isinstance(obj, list): return [_walk(v, path + (str(i),)) for i, v in enumerate(obj)] # scalar - use marker that will be replaced with to_json @@ -275,12 +261,7 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler): return f"__LOOP_DICT__{collection_var}__{item_var}__" if isinstance(obj, dict): - # Keys are emitted verbatim into the template, so neutralise any - # Jinja markup in them (see _generate_json_template_from_text). - return { - escape_jinja_literal(str(k)): _walk(v, current_path + (str(k),)) - for k, v in obj.items() - } + return {k: _walk(v, current_path + (str(k),)) for k, v in obj.items()} if isinstance(obj, list): # Check if this list is a loop candidate if current_path in loop_paths: @@ -383,21 +364,8 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler): ] # first line has no indent; we prepend `inner` when emitting for i, key in enumerate(keys): comma = "," if i < len(keys) - 1 else "" - # Defence in depth: never interpolate a raw source key into an - # ``item_var.key`` reference. A key such as ``a }}{{ x`` would break - # out of the value placeholder and inject a live construct that the - # output-safety gate cannot distinguish from a legitimate variable. - if not is_safe_loop_field_key(key): - raise ValueError( - f"refusing to emit loop-item field reference for unsafe key: {key!r}" - ) - # The literal key text is emitted verbatim into the template; escape any - # Jinja markup in it. The value side ({item_var}.{key}) is constrained by - # the output safety gate's dotted-name allowlist, which fails closed on - # anything that is not a plain identifier path. dict_lines.append( - f'{field}"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}": ' - f"{j2.to_json(f'{item_var}.{key}')}{comma}" + f'{field}"{key}": ' f"{j2.to_json(f'{item_var}.{key}')}{comma}" ) # Comma between *items* goes after the closing brace. dict_lines.append(f"{inner}}}{j2.if_not_loop_last()},{j2.endif()}") diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/postfix.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/postfix.py index f6a1974..e2e442a 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/postfix.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/postfix.py @@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ from typing import Any from . import BaseHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler): @@ -109,16 +108,16 @@ class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler): stripped = content.strip() if not stripped: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) i += 1 continue if stripped.startswith("#"): - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) i += 1 continue if "=" not in content: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) i += 1 continue @@ -128,7 +127,7 @@ class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler): key = before_eq.strip() if not key: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) i += 1 continue @@ -163,21 +162,16 @@ class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler): var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, (key,)) v = value - # ``before_eq`` (key) and ``comment_part`` are source-derived and may - # contain template metacharacters; escape each around the safe - # placeholder. - safe_before = escape_jinja_literal(before_eq) - safe_comment = escape_jinja_literal(comment_part) quoted = len(v) >= 2 and v[0] == v[-1] and v[0] in {'"', "'"} if quoted: replacement = ( - f"{safe_before}={leading_ws}{j2.quoted_variable(var)}" - f"{safe_comment}{newline}" + f"{before_eq}={leading_ws}{j2.quoted_variable(var)}" + f"{comment_part}{newline}" ) else: replacement = ( - f"{safe_before}={leading_ws}{j2.variable(var)}" - f"{safe_comment}{newline}" + f"{before_eq}={leading_ws}{j2.variable(var)}" + f"{comment_part}{newline}" ) out_lines.append(replacement) diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ssh.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ssh.py index f588a33..a6c0d2f 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ssh.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ssh.py @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ from typing import Any from . import BaseHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal _SECTION_KEYWORDS = {"host", "match"} @@ -256,12 +255,12 @@ class SshConfigHandler(BaseHandler): out_lines: list[str] = [] for ln in parsed.lines: if ln.kind != "kv": - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(ln.raw)) + out_lines.append(ln.raw) continue path = self._path_for_line(ln) if not path: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(ln.raw)) + out_lines.append(ln.raw) continue var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path) @@ -271,12 +270,9 @@ class SshConfigHandler(BaseHandler): else: replacement_value = j2.variable(var) - # ``before_value`` (keyword + spacing) and ``comment`` are - # source-derived; escape around the safe placeholder. rendered = ( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(ln.before_value)}{replacement_value}" - f"{ln.whitespace_before_comment}" - f"{escape_jinja_literal(ln.comment)}{ln.newline}" + f"{ln.before_value}{replacement_value}" + f"{ln.whitespace_before_comment}{ln.comment}{ln.newline}" ) out_lines.append(rendered) diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/systemd.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/systemd.py index d28a8c5..8118808 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/systemd.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/systemd.py @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ from typing import Any from . import BaseHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal @dataclass @@ -158,13 +157,7 @@ class SystemdUnitHandler(BaseHandler): out_lines: list[str] = [] for ln in parsed.lines: if ln.kind != "kv" or not ln.section or not ln.key: - # Verbatim lines (blank/comment/section/unrecognised "raw") - # originate from the source file. Escape template - # metacharacters so they cannot become live template code. - # This is the only handler that emits unrecognised lines, which - # is where Jinja *statement* injection (``{% ... %}``) was - # possible, so escaping here is essential. - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(ln.raw)) + out_lines.append(ln.raw) continue path: tuple[str, ...] = (ln.section, ln.key) @@ -173,18 +166,16 @@ class SystemdUnitHandler(BaseHandler): var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path) v = (ln.value or "").strip() - safe_before = escape_jinja_literal(ln.before_eq) - safe_comment = escape_jinja_literal(ln.comment) quoted = len(v) >= 2 and v[0] == v[-1] and v[0] in {'"', "'"} if quoted: repl = ( - f"{safe_before}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}" - f"{j2.quoted_variable(var)}{safe_comment}" + f"{ln.before_eq}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}" + f"{j2.quoted_variable(var)}{ln.comment}" ) else: repl = ( - f"{safe_before}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}" - f"{j2.variable(var)}{safe_comment}" + f"{ln.before_eq}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}" + f"{j2.variable(var)}{ln.comment}" ) newline = "\n" if ln.raw.endswith("\n") else "" diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/toml.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/toml.py index b2aa6e5..15d5a2a 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/toml.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/toml.py @@ -5,8 +5,7 @@ from typing import Any from . import DictLikeHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal -from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate, is_safe_loop_field_key +from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate try: import tomllib @@ -78,25 +77,19 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): def emit_kv(path: tuple[str, ...], key: str, value: Any) -> None: var_name = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,)) if isinstance(value, str): - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}") elif isinstance(value, bool): # Booleans need | lower filter (Python True/False → TOML true/false) - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}") else: - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}") def walk(obj: dict[str, Any], path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None: scalar_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if not isinstance(v, dict)} nested_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if isinstance(v, dict)} if path: - header = ".".join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in path) + header = ".".join(path) lines.append(f"[{header}]") for key, val in scalar_items.items(): @@ -137,14 +130,10 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): def emit_kv(path: tuple[str, ...], key: str, value: Any) -> None: var_name = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,)) if isinstance(value, str): - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}") elif isinstance(value, bool): # Booleans need | lower filter (Python True/False → TOML true/false) - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}") elif isinstance(value, list): # Check if this list is a loop candidate if path + (key,) in loop_paths: @@ -168,26 +157,19 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): elif candidate.item_schema in ("simple_dict", "nested"): # Dict list loop - TOML array of tables # This is complex for TOML, using simplified approach - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = " - f"{j2.to_json(var_name)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = " f"{j2.to_json(var_name)}") else: # Not a loop, treat as regular variable - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}") else: - lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}" - ) + lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}") def walk(obj: dict[str, Any], path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None: scalar_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if not isinstance(v, dict)} nested_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if isinstance(v, dict)} if path: - header = ".".join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in path) + header = ".".join(path) lines.append(f"[{header}]") for key, val in scalar_items.items(): @@ -235,7 +217,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): # Blank or pure comment if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"): - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Table header: [server] or [server.tls] or [[array.of.tables]] @@ -248,7 +230,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): inner = inner.strip("[]") # handle [[table]] as well parts = [p.strip() for p in inner.split(".") if p.strip()] current_table = tuple(parts) - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Try key = value @@ -263,7 +245,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): eq_index = content.find("=") if eq_index == -1: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue before_eq = content[:eq_index] @@ -271,7 +253,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): key = before_eq.strip() if not key: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Whitespace after '=' @@ -307,23 +289,19 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): nested_var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, nested_path) if isinstance(sub_val, str): inner_bits.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}" + f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}" ) elif isinstance(sub_val, bool): inner_bits.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" + f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" ) else: inner_bits.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" + f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" ) replacement_value = "{ " + ", ".join(inner_bits) + " }" new_content = ( - escape_jinja_literal(before_eq) - + "=" - + leading_ws - + replacement_value - + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part) + before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part ) out_lines.append(new_content + newline) continue @@ -349,11 +327,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): replacement_value = j2.variable(var_name) new_content = ( - escape_jinja_literal(before_eq) - + "=" - + leading_ws - + replacement_value - + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part) + before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part ) out_lines.append(new_content + newline) @@ -381,7 +355,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"): # Only output if we're not skipping if not skip_until_next_table: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Table header: [server] or [server.tls] or [[array.of.tables]] @@ -430,39 +404,25 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): out_lines.append( f"{j2.for_start(item_var, collection_var)}\n" ) - out_lines.append( - f"[[{'.'