Remove Fediverse link

0.7.0
More hardening
2026-07-24 10:58:23 +10:00 · 2026-07-05 10:54:37 +10:00 · 2026-07-03 12:23:52 +10:00 · 2026-07-02 14:52:09 +10:00 · 2026-07-02 14:22:07 +10:00 · 2026-07-01 12:23:19 +10:00
33 changed files with 2702 additions and 776 deletions
--- a/.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml
@ -7,6 +7,14 @@ jobs:
  test:
    runs-on: docker

+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        include:
+          - distro: debian
+            image: docker.io/library/debian:13
+            python: python3
+
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@v4
@ -17,13 +25,29 @@ jobs:
          DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3-venv pipx

      - name: Install Poetry
+        env:
+          PYTHON_BIN: ${{ matrix.python }}
+          POETRY_VERSION: "2.4.1"
        run: |
-          pipx install poetry==1.8.3
-          /root/.local/bin/poetry --version
+          set -eux
+          if ! command -v pipx >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            "${PYTHON_BIN}" -m pip install --user pipx
+          fi
+          PIPX_BIN="$(command -v pipx || true)"
+          if [ -z "${PIPX_BIN}" ]; then
+            PIPX_BIN="${HOME}/.local/bin/pipx"
+          fi
+          "${PIPX_BIN}" install --python "${PYTHON_BIN}" "poetry==${POETRY_VERSION}"
          echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+          export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
+          poetry --version
+          poetry --version | grep -E "Poetry \(version 2\."

      - name: Install project deps (including test extras)
+        env:
+          PYTHON_BIN: ${{ matrix.python }}
        run: |
+          poetry env use "${PYTHON_BIN}"
          poetry install --with dev

      - name: Run test script
--- a/Dockerfile.debbuild
+++ b/Dockerfile.debbuild
@ -61,6 +61,23 @@ rsync -a --delete \
  "${SRC}/" "${WORK}/"

 cd "${WORK}"
+
+# This project's pyproject.toml uses the PEP 621 [project] table, which needs
+# poetry-core >= 2.0.  Debian bookworm and Ubuntu jammy/noble ship an older
+# poetry-core that cannot parse it.  On those, swap in the legacy Poetry 1.x
+# formatted metadata (kept in sync at pyproject.poetry1.toml) for the build.
+# trixie and newer ship poetry-core 2.x and keep the PEP 621 file.
+if [ -f pyproject.poetry1.toml ]; then
+  core_ver="$(python3 -c 'import poetry.core as c; print(c.__version__)' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
+  core_major="${core_ver%%.*}"
+  if [ "${core_major:-0}" -lt 2 ]; then
+    echo "poetry-core ${core_ver} < 2.0: using legacy pyproject.poetry1.toml"
+    cp pyproject.poetry1.toml pyproject.toml
+  else
+    echo "poetry-core ${core_ver} >= 2.0: using PEP 621 pyproject.toml"
+  fi
+fi
+
 if [ -n "${SUITE:-}" ]; then
  export DEBEMAIL="mig@mig5.net"
  export DEBFULLNAME="Miguel Jacq"
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@ -4,55 +4,134 @@
  <img src="https://git.mig5.net/mig5/jinjaturtle/raw/branch/main/jinjaturtle.svg" alt="JinjaTurtle logo" width="240" />
 </div>

-JinjaTurtle is a command-line tool to help you generate Jinja2 templates and
-Ansible inventory from a native configuration file (or files) of a piece of
-software.
+JinjaTurtle is a command-line tool that helps turn existing native
+configuration files into reusable configuration-management templates.
+
+By default it generates:
+
+- a **Jinja2** template; and
+- an **Ansible defaults YAML** file containing the variables used by that
+  template.
+
+JinjaTurtle does not try to replace configuration-management tools. Its job is
+to speed up the boring first pass: take a real config file, discover the values
+inside it, replace those values with variables, and write the corresponding
+variable data beside the template.

 ## How it works

- * The config file(s) is/are examined
- * Parameter key names are generated based on the parameter names in the
-   config file. In keeping with Ansible best practices, you pass a prefix
-   for the key names, which should typically match the name of your Ansible
-   role.
- * A Jinja2 file is generated from the file with those parameter key names
-   injected as the `{{ variable }}` names.
- * An Ansible inventory YAML file is generated with those key names and the
-   *values* taken from the original config file as the default vars.
+JinjaTurtle examines a source config file and keeps the original structure as
+much as possible.