.join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in table_path)}]]\n" - ) + out_lines.append(f"[[{'.'.join(table_path)}]]\n") # Add fields from sample item for key, value in sample_item.items(): if key == "_key": continue - # Defence in depth: the loop analyzer refuses a - # dict-loop whose items contain a non-identifier - # key, so ``key`` is always a plain identifier - # here. Never interpolate a raw key into an - # ``item_var.key`` reference: a key such as - # ``a }}{{ x`` would break out of the placeholder - # and inject a live construct. - if not is_safe_loop_field_key(key): - raise ValueError( - "refusing to emit loop-item field " - f"reference for unsafe key: {key!r}" - ) if isinstance(value, str): out_lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = " + f"{key} = " f"{self._toml_quoted_expr(f'{item_var}.{key}')}\n" ) elif isinstance(value, bool): out_lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = " + f"{key} = " f"{self._toml_value_expr(f'{item_var}.{key}', value)}\n" ) else: out_lines.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = " + f"{key} = " f"{self._toml_value_expr(f'{item_var}.{key}', value)}\n" ) @@ -477,7 +437,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): skip_until_next_table = False current_table = table_path - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # If we're inside a skipped array-of-tables section, skip this line @@ -496,7 +456,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): eq_index = content.find("=") if eq_index == -1: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue before_eq = content[:eq_index] @@ -504,7 +464,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): key = before_eq.strip() if not key: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Whitespace after '=' @@ -541,11 +501,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): replacement_value = j2.to_json(collection_var) new_content = ( - escape_jinja_literal(before_eq) - + "=" - + leading_ws - + replacement_value - + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part) + before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part ) out_lines.append(new_content + newline) continue @@ -570,23 +526,19 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): nested_var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, nested_path) if isinstance(sub_val, str): inner_bits.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}" + f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}" ) elif isinstance(sub_val, bool): inner_bits.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" + f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" ) else: inner_bits.append( - f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" + f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}" ) replacement_value = "{ " + ", ".join(inner_bits) + " }" new_content = ( - escape_jinja_literal(before_eq) - + "=" - + leading_ws - + replacement_value - + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part) + before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part ) out_lines.append(new_content + newline) continue @@ -612,11 +564,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler): replacement_value = j2.variable(var_name) new_content = ( - escape_jinja_literal(before_eq) - + "=" - + leading_ws - + replacement_value - + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part) + before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part ) out_lines.append(new_content + newline) diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/xml.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/xml.py index 56e3fd7..51c7a73 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/xml.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/xml.py @@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations from collections import Counter, defaultdict from pathlib import Path from typing import Any -import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET # nosec B405 - safe trees only; parsing uses defusedxml -import defusedxml.ElementTree as DET +import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET # nosec from .base import BaseHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate @@ -21,11 +19,11 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler): def parse(self, path: Path) -> ET.Element: text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - # Security must live in the handler, not only in the CLI entry point: - # callers may import JinjaTurtle as a library and invoke parse_config() - # directly. defusedxml rejects DTD/entity abuse and also discards - # comments by default, matching the previous TreeBuilder behaviour. - root = DET.fromstring(text) + parser = ET.XMLParser( + target=ET.TreeBuilder(insert_comments=False) + ) # nosec B314 + parser.feed(text) + root = parser.close() return root def flatten(self, parsed: Any) -> list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]]: @@ -232,37 +230,6 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler): walk(root, ()) - # Internal marker prefixes used by JinjaTurtle's own comment nodes. These - # must NOT be escaped (they are converted into real Jinja control structures - # downstream). Source-file comments have none of these prefixes. - _MARKER_PREFIXES = ("LOOP:", "IF:", "ENDIF:") - - def _is_jt_marker(self, comment_text: str) -> bool: - stripped = (comment_text or "").lstrip() - return any(stripped.startswith(p) for p in self._MARKER_PREFIXES) - - def _escape_source_comments(self, root: ET.Element) -> None: - """Escape template metacharacters in comments preserved from the source. - - XML comments are re-emitted verbatim by ``ET.tostring`` (the tree is - parsed with ``insert_comments=True``). Attacker-controlled comment text - such as ```` would otherwise become live - template code. Element/attribute *names* cannot carry Jinja delimiters - (XML naming rules forbid the characters and the parser rejects them), and - text/attribute *values* are already replaced with ``{{ var }}`` - placeholders, so comments (and the prolog, handled separately) are the - only XML injection vector. - - JinjaTurtle's own internal marker comments are left untouched so they can - be converted into real loops/conditionals later. - """ - # ET represents comments with a callable tag (ET.Comment). Iterate all - # descendants and escape comment text that is not one of our markers. - for elem in root.iter(): - if elem.tag is ET.Comment: - if not self._is_jt_marker(elem.text or ""): - elem.text = escape_jinja_literal(elem.text or "") - def _generate_xml_template_from_text(self, role_prefix: str, text: str) -> str: """Generate scalar-only Jinja2 template.""" prolog, body = self._split_xml_prolog(text) @@ -273,16 +240,12 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler): self._apply_jinja_to_xml_tree(role_prefix, root) - # Neutralise template metacharacters in any comments preserved from the - # source file before serialising. - self._escape_source_comments(root) - indent = getattr(ET, "indent", None) if indent is not None: indent(root, space=" ") # type: ignore[arg-type] xml_body = ET.tostring(root, encoding="unicode") - return escape_jinja_literal(prolog) + xml_body + return prolog + xml_body def _generate_xml_template_with_loops_from_text( self, @@ -302,11 +265,6 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler): # Apply Jinja transformations (including loop markers) self._apply_jinja_to_xml_tree(role_prefix, root, loop_candidates) - # Escape comments preserved from the source. JinjaTurtle's own - # LOOP/IF/ENDIF marker comments are recognised and left intact so they - # can be converted into real Jinja control structures below. - self._escape_source_comments(root) - # Convert to string indent = getattr(ET, "indent", None) if indent is not None: @@ -317,7 +275,7 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler): # Post-process to replace loop markers with actual Jinja loops xml_body = self._insert_xml_loops(xml_body, role_prefix, loop_candidates, root) - return escape_jinja_literal(prolog) + xml_body + return prolog + xml_body def _insert_xml_loops( self, diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/yaml.py b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/yaml.py index 9a868a6..19013f8 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/yaml.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/yaml.py @@ -6,41 +6,9 @@ from typing import Any from .dict import DictLikeHandler from .. import j2 -from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal -from ..loop_analyzer import is_safe_loop_field_key from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate -def _reject_recursive_structure(obj: Any) -> None: - """Raise ``yaml.YAMLError`` if *obj* contains a reference cycle. - - A recursive YAML anchor (``a: &a [*a]``) produces a container that contains - itself. Every consumer in JinjaTurtle walks the parsed object depth-first, - so a cycle would raise ``RecursionError`` deep in unrelated code. Detect it - up front by tracking the ``id()`` of containers on the current descent path; - a repeat means a cycle. ``yaml.YAMLError`` is raised so ``parse_config`` - normalises it into a clean ``ConfigParseError`` like any other malformed - input, rather than surfacing a stack-overflow traceback. - """ - - on_path: set[int] = set() - - def walk(node: Any) -> None: - if isinstance(node, (dict, list)): - marker = id(node) - if marker in on_path: - raise yaml.YAMLError( - "recursive/self-referential YAML structure is not supported" - ) - on_path.add(marker) - children = node.values() if isinstance(node, dict) else node - for child in children: - walk(child) - on_path.discard(marker) - - walk(obj) - - class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): """ YAML handler that can generate both scalar templates and loop-based templates. @@ -51,16 +19,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): def parse(self, path: Path) -> Any: text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - parsed = yaml.safe_load(text) or {} - # PyYAML's safe_load happily builds *recursive* structures from an anchor - # that references itself (e.g. ``a: &a [*a]``). Downstream flattening, - # timestamp-stringifying and template generation all walk the parsed - # object recursively and would blow the Python stack (RecursionError) on - # such input. JinjaTurtle is regularly pointed at harvested, - # attacker-influenceable config, so reject a self-referential document - # cleanly here rather than crashing later. - _reject_recursive_structure(parsed) - return parsed + return yaml.safe_load(text) or {} def generate_jinja2_template( self, @@ -143,7 +102,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): indent = len(raw_line) - len(stripped) if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"): - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue while stack and indent < stack[-1][0]: @@ -153,7 +112,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): key_part, rest = stripped.split(":", 1) key = key_part.strip() if not key: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue rest_stripped = rest.lstrip(" \t") @@ -166,7 +125,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): stack.append((indent, path, "map")) if not has_value: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue value_part, comment_part = self._split_inline_comment( @@ -188,8 +147,8 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value) leading = rest[: len(rest) - len(rest.lstrip(" \t"))] - new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}" - new_stripped = f"{escape_jinja_literal(key)}:{new_rest}" + new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{comment_part}" + new_stripped = f"{key}:{new_rest}" out_lines.append( " " * indent + new_stripped @@ -226,7 +185,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): else: replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value) - new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}" + new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{comment_part}" out_lines.append( " " * indent + new_stripped @@ -234,7 +193,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): ) continue - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) return "".join(out_lines) @@ -316,7 +275,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): next_line = next_significant_line(line_index) if next_line is None: skip_until_indent = None - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) else: next_indent, next_stripped = next_line still_in_collection = next_indent > skip_until_indent or ( @@ -325,12 +284,12 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): ) if not still_in_collection: skip_until_indent = None - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue if is_comment: if indent <= skip_until_indent: skip_until_indent = None - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) # Comments/blank lines indented beneath the replaced # collection are considered part of that collection and # cannot be placed safely inside a generated loop. @@ -344,7 +303,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): # Blank or comment lines if is_blank or is_comment: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Adjust stack based on indent @@ -356,7 +315,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): key_part, rest = stripped.split(":", 1) key = key_part.strip() if not key: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue rest_stripped = rest.lstrip(" \t") @@ -394,7 +353,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): continue if not has_value: - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) continue # Scalar value - replace with variable @@ -417,8 +376,8 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value) leading = rest[: len(rest) - len(rest.lstrip(" \t"))] - new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}" - new_stripped = f"{escape_jinja_literal(key)}:{new_rest}" + new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{comment_part}" + new_stripped = f"{key}:{new_rest}" out_lines.append( " " * indent + new_stripped @@ -480,7 +439,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): else: replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value) - new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}" + new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{comment_part}" out_lines.append( " " * indent + new_stripped @@ -488,7 +447,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): ) continue - out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line)) + out_lines.append(raw_line) return "".join(out_lines) @@ -521,7 +480,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): lines: list[str] = [] if not is_list: key = candidate.path[-1] if candidate.path else "items" - lines.append(f"{indent_str}{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}:") + lines.append(f"{indent_str}{key}:") item_lines: list[str] = [] if candidate.items: @@ -551,10 +510,10 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): # into the rendered YAML and nesting the next top-level key. lines.append(f"{j2.for_start(item_var, collection_var)}{item_lines[0]}") lines.extend(item_lines[1:]) - lines.append(j2.for_end(keep_trailing_newline=True)) + lines.append(j2.for_end()) else: lines.append(j2.for_start(item_var, collection_var)) - lines.append(j2.for_end(keep_trailing_newline=True)) + lines.append(j2.for_end()) return "\n".join(lines) @@ -587,31 +546,15 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler): # Special key for dict collections - output as comment or skip continue - # Defence in depth: the loop analyzer already refuses a dict-loop - # whose items contain a non-identifier key (see _analyze_dict_schema), - # so ``key`` should always be a plain identifier here. Assert it - # rather than interpolate a raw key into a Jinja reference: a key such - # as ``a }}{{ x`` would otherwise close the placeholder and inject a - # live construct that the output gate cannot distinguish from a - # legitimate variable. - if not is_safe_loop_field_key(key): - raise ValueError( - f"refusing to emit loop-item field reference for unsafe key: {key!r}" - ) - if first_key and is_list_item: # First key gets the list marker value_expr = self._yaml_value_expr(f"{loop_var}.{key}", value) - lines.append( - f"{indent_str}- {escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}: {value_expr}" - ) + lines.append(f"{indent_str}- {key}: {value_expr}") first_key = False else: # Subsequent keys are indented sub_indent = indent + 2 if is_list_item else indent value_expr = self._yaml_value_expr(f"{loop_var}.{key}", value) - lines.append( - f"{' ' * sub_indent}{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}: {value_expr}" - ) + lines.append(f"{' ' * sub_indent}{key}: {value_expr}") return lines diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/j2.py b/src/jinjaturtle/j2.py index e20ed20..498a39e 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/j2.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/j2.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations from typing import Any +NAME = "jinja2" TEMPLATE_EXTENSION = "j2" JSON_VALUE_FILTER = "to_json(ensure_ascii=False)" @@ -42,19 +43,10 @@ def to_json( return filtered(value, f"to_json({', '.join(args)})") -def statement( - value: str, - *, - trim_right: bool = False, - keep_trailing_newline: bool = False, -) -> str: +def statement(value: str, *, trim_right: bool = False) -> str: """Return a Jinja2 statement tag for an already-built statement body.""" - if trim_right and keep_trailing_newline: - raise ValueError("trim_right and keep_trailing_newline are mutually exclusive") if trim_right: return f"{{% {value} -%}}" - if keep_trailing_newline: - return f"{{% {value} +%}}" return f"{{% {value} %}}" @@ -74,12 +66,8 @@ def for_start(item_var: str, collection_var: str) -> str: return statement(f"for {item_var} in {collection_var}") -def for_end(*, trim_right: bool = False, keep_trailing_newline: bool = False) -> str: - return statement( - "endfor", - trim_right=trim_right, - keep_trailing_newline=keep_trailing_newline, - ) +def for_end(*, trim_right: bool = False) -> str: + return statement("endfor", trim_right=trim_right) def yaml_scalar_expression(var_name: str, raw_value: str | None = None) -> str: diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/loop_analyzer.py b/src/jinjaturtle/loop_analyzer.py index 608c8e4..23702d8 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/loop_analyzer.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/loop_analyzer.py @@ -7,34 +7,10 @@ instead of flattened scalar variables. from __future__ import annotations -import re from collections import Counter from typing import Any, Literal -# A dict-loop emits per-item field references of the form ``loopvar.``. -# ```` is derived from a source key, which is attacker-influenceable when -# JinjaTurtle is fed harvested config. The output-safety gate only accepts a -# reference whose every hop matches this identifier class, so a key must reduce -# to exactly this shape before it can be used as a loop-item field. Anything else -# (a key containing ``}}``, quotes, ``.``, ``__``, ...) must not be turned into a -# loop; the caller falls back to scalar generation, where every value goes through -# make_var_name() and all verbatim text is escaped. -_SAFE_LOOP_FIELD_RE = re.compile(r"(?!\w*__)[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\Z") - - -def is_safe_loop_field_key(key: Any) -> bool: - """Return True if *key* is safe to emit as a ``loopvar.`` field access. - - The check mirrors the output-safety gate's identifier class (single - identifier, no double underscore). A key that does not match cannot be - expressed as a dotted loop-item reference without risking template - injection, so a loop candidate containing such a key is rejected upstream. - """ - - return bool(_SAFE_LOOP_FIELD_RE.match(str(key))) - - class LoopCandidate: """ Represents a detected loop opportunity in the config structure. @@ -289,19 +265,6 @@ class LoopAnalyzer: if not dicts: return "heterogeneous" - # Security: a dict-loop emits ``loopvar.`` field references. If any - # item key is not a plain identifier, it cannot be expressed safely as a - # dotted reference (a key such as ``a }}{{ x`` would break out of the - # placeholder and inject a live construct). Refuse the loop so the caller - # falls back to scalar generation, which escapes all verbatim text and - # routes every value through make_var_name(). - for d in dicts: - for k in d.keys(): - if k == "_key": - continue - if not is_safe_loop_field_key(k): - return "heterogeneous" - # Get key sets from each dict key_sets = [set(d.keys()) for d in dicts] diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/multi.py b/src/jinjaturtle/multi.py index ce54e1c..05f92b3 100644 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/multi.py +++ b/src/jinjaturtle/multi.py @@ -22,26 +22,15 @@ Notes: from collections import Counter, defaultdict from copy import deepcopy -import os import configparser -import stat -import sys from dataclasses import dataclass from pathlib import Path from typing import Any, Iterable import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET # nosec from . import j2 -from .core import ( - dump_yaml, - flatten_config, - make_var_name, - parse_config, - ConfigParseError, -) +from .core import dump_yaml, flatten_config, make_var_name, parse_config from .handlers.xml import XmlHandler -from .safety import verify_jinja2_template_safe, verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys -from .escape import escape_jinja_literal SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES: dict[str, set[str]] = { @@ -53,23 +42,8 @@ SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES: dict[str, set[str]] = { } -def _lstat(path: Path) -> os.stat_result: - return path.lstat() - - def is_supported_file(path: Path) -> bool: - """Return True only for real regular files with supported suffixes. - - pathlib.Path.is_file() follows symlinks. Folder mode must not follow - attacker-controlled symlinks when run over an untrusted tree, especially if - an administrator accidentally runs the CLI as root. - """ - - try: - st = _lstat(path) - except FileNotFoundError: - return False - if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode): + if not path.is_file(): return False suffix = path.suffix.lower() for exts in SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES.values(): @@ -79,16 +53,11 @@ def is_supported_file(path: Path) -> bool: def iter_supported_files(root: Path, recursive: bool) -> list[Path]: - try: - st = _lstat(root) - except FileNotFoundError: + if not root.exists(): raise FileNotFoundError(str(root)) - - if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode): - raise ValueError(f"refusing to follow symlink: {root}") - if stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode): + if root.is_file(): return [root] if is_supported_file(root) else [] - if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode): + if not root.is_dir(): return [] it = root.rglob("*") if recursive else root.glob("*") @@ -191,11 +160,6 @@ def _yaml_render_union( if isinstance(union_obj, dict): for key, val in union_obj.items(): key_path = path + (str(key),) - # The key text is copied verbatim into the template; escape it so an - # attacker-influenced key (e.g. ``{{ 7*7 }}``) cannot become live - # template code. ``key_path`` (used only to build sanitised var - # names) keeps the original key. - safe_key = escape_jinja_literal(str(key)) cond_var = ( defined_var_name(role_prefix, key_path) if key_path in optional_containers @@ -206,13 +170,13 @@ def _yaml_render_union( value = _yaml_scalar_placeholder(role_prefix, key_path, val) if cond_var: lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(cond_var)}") - lines.append(f"{ind}{safe_key}: {value}") + lines.append(f"{ind}{key}: {value}") if cond_var: lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.endif()}") else: if cond_var: lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(cond_var)}") - lines.append(f"{ind}{safe_key}:") + lines.append(f"{ind}{key}:") lines.extend( _yaml_render_union( role_prefix, @@ -250,7 +214,6 @@ def _yaml_render_union( first = True for k, v in item.items(): kp = item_path + (str(k),) - safe_k = escape_jinja_literal(str(k)) k_cond = ( defined_var_name(role_prefix, kp) if kp in optional_containers @@ -261,14 +224,14 @@ def _yaml_render_union( if first: if k_cond: lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(k_cond)}") - lines.append(f"{ind}- {safe_k}: {value}") + lines.append(f"{ind}- {k}: {value}") if k_cond: lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.endif()}") first = False else: if k_cond: lines.append(f"{ind} {j2.if_defined(k_cond)}") - lines.append(f"{ind} {safe_k}: {value}") + lines.append(f"{ind} {k}: {value}") if k_cond: lines.append(f"{ind} {j2.endif()}") else: @@ -276,7 +239,7 @@ def _yaml_render_union( if first: if k_cond: lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(k_cond)}") - lines.append(f"{ind}- {safe_k}:") + lines.append(f"{ind}- {k}:") lines.extend( _yaml_render_union( role_prefix, @@ -292,7 +255,7 @@ def _yaml_render_union( else: if k_cond: lines.append(f"{ind} {j2.if_defined(k_cond)}") - lines.append(f"{ind} {safe_k}:") + lines.append(f"{ind} {k}:") lines.extend( _yaml_render_union( role_prefix, @@ -338,7 +301,6 @@ def _toml_render_union( def emit_kv(path: tuple[str, ...], key: str, value: Any) -> None: var_name = make_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,)) - safe_key = escape_jinja_literal(str(key)) cond = ( defined_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,)) if (path + (key,)) in optional_containers @@ -347,11 +309,11 @@ def _toml_render_union( if cond: lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(cond)}") if isinstance(value, str): - lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var_name)}") + lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var_name)}") elif isinstance(value, bool): - lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.lower(var_name)}") + lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.lower(var_name)}") else: - lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.variable(var_name)}") + lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.variable(var_name)}") if cond: lines.append(j2.endif()) @@ -364,7 +326,7 @@ def _toml_render_union( ) if cond: lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(cond)}") - lines.append(f"[{'.'