-By default, the Jinja2 template and the Ansible inventory are printed to
-stdout. However, it is possible to output the results to new files.
+For the default Jinja2/Ansible mode:
+
+1. The config file is parsed.
+2. Variable names are generated from the config keys and paths.
+3. Those variable names are prefixed with `--role-name`, which should usually
+   match your Ansible role name.
+4. A Jinja2 template is generated with values replaced by `{{ variable }}`
+   expressions.
+5. An Ansible defaults YAML file is generated with those variables and the
+   original values.
+
+By default, the generated variable data and template are printed to stdout. Use
+`--defaults-output` and `--template-output` to write them to files.
+
+## Jinja2 / Ansible example
+
+Say you have a `php.ini` file and you are inside an Ansible role with
+`defaults/` and `templates/` directories:
+
+```shell
+jinjaturtle php.ini \
+  --role-name php \
+  --defaults-output defaults/main.yml \
+  --template-output templates/php.ini.j2
+```
+
+Given a source value such as:
+
+```ini
+memory_limit = 256M
+```
+
+JinjaTurtle will produce a template value like:
+
+```jinja2
+memory_limit = {{ php_memory_limit }}
+```
+
+and defaults data like:
+
+```yaml
+php_memory_limit: 256M
+```

 ## What sort of config files can it handle?

-TOML, YAML, INI, JSON and XML-style config files should be okay. There are always
-going to be some edge cases in very complex files that are difficult to work
-with, though, so you may still find that you need to tweak the results.
+JinjaTurtle supports common structured and semi-structured config formats:

-For XML and YAML files, JinjaTurtle will attempt to generate 'for' loops
-and lists in the Ansible yaml if the config file looks homogenous enough to
-support it. However, if it lacks the confidence in this, it will fall back to
-using scalar-style flattened attributes.
+- TOML
+- YAML
+- INI-style files
+- JSON
+- XML
+- Postfix `main.cf`
+- systemd unit files, such as `*.service`, `*.socket`, `*.timer`, and related
+  unit types
+- OpenSSH-style config files, including `ssh_config`, `sshd_config`, and common
+  `*.conf` snippets detected as SSH config

-You may need or wish to tidy up the config to suit your needs.
+For ambiguous extensions such as `*.conf`, JinjaTurtle uses lightweight content
+sniffing. You can always force a handler with `--format`.

-The goal here is really to *speed up* converting files into Ansible/Jinja2,
-but not necessarily to make it perfect.
+For YAML, XML, TOML, INI-style, and other supported structured files,
+JinjaTurtle will attempt to generate loops when a repeated structure looks
+homogeneous enough. If it is not confident, it falls back to flattened scalar
+variables.
+
+Some very complex files will still need manual cleanup. The goal is to speed up
+conversion into Jinja2 templates, not to guarantee a perfect final module without
+review.
+
+## JSON, quoting, and type preservation
+
+JinjaTurtle tries to preserve rendered config types.
+
+For JSON, it uses JSON-aware expressions rather than plain string substitution.
+This avoids generating invalid JSON such as:
+
+```json
+{"enabled": True}
+```
+
+when the correct rendered JSON should be:
+
+```json
+{"enabled": true}
+```
+
+This uses Ansible-style JSON filters.

 ## Can I convert multiple files at once?

-Certainly! Pass the folder name instead of a specific file name, and JinjaTurtle
-will convert any files it understands in that folder, storing all the various
-vars in the destination defaults yaml file, and converting each file into a
-Jinja2 template per file type.
+Yes. Pass a directory instead of a single file and JinjaTurtle will convert the
+files it understands in that directory.

-If all the files had the same 'type', there'll be one Jinja2 template.
+```shell
+jinjaturtle ./config-dir \
+  --role-name myrole \
+  --defaults-output defaults/main.yml \
+  --template-output templates/
+```

-You can also pass `--recursive` to recurse into subfolders.
+Use `--recursive` to recurse into subdirectories.

-Note: when using 'folder' mode and multiple files of the same type, their vars
-will be listed under an 'items' parent key in the yaml, each with an `id` key.
-You'll then want to use a `loop` in Ansible later, e.g:
+In folder mode, variables for multiple files of the same type are grouped under
+an `items`-style structure in the generated YAML so that the resulting templates
+can be used with loops in Ansible.
+
+For example:

 ```yaml
 - name: Render configs
@ -93,9 +172,9 @@ sudo dnf upgrade --refresh
 sudo dnf install jinjaturtle
 ```

-### From PyPi
+### From PyPI

-```
+```bash
 pip install jinjaturtle
 ```

@ -103,61 +182,97 @@ pip install jinjaturtle

 Clone the repo and then run inside the clone:

-```
+```bash
 poetry install
 ```