.join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in path)}]") + lines.append(f"[{'.'.join(path)}]") scalar_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if not isinstance(v, dict)} nested_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if isinstance(v, dict)} @@ -450,11 +412,10 @@ def _ini_render_union( ) if sec_cond: lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(sec_cond)}") - lines.append(f"[{escape_jinja_literal(str(section))}]") + lines.append(f"[{section}]") for key, raw_val in union.items(section, raw=True): path = (section, key) var = make_var_name(role_prefix, path) - safe_key = escape_jinja_literal(str(key)) key_cond = ( defined_var_name(role_prefix, path) if path in optional_keys else None ) @@ -463,9 +424,9 @@ def _ini_render_union( if key_cond: lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(key_cond)}") if quoted: - lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var)}") + lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var)}") else: - lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.variable(var)}") + lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.variable(var)}") if key_cond: lines.append(j2.endif()) lines.append("") @@ -638,13 +599,7 @@ def process_directory( # Parse and group by format grouped: dict[str, list[tuple[Path, Any]]] = defaultdict(list) for p in files: - try: - fmt, parsed = parse_config(p, None) - except ConfigParseError as exc: - # One malformed file should not abort processing of an entire - # directory. Skip it with a warning; the rest still generate. - print(f"jinjaturtle: skipping {p}: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) - continue + fmt, parsed = parse_config(p, None) if fmt not in FOLDER_SUPPORTED_FORMATS: # Directory mode only supports a subset of formats for now. continue @@ -814,12 +769,4 @@ def process_directory( defaults_doc[out.list_var] = out.items defaults_yaml = dump_yaml(defaults_doc, sort_keys=True) - # Defence in depth: folder-mode union templates are built by their own - # renderers (not core.generate_jinja2_template), so gate each one here too. - # Any un-neutralised source text that became a live tag aborts generation. - for out in outputs: - verify_jinja2_template_safe(out.template) - if out.fmt == "json": - verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(out.template) - return defaults_yaml, outputs diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/output_safety.py b/src/jinjaturtle/output_safety.py deleted file mode 100644 index eac40f9..0000000 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/output_safety.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,191 +0,0 @@ -from __future__ import annotations - -"""Safer file-output helpers for the JinjaTurtle CLI. - -The CLI is often used by administrators. A plain Path.write_text() follows a -final-path symlink and can therefore be dangerous when a root-run invocation -writes into an attacker-writable tree. These helpers validate path components, -refuse symlink parents, reject root-run output through untrusted parent -components, write through a temporary file in the target directory, and replace -the final path atomically. Existing final-path symlinks are refused rather than -followed. -""" - -import os -from pathlib import Path -import stat -import tempfile - - -class OutputPathError(OSError): - """Raised when a requested output path is unsafe.""" - - -# Keep a reference to the real euid getter. Tests can monkeypatch -# _effective_uid directly without changing process-wide os.geteuid behaviour. -_OS_GETEUID = getattr(os, "geteuid", None) - - -def _effective_uid() -> int | None: - if _OS_GETEUID is None: - return None - try: - return int(_OS_GETEUID()) - except OSError: - return None - - -def _absolute(path: Path) -> Path: - expanded = path.expanduser() - return expanded if expanded.is_absolute() else Path.cwd() / expanded - - -def _chmod_private(path: Path) -> None: - try: - os.chmod(path, 0o700) - except OSError: - # Best-effort; mkdir(mode=0o700) is already used for normal filesystems. - pass - - -def _assert_trusted_root_parent(path: Path, st: os.stat_result) -> None: - """Reject root-run output through attacker-controlled parent directories. - - A root-run JinjaTurtle process may write files that an administrator later - applies as configuration-management input. Parent directories controlled by - an unprivileged user are therefore not acceptable output anchors. Root-owned - sticky shared directories such as /tmp are allowed as a boundary, but any - existing child below them must be root-owned and not writable by group/other. - """ - - if _effective_uid() != 0: - return - if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode): - raise OutputPathError(f"output parent is not a directory: {path}") - if st.st_uid != 0: - raise OutputPathError( - f"output parent is not owned by root; refusing root-run output: {path}" - ) - writable_by_group_or_other = st.st_mode & (stat.S_IWGRP | stat.S_IWOTH) - sticky = st.st_mode & stat.S_ISVTX - if writable_by_group_or_other and not sticky: - raise OutputPathError( - "output parent is writable by group/other; " - f"refusing root-run output: {path}" - ) - - -def _assert_existing_directory_component(path: Path) -> None: - try: - st = path.lstat() - except OSError as exc: - raise OutputPathError(f"unable to inspect output parent: {path}") from exc - if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode): - raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to use symlink parent: {path}") - if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode): - raise OutputPathError(f"output parent is not a directory: {path}") - _assert_trusted_root_parent(path, st) - - -def _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(path: Path) -> Path: - """Create/validate a directory tree one component at a time. - - pathlib.mkdir(parents=True) can traverse a symlink inserted after a parent - pre-check. Walking one component at a time keeps every existing component - checked before it is used, and newly-created components are immediately - re-inspected. - """ - - out = _absolute(path) - parts = out.parts - if not parts: - return out - - if out.is_absolute(): - cur = Path(parts[0]) - rest = parts[1:] - _assert_existing_directory_component(cur) - else: - # _absolute() currently always returns an absolute path, but keep this - # branch for clarity if that helper is ever relaxed. - cur = Path.cwd() - rest = parts - _assert_existing_directory_component(cur) - - for part in rest: - cur = cur / part - if os.path.lexists(cur): - _assert_existing_directory_component(cur) - continue - try: - os.mkdir(cur, 0o700) - except FileExistsError: - _assert_existing_directory_component(cur) - continue - _chmod_private(cur) - _assert_existing_directory_component(cur) - - return out - - -def _check_existing_output_file(path: Path) -> None: - try: - st = path.lstat() - except FileNotFoundError: - return - if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode): - raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to write through symlink: {path}") - if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode): - raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to replace non-regular file: {path}") - - -def _check_parent_components(parent: Path) -> None: - """Require every existing parent component to be a trusted real directory.""" - - _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(parent) - - -def ensure_safe_directory(path: Path) -> None: - """Create or validate a directory tree without accepting unsafe parents.""" - - _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(path) - - -def write_text_safely(path: Path, text: str, *, encoding: str = "utf-8") -> None: - """Write text without following a final-path symlink. - - The target's parent is created/validated component by component. Existing - parent symlinks are refused for every user. When running as root, existing - parent components must also be root-owned and not writable by group/other, - except for sticky shared boundaries such as /tmp. Existing final-path - symlinks are refused rather than followed. - """ - - path = _absolute(path) - parent = _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(path.parent) - _check_existing_output_file(path) - - fd = -1 - tmp_name: str | None = None - try: - fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp( - prefix=f".{path.name}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=str(parent), text=True - ) - with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding=encoding) as f: - fd = -1 - f.write(text) - f.flush() - os.fsync(f.fileno()) - os.chmod(tmp_name, 0o600) - _check_parent_components(path.parent) - _check_existing_output_file(path) - os.replace(tmp_name, path) - tmp_name = None - finally: - if fd >= 0: - os.close(fd) - if tmp_name is not None: - try: - os.unlink(tmp_name) - except FileNotFoundError: - pass diff --git a/src/jinjaturtle/safety.py b/src/jinjaturtle/safety.py deleted file mode 100644 index 938f2ad..0000000 --- a/src/jinjaturtle/safety.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,382 +0,0 @@ -from __future__ import annotations - -"""Output safety gate for generated templates (defence in depth). - -JinjaTurtle's first line of defence is per-handler escaping: every piece of -verbatim source text is meant to be wrapped/neutralised before it reaches the -template (see ``escape.py``). That model is correct but *fragile*: it relies on -every handler remembering to escape at every site, and on the escaper being -exactly right for every delimiter form. A single forgotten call site -- or a -new handler, or a missed delimiter variant -- silently reopens a -template-injection / SSTI path that can become remote code execution on the -configuration-management control node when the template is later rendered. - -This module adds a second, independent line of defence that does **not** depend -on getting every escape right. It inspects the *finished* template and proves a -single global property: - - Every *live* template construct in the output is one that JinjaTurtle itself - legitimately emits. Anything else can only have originated from - un-neutralised source text, so generation fails loudly instead of emitting a - dangerous template. - -The check is positive/allowlist-based, which is the safe direction: unknown -constructs are rejected, not ignored. It runs at the single choke points in -``core.py`` (``generate_jinja2_template``) so it covers every current handler and -every future one automatically. - -Why this is robust against the escaper being wrong ---------------------------------------------------- -We tokenise with Jinja2's own lexer. The lexer emits a JinjaTurtle -``{% raw %} ... {% endraw %}`` wrapper as ``raw_begin`` / inert ``data`` / -``raw_end``: the wrapped literal text is *not* tokenised as live tags. So the -verifier only ever sees, as live constructs, the tags Jinja2 would actually -execute. If an escaped block was mis-wrapped such that a payload escapes the -raw wrapper (the historical ``{%+ endraw %}`` bug), that payload now appears as a -*live* token here and is rejected -- the gate catches the failure even though -the escaper produced it. -""" - -import re - -__all__ = [ - "TemplateSafetyError", - "verify_jinja2_template_safe", - "verify_erb_template_safe", - "verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys", -] - - -class TemplateSafetyError(Exception): - """Raised when a generated template contains a construct JinjaTurtle would - never emit, indicating that un-neutralised source text became live template - code. Generation must abort rather than emit the template.""" - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Allowlist grammar for JinjaTurtle-emitted Jinja2. -# -# JinjaTurtle emits a deliberately tiny subset of Jinja2. Each pattern below -# describes the *full body* of a tag (the text between ``{%``/``%}`` or -# ``{{``/``}}``), already stripped of surrounding whitespace and of any ``-``/ -# ``+`` whitespace-control markers. Identifiers (variable names, loop vars, -# keys) are restricted to a conservative character class; crucially this class -# excludes characters needed for SSTI gadgets (quotes, parentheses, brackets, -# arithmetic/operator characters, ``%``, ``|`` except in the known filter forms, -# attribute access beyond a single dotted hop, etc.). -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - -# A single identifier. Word characters only, and -- critically -- no -# double-underscore anywhere. ``__`` is the gateway to every classic Jinja2 -# SSTI gadget (``__class__``, ``__init__``, ``__globals__``, ``__builtins__``), -# and JinjaTurtle never emits a dunder, so forbidding ``__`` here removes the -# entire attribute-traversal escape class even if such a token reached output. -_NAME = r"(?!\w*__)[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*" - -# A dotted reference for loop-item field access. JinjaTurtle emits at most -# three hops (``loopvar``, ``loopvar.field``, ``loopvar.key.subkey``), so cap the -# depth rather than allow arbitrary chains. -_DOTTED = rf"{_NAME}(?:\.{_NAME}){{0,2}}" - -# Filters JinjaTurtle is known to emit inside ``{{ ... }}`` expressions. -_KNOWN_FILTERS = ( - r"lower", - r"to_json\(ensure_ascii=(?:True|False)\)", - r"to_json\(indent=\d+,\s*ensure_ascii=(?:True|False)\)", - r"tojson", -) -_FILTER_ALT = "|".join(_KNOWN_FILTERS) - -# Expression bodies allowed inside ``{{ ... }}``. -_EXPR_PATTERNS = tuple( - re.compile(p) - for p in ( - # Plain variable / dotted loop-field reference. - rf"^{_DOTTED}$", - # Filtered reference: ``name | filter`` (one known filter). - rf"^{_DOTTED}\s*\|\s*(?:{_FILTER_ALT})$", - # YAML-preserving boolean ternary emitted by j2.yaml_*_expression: - # 'true' if NAME else 'false' / "true" if NAME else "false" - rf"^(['\"])(?:true|false)\1\s+if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+else\s+(['\"])(?:true|false)\2$", - # YAML-preserving null ternary: - # 'null' if NAME is none else NAME - rf"^(['\"])null\1\s+if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+none\s+else\s+{_DOTTED}$", - ) -) - -# Statement bodies allowed inside ``{% ... %}``. -_STMT_PATTERNS = tuple( - re.compile(p) - for p in ( - rf"^for\s+{_NAME}\s+in\s+{_DOTTED}$", - r"^endfor$", - rf"^if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+defined$", - rf"^if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+none$", - r"^if\s+not\s+loop\.last$", - r"^else$", - r"^endif$", - # ``elif`` is emitted only for the same shapes as the if-conditions - # above; keep it conservative. - rf"^elif\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+(?:defined|none)$", - ) -) - - -def _strip_ws_control(body: str) -> str: - """Remove a leading/trailing Jinja whitespace-control marker and spaces.""" - body = body.strip() - if body[:1] in "-+": - body = body[1:] - if body[-1:] in "-+": - body = body[:-1] - return body.strip() - - -# Built-in Jinja2/Ansible globals that JinjaTurtle never emits as a reference -# head. The allowlist grammar necessarily accepts any bare identifier (it cannot -# tell an injected global from a legitimate generated variable), so these names -# are rejected explicitly: their presence as the head of a live reference means -# source text leaked into a live construct. This is a targeted backstop and does -# not replace the grammar check. -_FORBIDDEN_REFERENCE_HEADS = frozenset( - { - "range", - "dict", - "lipsum", - "cycler", - "joiner", - "namespace", - "config", - "self", - "cycle", - "request", - "get_flashed_messages", - "url_for", - # Ansible global set - "lookup", - "q", - "query", - "now", - "omit", - "undef", - } -) - - -def _reference_head(body: str) -> str: - """Return the leading identifier (before any dot/filter) of an expression.""" - body = _strip_ws_control(body) - m = re.match(r"[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*", body) - return m.group(0) if m else "" - - -def _expr_is_allowed(body: str) -> bool: - body = _strip_ws_control(body) - if _reference_head(body) in _FORBIDDEN_REFERENCE_HEADS: - return False - return any(p.match(body) for p in _EXPR_PATTERNS) - - -def _stmt_is_allowed(body: str) -> bool: - body = _strip_ws_control(body) - # A ``for ... in `` whose collection is a forbidden global is - # rejected for the same reason as an expression head. - m = re.match(r"for\s+[A-Za-z_]\w*\s+in\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)", body) - if m and m.group(1) in _FORBIDDEN_REFERENCE_HEADS: - return False - return any(p.match(body) for p in _STMT_PATTERNS) - - -def verify_jinja2_template_safe(template_text: str) -> None: - """Validate that *template_text* contains only JinjaTurtle-emitted Jinja2. - - Raises :class:`TemplateSafetyError` on the first live construct that is not - in the allowlist grammar. Text inside JinjaTurtle's own ``{% raw %}`` - wrappers is treated as inert (the lexer does not tokenise it as tags), so - legitimately-escaped source content passes. - """ - # Import lazily so the dependency is only needed when generating Jinja2. - import jinja2 - - env = jinja2.Environment(autoescape=True) - - try: - tokens = list(env.lex(template_text)) - except jinja2.TemplateSyntaxError as exc: - # A syntax error means our own raw-wrapping did not fully contain the - # source text (e.g. an early ``endraw`` breakout left dangling tags). - # That is precisely a safety failure, not a benign parse hiccup. - raise TemplateSafetyError( - f"generated template does not lex as the JinjaTurtle subset: {exc}" - ) from exc - - # Walk the token stream. Jinja2 yields raw blocks as single - # ``raw_begin``/``raw_end`` tokens with inert ``data`` between them, so we - # never see wrapped literal text as live tags. We collect the raw inner - # text of each live ``{% %}`` / ``{{ }}`` construct (preserving original - # spacing) and check it against the allowlist. - mode: str | None = None # None, "block", or "variable" - body_parts: list[str] = [] - - def _flush(kind: str, lineno: int) -> None: - body = "".join(body_parts) - if kind == "variable": - ok = _expr_is_allowed(body) - else: - ok = _stmt_is_allowed(body) - if not ok: - shown = body.strip() - wrapped = ( - "{{ " + shown + " }}" if kind == "variable" else "{% " + shown + " %}" - ) - raise TemplateSafetyError( - "refusing to emit template: unexpected live " - f"{'expression' if kind == 'variable' else 'statement'} " - f"{wrapped!r} at line {lineno}. This construct is not one " - "JinjaTurtle emits, so it likely came from un-neutralised " - "source text (possible template injection)." - ) - - for lineno, tok_type, value in tokens: - if tok_type in ("variable_begin", "block_begin"): - mode = "variable" if tok_type == "variable_begin" else "block" - body_parts = [] - elif tok_type in ("variable_end", "block_end"): - if mode is not None: - _flush(mode, lineno) - mode = None - body_parts = [] - elif mode is not None: - # Preserve the original token text (including its own whitespace - # tokens) so the reconstructed body matches the source spacing. - body_parts.append(value if isinstance(value, str) else str(value)) - # raw_begin / raw_end / data tokens outside a tag are inert: skip. - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# JSON-key gate (defence in depth, format-specific). -# -# JinjaTurtle never emits a live Jinja construct inside a JSON *object key*: keys -# are copied verbatim from the source and (after escape.py) are wrapped in -# ``{% raw %}`` if they contain markup, so a key never lexes as a live tag. A -# live construct in key position can therefore only mean source key text leaked -# into the template unescaped (the json-handler blind spot). This gate is -# independent of the escaper: it inspects the finished template, replaces every -# *live* Jinja construct with an inert sentinel (raw-wrapped literal text stays -# literal), and rejects any sentinel that lands in a JSON key slot. -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - -# Sentinel byte that cannot occur in normal generated template text. -_LIVE_SENTINEL = "\x00" - -# A JSON key is a double-quoted string immediately followed (after optional -# whitespace) by a colon. We only need to detect a sentinel *inside* such a -# string, so match a quoted run that ends in `":` and look for the sentinel. -_JSON_KEY_RE = re.compile(r'"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"\s*:', re.S) - -_KEY_JINJA_DELIMS = ("{{", "}}", "{%", "%}", "{#", "#}") - - -def _contains_jinja_delim(text: str) -> bool: - """True if *text* contains any Jinja delimiter (live or escaped-literal).""" - return any(d in text for d in _KEY_JINJA_DELIMS) - - -def verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(template_text: str) -> None: - """Reject a JSON template that carries Jinja markup in an object key. - - JinjaTurtle never templates a JSON *object key*: keys come straight from the - source and a key is an identifier/string, never a value placeholder. Any - Jinja in key position therefore means attacker-influenced source key text - reached the template. This gate fails closed on it, independent of whether a - handler left the markup *live* (a raw ``{{ ... }}`` in the key) or *escaped* - it into a ``{% raw %}`` wrapper -- both indicate a key that should never have - contained templating, so generation aborts rather than emitting it. - - Detection is done on the lexer token stream: we reconstruct the document with - every live tag collapsed to a sentinel and every ``{% raw %}``-wrapped region - also marked, then reject a sentinel that lands inside a JSON key string. - """ - import jinja2 - - env = jinja2.Environment(autoescape=True) - try: - tokens = list(env.lex(template_text)) - except jinja2.TemplateSyntaxError as exc: - raise TemplateSafetyError( - f"generated JSON template does not lex as the JinjaTurtle subset: {exc}" - ) from exc - - out: list[str] = [] - in_tag = False - for _lineno, tok_type, value in tokens: - if tok_type in ("variable_begin", "block_begin", "comment_begin"): - # A live construct: collapse to a sentinel so it is detectable if it - # sits in key position. (raw_begin/raw_end are *not* live; the data - # inside a raw block is preserved verbatim below, so an escaped key - # still shows its literal Jinja delimiters to the key check.) - in_tag = True - out.append(_LIVE_SENTINEL) - elif tok_type in ("variable_end", "block_end", "comment_end"): - in_tag = False - elif not in_tag: - # data, whitespace, raw_begin/raw_end markers, and inert raw content. - out.append(value if isinstance(value, str) else str(value)) - - reconstructed = "".join(out) - - for match in _JSON_KEY_RE.finditer(reconstructed): - key_text = match.group(1) - if _LIVE_SENTINEL in key_text or _contains_jinja_delim(key_text): - raise TemplateSafetyError( - "refusing to emit JSON template: Jinja markup appears inside a " - "JSON object key. JinjaTurtle never templates keys, so this " - "indicates attacker-influenced source key text (possible " - "template injection)." - ) - - -# -# JinjaTurtle's ERB output is produced by translating the (already-verified) -# Jinja2 subset, so the Jinja2 gate is the primary guarantee. As an independent -# ERB-side backstop we confirm that every ERB tag body is one the translator -# emits, and that no Jinja2 delimiters survived into the ERB output (which would -# indicate a raw block the translator failed to recognise -- the historical -# ``{%+ raw %}`` blind spot). -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - -_ERB_TAG_RE = re.compile(r"<%[-=#]?(.*?)[-]?%>", re.S) -_JINJA_DELIMS = ("{{", "}}", "{%", "%}", "{#", "#}") - -# Bodies the ErbTranslator emits. Kept permissive for Ruby method chains it -# constructs (``@var``, ``.each_with_index``, ``JSON.generate(...)`` etc.) but -# anchored so arbitrary attacker text cannot masquerade as one. -_ERB_STMT_PATTERNS = tuple( - re.compile(p) - for p in ( - r"^require 'json'$", - r"^end$", - r"^else$", - r"^@?[A-Za-z_][\w@\.\[\]'\"]*\.each_with_index do \|[A-Za-z_]\w*, __jt_idx_\d+\| $", - r"^if .+$", - r"^elsif .+$", - r"^unless .+\.nil\?$", - r"^# Unsupported JinjaTurtle statement: .*$", - ) -) - - -def verify_erb_template_safe(template_text: str) -> None: - """Validate that *template_text* contains no leftover Jinja2 delimiters. - - The translator is the security-relevant step for ERB; this backstop ensures - no live Jinja construct survived translation (which would mean a raw block - was not recognised and source text passed through untouched). - """ - for delim in _JINJA_DELIMS: - if delim in template_text: - raise TemplateSafetyError( - "refusing to emit ERB template: it still contains the Jinja2 " - f"delimiter {delim!r}, which means source text was not fully " - "translated/neutralised (possible template injection)." - ) diff --git a/tests/test_cli.py b/tests/test_cli.py index c0d5470..e4ac519 100644 --- a/tests/test_cli.py +++ b/tests/test_cli.py @@ -132,3 +132,57 @@ def test_cli_folder_single_output_file_when_one_format(tmp_path): assert defaults_path.is_file() assert template_path.is_file() assert "to_json" in template_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def test_cli_erb_outputs_puppet_hiera_and_erb_template(tmp_path): + cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini" + cfg.write_text("[main]\nport = 8080\n", encoding="utf-8") + data_out = tmp_path / "common.yaml" + template_out = tmp_path / "app.ini.erb" + + exit_code = cli._main( + [ + str(cfg), + "-r", + "php", + "--template-engine", + "erb", + "--defaults-output", + str(data_out), + "--template-output", + str(template_out), + ] + ) + + assert exit_code == 0 + assert "php::main_port: '8080'" in data_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + assert "port = <%= @main_port %>" in template_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def test_cli_erb_can_use_separate_puppet_class_namespace(tmp_path): + cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini" + cfg.write_text("[main]\nport = 8080\n", encoding="utf-8") + data_out = tmp_path / "node.yaml" + template_out = tmp_path / "app.ini.erb" + + exit_code = cli._main( + [ + str(cfg), + "-r", + "php_etc_app_ini", + "--template-engine", + "erb", + "--puppet-class", + "php", + "--defaults-output", + str(data_out), + "--template-output", + str(template_out), + ] + ) + + assert exit_code == 0 + data = data_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + template = template_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + assert "php::php_etc_app_ini_main_port: '8080'" in data + assert "port = <%= @php_etc_app_ini_main_port %>" in template diff --git a/tests/test_config_parse_errors.py b/tests/test_config_parse_errors.py deleted file mode 100644 index 7f4c422..0000000 --- a/tests/test_config_parse_errors.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,205 +0,0 @@ -"""Regression tests for malformed-input handling (``ConfigParseError``). - -Bug: every parse-layer handler (xml/json/toml/yaml/ini) used to let its -underlying parser's exception escape as an unhandled traceback when given a -malformed file. Pointing JinjaTurtle (or Enroll, which calls it as a library) -at harvested, attacker-influenceable config makes malformed input an entirely -expected condition, so it must fail cleanly instead of crashing. - -These tests pin down that: - - * ``parse_config`` raises the normalised ``ConfigParseError`` for malformed - XML/JSON/TOML/INI; - * defusedxml's *security* exceptions (XXE / ``EntitiesForbidden``) are NOT - swallowed by that normalisation -- they must still propagate so a caller can - distinguish "malformed" from "malicious"; - * an unrelated error (e.g. the TOML "tomllib missing" ``RuntimeError``) is not - captured by the normalisation either; - * the CLI exits non-zero with a clean message (no traceback) on malformed - input; and - * folder mode skips an unparseable file instead of aborting the whole run. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import subprocess -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest - -from jinjaturtle.core import ConfigParseError, parse_config - - -def _run_cli(args: list[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: - return subprocess.run( - [sys.executable, "-m", "jinjaturtle.cli", *args], - capture_output=True, - text=True, - ) - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize( - "fmt,filename,content", - [ - # Element name is not well-formed XML -> expat ParseError historically - # escaped as an uncaught traceback. - ("xml", "bad.xml", "<{{tag}}/>"), - ("xml", "bad2.xml", ""), - ("json", "bad.json", "{not valid json"), - ("toml", "bad.toml", "x = = ="), - # A bare key with no value is invalid INI for configparser. - ("ini", "bad.ini", "[s]\nthis line has no equals and no colon\n"), - ], -) -def test_parse_config_raises_configparseerror_on_malformed( - tmp_path: Path, fmt: str, filename: str, content: str -) -> None: - src = tmp_path / filename - src.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8") - with pytest.raises(ConfigParseError): - parse_config(src, fmt=fmt) - - -def test_parse_config_does_not_swallow_xxe_security_exception(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """defusedxml's EntitiesForbidden must propagate, not become ConfigParseError. - - EntitiesForbidden subclasses ValueError, so a naive ``except ValueError`` / - ``except Exception`` in parse_config would mask an XXE attempt as a benign - "malformed file". The normalisation is deliberately scoped to exclude it. - """ - from defusedxml.common import EntitiesForbidden - - xxe = ( - '\n' - ' ]>\n' - "&xxe;\n" - ) - src = tmp_path / "xxe.xml" - src.write_text(xxe, encoding="utf-8") - with pytest.raises(EntitiesForbidden): - parse_config(src, fmt="xml") - - -def test_parse_config_does_not_swallow_unrelated_runtimeerror( - tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch -) -> None: - """A non-malformation error (tomllib missing) must propagate unchanged.""" - import jinjaturtle.handlers.toml as toml_module - - monkeypatch.setattr(toml_module, "tomllib", None) - src = tmp_path / "x.toml" - src.write_text('a = "b"\n', encoding="utf-8") - with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc: - parse_config(src, fmt="toml") - assert "tomllib/tomli is required" in str(exc.value) - - -def test_cli_fails_cleanly_on_malformed_xml(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """The CLI must exit non-zero with a clean message, not a traceback.""" - src = tmp_path / "bad.xml" - src.write_text("<{{tag}}/>", encoding="utf-8") - res = _run_cli([str(src), "-f", "xml", "-r", "demo"]) - assert res.returncode != 0 - # Clean, user-facing message -- not a Python traceback. - assert "could not parse" in res.stderr - assert "Traceback (most recent call last)" not in res.stderr - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize( - "content", - [ - # Classic XXE: external SYSTEM entity used to read a local file. - ( - '\n' - ']>\n' - "&xxe;\n" - ), - # Billion-laughs style internal entity expansion. - ( - '\n' - ']>\n' - "&lol2;\n" - ), - # External parameter entity (SSRF / out-of-band XXE vector). - ( - '\n' - ' %ext;]>\n' - "x\n" - ), - ], -) -def test_cli_refuses_xxe_cleanly(tmp_path: Path, content: str) -> None: - """defusedxml's security refusal must surface as a clean non-zero exit. - - ``EntitiesForbidden``/``DTDForbidden``/``ExternalReferenceForbidden`` subclass - ``DefusedXmlException`` (and ``ValueError``). ``parse_config`` deliberately - lets them propagate rather than folding them into ``ConfigParseError`` so a - blocked attack stays distinguishable from a benign malformed file. The CLI - must therefore catch ``DefusedXmlException`` itself and exit cleanly instead - of leaking a Python traceback. - """ - src = tmp_path / "xxe.xml" - src.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8") - res = _run_cli([str(src), "-f", "xml", "-r", "demo"]) - assert res.returncode == 2 - assert "refusing unsafe XML input" in res.stderr - assert "Traceback (most recent call last)" not in res.stderr - - -def test_folder_mode_skips_unparseable_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """One malformed file should not abort processing of the whole directory.""" - from jinjaturtle.multi import process_directory - - good = tmp_path / "good.json" - good.write_text('{ "host": "localhost" }', encoding="utf-8") - bad = tmp_path / "bad.json" - bad.write_text("{not valid json", encoding="utf-8") - - defaults_yaml, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo") - # The good file still produced output despite the bad sibling: its content - # and source id appear, and a template was generated. - assert "localhost" in defaults_yaml - assert "good.json" in defaults_yaml - assert outputs - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize( - "content", - [ - "a: &a [*a]\n", # self-referential sequence alias - "root: &r\n child: *r\n", # self-referential mapping alias - ], -) -def test_recursive_yaml_is_rejected_cleanly(tmp_path: Path, content: str) -> None: - """A recursive YAML anchor must fail as a clean ConfigParseError. - - PyYAML's safe_load builds a self-referential object from a recursive anchor; - JinjaTurtle's downstream walks (flatten, timestamp-stringify, template gen) - would otherwise blow the stack with a RecursionError traceback. Harvested - config is attacker-influenceable, so this must fail closed. - """ - src = tmp_path / "cyclic.yaml" - src.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8") - with pytest.raises(ConfigParseError): - parse_config(src, "yaml") - - -def test_recursive_yaml_cli_exits_nonzero_without_traceback(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - src = tmp_path / "cyclic.yaml" - src.write_text("a: &a [*a]\n", encoding="utf-8") - res = _run_cli([str(src), "-f", "yaml", "-r", "role"]) - assert res.returncode != 0 - assert "Traceback" not in res.stderr - assert "RecursionError" not in res.stderr - - -def test_shared_noncyclic_yaml_aliases_still_work(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """A shared (acyclic) anchor referenced multiple times is a DAG, not a - cycle, and must still parse and template normally.""" - src = tmp_path / "shared.yaml" - src.write_text("base: &b\n x: 1\na: *b\nc: *b\n", encoding="utf-8") - fmt, parsed = parse_config(src, "yaml") - assert fmt == "yaml" - assert parsed["a"] == {"x": 1} - assert parsed["c"] == {"x": 1} diff --git a/tests/test_core_utils.py b/tests/test_core_utils.py index fda6dd0..c8e41e1 100644 --- a/tests/test_core_utils.py +++ b/tests/test_core_utils.py @@ -191,43 +191,3 @@ def test_flatten_config_unsupported_format(): flatten_config("bogusfmt", parsed=None) assert "Unsupported format" in str(exc.value) - - -def test_make_var_name_collapses_adjacent_separators(): - """Regression: adjacent separators must not produce a forbidden ``__``. - - A source key such as ``log..level`` or ``cache--size`` previously sanitised - to a name containing a double underscore (``..._log__level``). The output - safety gate in safety.py rejects *any* ``__`` in a generated identifier - (it is the gateway to Jinja2 SSTI gadgets), so emitting one made JinjaTurtle - reject its own placeholder and abort generation on entirely benign config. - make_var_name now collapses runs of underscores to a single ``_``. - """ - for raw_key in ("log..level", "cache--size", "a...b", "x.-.y", "a..b--c"): - name = make_var_name("role", ("main", raw_key)) - assert "__" not in name, f"{raw_key!r} produced {name!r}" - # Still a valid Ansible/Jinja identifier. - assert name.replace("_", "").isalnum() or name == "role" - - # The double-underscore-free collapse is stable and predictable. - assert make_var_name("role", ("main", "log..level")) == "role_main_log_level" - assert make_var_name("role", ("main", "cache--size")) == "role_main_cache_size" - # A leading-digit-free prefix with its own repeated separators is collapsed too. - assert make_var_name("My__Role", ("k",)) == "my_role_k" - - -def test_make_var_name_collapsed_names_pass_output_safety_gate(): - """The names make_var_name emits must be accepted by the safety gate. - - This binds the two modules together: whatever identifier make_var_name - produces for a hostile-looking key must lex as the JinjaTurtle subset, so a - real template built from it is not refused. - """ - from jinjaturtle.safety import verify_jinja2_template_safe - - for raw_key in ("log..level", "cache--size", "a...b", "weird..key..name"): - var = make_var_name("demo", ("section", raw_key)) - # Build the kind of expression a handler would emit for this variable. - template = "{{ " + var + " }}" - # Must not raise TemplateSafetyError. - verify_jinja2_template_safe(template) diff --git a/tests/test_injection_security.py b/tests/test_injection_security.py deleted file mode 100644 index 4afb7a5..0000000 --- a/tests/test_injection_security.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,327 +0,0 @@ -"""Security regression tests for template injection (SSTI). - -JinjaTurtle copies parts of the source config (comments, unrecognised lines, -structural keys) verbatim into the generated template. If that text contains -Jinja2/ERB delimiters it must be neutralised, otherwise attacker-influenced -config content becomes live template code that executes when Ansible later -renders the template. - -These tests render the *generated* template the way a downstream tool would and -assert that an injected payload never executes. A tripwire object is exposed -under every name a payload might reference; if the rendered output ever contains -the tripwire sentinel, an injected expression executed and the test fails. -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import subprocess -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import jinja2 -import pytest -import yaml as pyyaml - -from jinjaturtle.escape import ( - escape_jinja_literal, -) - -TRIP = "__TRIPWIRE_FIRED__" - - -class _UnsafeAwareLoader(pyyaml.SafeLoader): - pass - - -def _construct_unsafe(loader: _UnsafeAwareLoader, node: pyyaml.Node): - return loader.construct_scalar(node) - - -_UnsafeAwareLoader.add_constructor("!unsafe", _construct_unsafe) - - -def _safe_load_defaults(text: str): - return pyyaml.load(text, Loader=_UnsafeAwareLoader) - - -class _Boom: - """Returns the tripwire sentinel for any access/call an SSTI payload makes.""" - - def run(self, *a, **k): - return TRIP - - def __call__(self, *a, **k): - return TRIP - - def __getitem__(self, k): - return self - - def __getattr__(self, n): - return _Boom() - - def __str__(self): - return TRIP - - -def _render_jinja(template_text: str, defaults: dict) -> str: - env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined) - env.filters.setdefault("to_json", lambda v, **k: __import__("json").dumps(v)) - env.filters.setdefault("lower", lambda v: str(v).lower()) - ctx = dict(defaults or {}) - for name in ("salt", "cmd", "os", "subprocess", "cycler", "lipsum", "namespace"): - ctx.setdefault(name, _Boom()) - return env.from_string(template_text).render(**ctx) - - -def _run_jinjaturtle(tmp_path: Path, source_name: str, body: str, fmt: str): - src = tmp_path / source_name - src.write_text(body, encoding="utf-8") - tpl = tmp_path / "out.tpl" - dfl = tmp_path / "defaults.yml" - res = subprocess.run( - [ - sys.executable, - "-m", - "jinjaturtle.cli", - str(src), - "-f", - fmt, - "--role-name", - "role", - "-t", - str(tpl), - "-d", - str(dfl), - ], - capture_output=True, - text=True, - ) - assert res.returncode == 0, f"generation failed: {res.stderr}" - defaults = _safe_load_defaults(dfl.read_text()) or {} - return tpl.read_text(), defaults - - -# A representative payload for each format, placed where the format allows -# attacker-controlled verbatim text (comments / unrecognised lines). -FORMAT_CASES = [ - ( - "ini", - "evil.ini", - "[s]\n" - "good = ok ; {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n" - "# {{ cmd.run('whoami') }}\n", - ), - ( - "yaml", - "evil.yaml", - "server:\n" " motd: ok\n" " # {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n", - ), - ( - "toml", - "evil.toml", - "[s]\n" 'good = "ok"\n' "# {{ cmd.run('id') }}\n", - ), - ( - "xml", - "evil.xml", - "\n" - " \n" - ' ok\n' - "\n", - ), - ( - "postfix", - "main.cf", - "myhostname = mail.example.com\n" "# {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n", - ), - ( - "systemd", - "evil.service", - "[Unit]\n" - "Description=ok\n" - "# {{ cmd.run('id') }}\n" - "RawLineNoEquals {% for x in ().__class__.__bases__ %}\n" - "[Service]\n" - "ExecStart=/bin/true\n", - ), - ( - "ssh", - "sshd_config", - "# {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n" "Port 22\n" "PermitRootLogin no\n", - ), -] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("fmt,name,body", FORMAT_CASES) -def test_comment_payload_does_not_execute(tmp_path, fmt, name, body): - template_text, defaults = _run_jinjaturtle(tmp_path, name, body, fmt) - rendered = _render_jinja(template_text, defaults) - assert TRIP not in rendered, f"injected payload executed for {fmt}:\n{rendered}" - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("fmt,name,body", FORMAT_CASES) -def test_generated_template_is_renderable(tmp_path, fmt, name, body): - # A correct escape must still produce a syntactically valid template. - template_text, defaults = _run_jinjaturtle(tmp_path, name, body, fmt) - # Should not raise a TemplateSyntaxError. - _render_jinja(template_text, defaults) - - -# --- JSON object-key injection ------------------------------------------------ -# -# The JSON handler copies the text *between* scalar values (object keys, -# punctuation) verbatim. A key is never a value placeholder, so Jinja markup in a -# key can only come from attacker-influenced source text. The output gate -# (verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys) must fail closed on it -- including the -# "benign-looking name" form (e.g. ``{{ ansible_hostname }}``) that the generic -# allowlist would otherwise accept as an ordinary variable reference, and which -# could leak an in-scope variable's value into the rendered config at apply time. - -JSON_KEY_INJECTION_BODIES = [ - # benign-looking variable reference (the residual bypass: passes the generic - # allowlist but must still be rejected in *key* position) - '{ "{{ ansible_hostname }}": "v" }', - # dotted reference (e.g. dumping another host's vars) - '{ "{{ hostvars.localhost }}": 1 }', - # self-referencing a sibling-derived variable name - '{ "{{ role_port }}": "x", "port": 8080 }', - # classic gadget (already rejected historically; kept as a guard) - '{ "{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__ }}": 1 }', - # statement injection in a key - '{ "{% for x in y %}k{% endfor %}": 1 }', - # nested object key - '{ "ok": { "{{ ansible_hostname }}": 2 } }', -] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("body", JSON_KEY_INJECTION_BODIES) -def test_json_key_injection_fails_closed_cli(tmp_path, body): - src = tmp_path / "evil.json" - src.write_text(body, encoding="utf-8") - out = tmp_path / "out.j2" - res = subprocess.run( - [ - sys.executable, - "-m", - "jinjaturtle.cli", - str(src), - "-f", - "json", - "--role-name", - "role", - "-t", - str(out), - ], - capture_output=True, - text=True, - ) - assert res.returncode == 2, f"expected fail-closed, got rc={res.returncode}" - assert "refusing to generate unsafe template" in res.stderr - assert not out.exists(), "no template may be written when the gate refuses" - - -def test_json_benign_keys_still_generate(tmp_path): - src = tmp_path / "ok.json" - src.write_text('{ "host": "localhost", "port": 8080 }', encoding="utf-8") - out = tmp_path / "out.j2" - res = subprocess.run( - [ - sys.executable, - "-m", - "jinjaturtle.cli", - str(src), - "-f", - "json", - "--role-name", - "demo", - "-t", - str(out), - ], - capture_output=True, - text=True, - ) - assert res.returncode == 0, res.stderr - template_text = out.read_text() - # Keys stay literal; values become placeholders. - assert '"host":' in template_text - assert "demo_host" in template_text - - -# --- Unit-level guarantees for the escaper itself --------------------------- - -SSTI_PAYLOADS = [ - "{{ 7*7 }}", - "{{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}", - "{% set x = cycler.__init__.__globals__ %}{{ x }}", - "{# comment payload #}", - "text {% endraw %} breakout {{ evil }}", - "nested {% endraw %} spacing {{ evil }}", - "{%- endraw -%}{{ evil }}", - # Whitespace-control markers: Jinja2 accepts "-", "+" or none adjacent to a - # tag's delimiters, and every variant closes a {% raw %} block. The "+" - # forms in particular were a raw-wrapper breakout vector (the defang regex - # historically only matched "-"), so all combinations must be neutralised. - "{%+ endraw %}{{ evil }}", - "{% endraw +%}{{ evil }}", - "{%+ endraw +%}{{ evil }}", - "{%- endraw +%}{{ evil }}", - "{%+ endraw -%}{{ evil }}", - # Full breakout attempt: close raw early, inject live code, re-open raw to - # swallow our trailing {% endraw %} so the template would otherwise compile. - "{%+ endraw %}{{ evil }}{%+ raw %}", - "mixed {{ a }} and {% b %} and {# c #}", - "}}{{ orphan delimiters %}{%", -] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("payload", SSTI_PAYLOADS) -def test_escape_jinja_literal_renders_back_to_original(payload): - """Escaped text must render to the exact original characters, inertly.""" - env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined) - escaped = escape_jinja_literal(payload) - rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(evil="EVIL", x="X", a="A") - assert rendered == payload - assert TRIP not in rendered - - -def test_escape_jinja_literal_noop_on_plain_text(): - for plain in ["", "hello world", "# a normal comment", "port = 8080", "key: value"]: - assert escape_jinja_literal(plain) == plain - - -def test_escape_jinja_literal_actually_blocks_execution(): - env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined) - payload = "{{ boom.run('x') }}" - escaped = escape_jinja_literal(payload) - rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(boom=_Boom()) - assert TRIP not in rendered - # Sanity: the *unescaped* payload would have fired the tripwire. - fired = env.from_string(payload).render(boom=_Boom()) - assert TRIP in fired - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize( - "endraw", - [ - "{% endraw %}", - "{% endraw -%}", - "{% endraw +%}", - "{%- endraw %}", - "{%- endraw -%}", - "{%- endraw +%}", - "{%+ endraw %}", - "{%+ endraw -%}", - "{%+ endraw +%}", - ], -) -def test_endraw_whitespace_control_cannot_break_out(endraw): - """Every whitespace-control form of endraw closes a {% raw %} block in - Jinja2, so each must be defanged. A payload that closes raw early, injects - a live tripwire call, then re-opens raw to balance the wrapper must still - render inertly back to its original characters.""" - env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined) - payload = f"{endraw}{{{{ boom.run('x') }}}}{{%+ raw %}}" - escaped = escape_jinja_literal(payload) - rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(boom=_Boom()) - assert TRIP not in rendered - assert rendered == payload diff --git a/tests/test_output_safety_gate.py b/tests/test_output_safety_gate.py deleted file mode 100644 index 055ceb3..0000000 --- a/tests/test_output_safety_gate.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,233 +0,0 @@ -"""Regression tests for the output safety gate (``jinjaturtle.safety``). - -The gate is JinjaTurtle's second, independent line of defence against template -injection. Where the per-handler escaper neutralises verbatim source text, the -gate inspects the *finished* template and refuses to emit it if any live -construct is not one JinjaTurtle itself produces. These tests cover: - - * the gate's allow/deny grammar (unit level); - * the two concrete injection findings that motivated it -- JSON object keys - and folder-mode union keys copied into templates unescaped; - * end-to-end CLI fail-closed behaviour (non-zero exit, no file written). -""" - -from __future__ import annotations - -import json -import subprocess -import sys -from pathlib import Path - -import pytest - -from jinjaturtle import core -from jinjaturtle.multi import process_directory -from jinjaturtle.safety import ( - TemplateSafetyError, - verify_jinja2_template_safe, - verify_erb_template_safe, -) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Unit: the allow/deny grammar. -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - -LEGIT_TEMPLATES = [ - "{{ demo_memory_limit }}", - "{{ demo_x | to_json(ensure_ascii=False) }}", - "{{ demo_a | to_json(indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) }}", - "{{ demo_name | lower }}", - "{{ 'true' if demo_flag else 'false' }}", - '{{ "true" if demo_flag else "false" }}', - "{{ 'null' if demo_v is none else demo_v }}", - "{% for server in demo_servers %}{{ server.name }}{% endfor %}", - "{{ server.config.port }}", - "{% if demo_x is defined %}{{ demo_x }}{% endif %}", - "{% if demo_x is none %}x{% endif %}", - "{% if not loop.last %},{% endif %}", - "plain text with no tags", - "{% raw %}# literal {{ not_code }} {% if x %}{% endraw %}", - "{% raw %}{{ 7*7 }}{% endraw %}: value", # escaped key (folder-mode fix) -] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("template", LEGIT_TEMPLATES) -def test_gate_allows_jinjaturtle_constructs(template): - # Must not raise. - verify_jinja2_template_safe(template) - - -MALICIOUS_TEMPLATES = [ - "{{ 7*7 }}", - "{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__ }}", - "{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('id').read() }}", - "{{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}", - "{{ self.__init__ }}", - "{% for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}{{ x }}{% endfor %}", - "{{ config.items() }}", - '{{ request["application"] }}', - "{% set x = 1 %}", - "{{ lipsum.__globals__ }}", - "{{ a.__class__.__mro__ }}", - "{{ ''.join(['a','b']) }}", - "{% include 'x' %}", - "{% import 'x' as y %}", -] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("template", MALICIOUS_TEMPLATES) -def test_gate_blocks_injection(template): - with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError): - verify_jinja2_template_safe(template) - - -def test_gate_blocks_double_underscore_anywhere(): - # The no-dunder rule is the backbone of blocking attribute-traversal SSTI. - with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError): - verify_jinja2_template_safe("{{ demo__x }}") - with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError): - verify_jinja2_template_safe("{{ a.b__c }}") - - -def test_gate_rejects_unlexable_breakout_as_safety_error(): - # A raw-wrapper breakout that leaves dangling tags must surface as a - # TemplateSafetyError, not a raw Jinja2 syntax error. - broken = "{% raw %}{%+ endraw %}{{ 7*7 }}" # unbalanced on purpose - with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError): - verify_jinja2_template_safe(broken) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Finding 1: JSON object keys copied verbatim into the template. -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - -JSON_KEY_PAYLOADS = [ - '{ "{{ 7*7 }}": "v" }', - '{ "{{cycler.__init__.__globals__}}": 1 }', - "{ \"ok\": { \"{{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\": 2 } }", -] - - -@pytest.mark.parametrize("src", JSON_KEY_PAYLOADS) -def test_json_key_injection_is_blocked(src): - parsed = json.loads(src) - with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError): - core.generate_jinja2_template("json", parsed, "demo", original_text=src) - - -def test_json_benign_template_still_generates(): - src = '{ "name": "app", "port": 8080 }' - parsed = json.loads(src) - out = core.generate_jinja2_template("json", parsed, "demo", original_text=src) - assert "demo_name" in out - assert "demo_port" in out - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# Finding 2: folder-mode union renderers copied keys verbatim. -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - - -def _write(tmp: Path, name: str, text: str) -> None: - (tmp / name).write_text(text, encoding="utf-8") - - -def test_folder_yaml_key_injection_is_neutralised(tmp_path): - # The malicious key must be escaped (root-cause fix), so the union template - # generates successfully AND passes the gate, rendering the key inertly. - _write(tmp_path, "a.yaml", '"{{ 7*7 }}": value\nnormalkey: ok\n') - _write(tmp_path, "b.yaml", "normalkey: ok2\n") - _defaults, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo") - template = "\n".join(o.template for o in outputs) - # Escaped, not live: - assert "{% raw %}{{ 7*7 }}{% endraw %}" in template - # And the gate (run inside process_directory) did not reject it. - - -def test_folder_ini_section_and_key_injection_neutralised(tmp_path): - _write( - tmp_path, - "a.ini", - "[{{ 7*7 }}]\n{{ evil }} = x\n", - ) - _write(tmp_path, "b.ini", "[normal]\nk = y\n") - _defaults, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo") - template = "\n".join(o.template for o in outputs) - # Section header and key are escaped, not live. - assert "{{ 7*7 }}" not in _strip_raw_blocks(template) - assert "{{ evil }}" not in _strip_raw_blocks(template) - - -def test_folder_toml_key_injection_neutralised(tmp_path): - _write(tmp_path, "a.toml", '"{{ 7*7 }}" = "v"\nok = "y"\n') - _write(tmp_path, "b.toml", 'ok = "z"\n') - _defaults, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo") - template = "\n".join(o.template for o in outputs) - assert "{{ 7*7 }}" not in _strip_raw_blocks(template) - - -def _strip_raw_blocks(text: str) -> str: - """Remove the *contents* of raw blocks so we can assert no LIVE payload - remains outside them.""" - import re - - return re.sub( - r"{%[-+]?\s*raw\s*[-+]?%}.*?{%[-+]?\s*endraw\s*[-+]?%}", - "", - text, - flags=re.S, - ) - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# ERB gate. -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - - -def test_erb_gate_blocks_leftover_jinja_delimiters(): - with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError): - verify_erb_template_safe("ok <%= @x %> but {{ leftover }} here") - - -def test_erb_gate_allows_clean_erb(): - verify_erb_template_safe("memory = <%= @memory_limit %>\n") - - -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # -# End-to-end CLI: fail closed. -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # - - -def _run_cli(args, env_extra=None): - import os - - env = {**os.environ, "PYTHONPATH": "src"} - if env_extra: - env.update(env_extra) - return subprocess.run( - [sys.executable, "-m", "jinjaturtle.cli", *args], - capture_output=True, - text=True, - env=env, - ) - - -def test_cli_fails_closed_on_injection(tmp_path): - bad = tmp_path / "evil.json" - bad.write_text('{ "{{ 7*7 }}": "v" }', encoding="utf-8") - out = tmp_path / "out.j2" - result = _run_cli([str(bad), "-r", "demo", "-f", "json", "-t", str(out)]) - assert result.returncode == 2 - assert "refusing to generate unsafe template" in result.stderr - # No template file may be written when the gate refuses. - assert not out.exists() - - -def test_cli_succeeds_on_benign_input(tmp_path): - good = tmp_path / "ok.json" - good.write_text('{ "name": "app" }', encoding="utf-8") - out = tmp_path / "out.j2" - result = _run_cli([str(good), "-r", "demo", "-f", "json", "-t", str(out)]) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert out.exists() diff --git a/tests/test_security_hardening.py b/tests/test_security_hardening.py deleted file mode 100644 index b5bb855..0000000 --- a/tests/test_security_hardening.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,136 +0,0 @@ -from __future__ import annotations - -from pathlib import Path -import os - -import pytest -import yaml -from defusedxml.common import EntitiesForbidden - -from jinjaturtle import cli -from jinjaturtle.core import generate_ansible_yaml, parse_config, flatten_config -from jinjaturtle.multi import is_supported_file, iter_supported_files, process_directory -from jinjaturtle.output_safety import OutputPathError, write_text_safely - - -class UnsafeAwareLoader(yaml.SafeLoader): - pass - - -def _unsafe(loader: UnsafeAwareLoader, node: yaml.Node): - return loader.construct_scalar(node) - - -UnsafeAwareLoader.add_constructor("!unsafe", _unsafe) - - -def test_jinja_values_are_emitted_as_ansible_unsafe(tmp_path: Path): - src = tmp_path / "app.ini" - src.write_text("[main]\ncmd = {{ lookup('pipe','id') }}\n", encoding="utf-8") - - fmt, parsed = parse_config(src) - defaults_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml("role", flatten_config(fmt, parsed)) - - assert "role_main_cmd: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml - assert "{{ lookup(''pipe'',''id'') }}" in defaults_yaml - loaded = yaml.load(defaults_yaml, Loader=UnsafeAwareLoader) - assert loaded["role_main_cmd"] == "{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}" - - -def test_folder_mode_marks_nested_jinja_values_and_ids_unsafe(tmp_path: Path): - src = tmp_path / "src" - src.mkdir() - # Filename ids are source-derived values too. - (src / "{{ bad }}.yaml").write_text( - "message: \"{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}\"\n", encoding="utf-8" - ) - - defaults_yaml, _outputs = process_directory( - src, recursive=False, role_prefix="role" - ) - - assert "id: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml - assert "role_message: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml - loaded = yaml.load(defaults_yaml, Loader=UnsafeAwareLoader) - assert loaded["role_items"][0]["id"] == "{{ bad }}.yaml" - assert loaded["role_items"][0]["role_message"] == "{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}" - - -def test_xml_parser_rejects_entities_when_called_as_library(tmp_path: Path): - src = tmp_path / "bad.xml" - src.write_text( - "]>&xxe;", - encoding="utf-8", - ) - - with pytest.raises(EntitiesForbidden): - parse_config(src, "xml") - - -def test_folder_mode_does_not_follow_symlinked_files(tmp_path: Path): - real = tmp_path / "secret.ini" - real.write_text("[main]\nsecret=yes\n", encoding="utf-8") - root = tmp_path / "root" - root.mkdir() - link = root / "link.ini" - link.symlink_to(real) - - assert not is_supported_file(link) - assert iter_supported_files(root, recursive=False) == [] - assert iter_supported_files(root, recursive=True) == [] - - -@pytest.mark.skipif(not hasattr(os, "symlink"), reason="symlinks unavailable") -def test_cli_refuses_to_write_through_final_symlink(tmp_path: Path): - target = tmp_path / "target.txt" - target.write_text("keep\n", encoding="utf-8") - link = tmp_path / "out.yml" - link.symlink_to(target) - - with pytest.raises(OutputPathError): - write_text_safely(link, "replace\n") - - assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep\n" - assert link.is_symlink() - - -def test_cli_refuses_symlinked_output_parent(tmp_path: Path): - real_dir = tmp_path / "real" - real_dir.mkdir() - link_dir = tmp_path / "linkdir" - link_dir.symlink_to(real_dir, target_is_directory=True) - - with pytest.raises(OutputPathError): - write_text_safely(link_dir / "out.yml", "data\n") - - assert not (real_dir / "out.yml").exists() - - -def test_cli_reports_unsafe_output_path_without_overwriting_symlink(tmp_path: Path): - cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini" - cfg.write_text("[main]\nname = ok\n", encoding="utf-8") - target = tmp_path / "target.yml" - target.write_text("keep\n", encoding="utf-8") - link = tmp_path / "defaults.yml" - link.symlink_to(target) - - exit_code = cli._main([str(cfg), "--defaults-output", str(link)]) - - assert exit_code == 2 - assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep\n" - - -def test_cli_refuses_root_output_through_group_writable_parent( - tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch -): - from jinjaturtle import output_safety - - unsafe_dir = tmp_path / "unsafe" - unsafe_dir.mkdir() - unsafe_dir.chmod(0o777) - monkeypatch.setattr(output_safety, "_effective_uid", lambda: 0) - - with pytest.raises(OutputPathError): - write_text_safely(unsafe_dir / "out.yml", "data\n") - - assert not (unsafe_dir / "out.yml").exists() diff --git a/tests/test_yaml_handler.py b/tests/test_yaml_handler.py index 543c759..5c70e27 100644 --- a/tests/test_yaml_handler.py +++ b/tests/test_yaml_handler.py @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from jinjaturtle.core import ( analyze_loops, flatten_config, generate_ansible_yaml, + generate_erb_template, generate_jinja2_template, ) from jinjaturtle.handlers.yaml import YamlHandler @@ -177,15 +178,17 @@ def test_yaml_loop_preserves_blank_separator_after_list(tmp_path: Path): "blank", "require:\n - rubocop-performance\n - rubocop-rspec\n\nAllCops:\n NewCops: enable\n", "\n - rubocop-rspec\n\nAllCops:", + "<% end %>\nAllCops:", ), ( "no_blank", "require:\n - rubocop-performance\n - rubocop-rspec\nAllCops:\n NewCops: enable\n", "\n - rubocop-rspec\nAllCops:", + "<% end %>AllCops:", ), ] - for label, text, rendered_expected in cases: + for label, text, rendered_expected, erb_expected in cases: path = tmp_path / f"{label}.yml" path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8") @@ -202,9 +205,19 @@ def test_yaml_loop_preserves_blank_separator_after_list(tmp_path: Path): rendered = Template(template).render(**defaults) assert rendered_expected in rendered + erb_template = generate_erb_template( + fmt, + parsed, + "role", + original_text=text, + loop_candidates=loop_candidates, + flat_items=flat_items, + ) + assert erb_expected in erb_template + def test_yaml_loop_preserves_following_top_level_comments(tmp_path: Path): - from jinja2 import Environment, Template + from jinja2 import Template from jinjaturtle.core import analyze_loops @@ -235,15 +248,10 @@ def test_yaml_loop_preserves_following_top_level_comments(tmp_path: Path): fmt, parsed, "role", original_text=text, loop_candidates=loop_candidates ) rendered = Template(template).render(**defaults) - ansible_rendered = ( - Environment(trim_blocks=True).from_string(template).render(**defaults) - ) assert "# Offense count: 2" in rendered assert "# This cop supports unsafe autocorrection" in rendered - assert "spec.rb\n\n# Offense count: 2" in ansible_rendered assert yaml.safe_load(rendered) == yaml.safe_load(text) - assert yaml.safe_load(ansible_rendered) == yaml.safe_load(text) def test_yaml_scalar_loop_preserves_quoted_list_items(tmp_path: Path):