-### AppImage
-
-Download the AppImage from the Releases and make it executable, and put it
-on your `$PATH`.
-
-## How to run it
-
-Say you have a `php.ini` file and you are in a directory structure like an
-Ansible role (with subfolders `defaults` and `templates`):
-
-```shell
-jinjaturtle php.ini \
-  --role-name php \
-  --defaults-output defaults/main.yml \
-  --template-output templates/php.ini.j2
-```
-
 ## Full usage info

-```
-usage: jinjaturtle [-h] -r ROLE_NAME [-f {json,ini,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd}] [-d DEFAULTS_OUTPUT] [-t TEMPLATE_OUTPUT] config
+```text
+usage: jinjaturtle [-h] [-r ROLE_NAME] [--recursive]
+                   [-f {ini,json,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd,ssh}]
+                   [-d DEFAULTS_OUTPUT] [-t TEMPLATE_OUTPUT]
+                   config

-Convert a config file into Ansible inventory and a Jinja2 template.
+Convert a config file into an Ansible defaults file and Jinja2 template.

 positional arguments:
-  config                Path to the source configuration file.
+  config                Path to a config file OR a folder containing supported
+                        config files. Supported: .toml, .yaml/.yml, .json,
+                        .ini/.cfg/.conf, .xml, ssh_config/sshd_config

 options:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  -r, --role-name ROLE_NAME
-                        Ansible role name, used as variable prefix (e.g. cometbft).
-  -f, --format {ini,json,toml,xml}
-                        Force config format instead of auto-detecting from filename.
+                        Role name / variable prefix. In Jinja2 mode this is
+                        usually the Ansible role name. Defaults to jinjaturtle.
+  --recursive           When CONFIG is a folder, recurse into subfolders.
+  -f, --format {ini,json,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd,ssh}
+                        Force config format instead of auto-detecting from
+                        filename.
  -d, --defaults-output DEFAULTS_OUTPUT
-                        Path to write defaults/main.yml. If omitted, default vars are printed to stdout.
+                        Path to write the generated variable YAML. If omitted,
+                        it is printed to stdout.
  -t, --template-output TEMPLATE_OUTPUT
-                        Path to write the Jinja2 config template. If omitted, template is printed to stdout.
+                        Path to write the generated config template. If omitted,
+                        it is printed to stdout.
 ```

 ## Additional supported formats

-JinjaTurtle can also template some common "bespoke" config formats:
+JinjaTurtle also templates some common bespoke config formats:

 - **Postfix main.cf** (`main.cf`) → `--format postfix`
 - **systemd unit files** (`*.service`, `*.socket`, etc.) → `--format systemd`
+- **OpenSSH config** (`ssh_config`, `sshd_config`, and detected snippets) →
+  `--format ssh`

-For ambiguous extensions like `*.conf`, JinjaTurtle uses lightweight content sniffing; you can always force a specific handler via `--format`.
+For ambiguous extensions like `*.conf`, JinjaTurtle uses lightweight content
+sniffing. You can always force a specific handler with `--format`.
+
+## Security model
+
+JinjaTurtle is frequently pointed at config files that were *harvested* from
+real systems, where some content may be influenced by an untrusted party (a
+hostname, a login banner, a `GECOS` comment, a "Managed by ..." note). It is
+therefore designed so that source content cannot turn into executable template
+code.
+
+Two guarantees matter:
+
+1. **Values are data, never code.** Every config *value* is replaced with a
+   `{{ variable }}` placeholder in the template, and the original value is stored
+   separately in the defaults data. When the template is later rendered,
+   the placeholder prints the value as a literal string; Jinja2 does not
+   recursively render the *contents* of a variable, so a payload sitting inside
+   a value is inert.
+
+2. **Verbatim text is neutralised.** To preserve formatting, JinjaTurtle copies
+   comments, blank lines, headers and any unrecognised lines from the source
+   into the template. Any template metacharacters in that copied text
+   (`{{ }}`, `{% %}`, `{# #}` ) are escaped so they render as the literal
+   characters the author wrote, rather than executing.
+
+### Consumer responsibilities
+
+The value guarantee above relies on the downstream renderer being single-pass,
+which is the normal case:
+
+- **Ansible**: rendering a template with `template:`/`ansible.builtin.template`
+  is single-pass. For defence in depth, treat the generated defaults as
+  untrusted input — Ansible already does not re-template variable *contents* by
+  default. If you build your own var structures from this data and pass them
+  through additional templating, mark untrusted values with the `!unsafe` tag so
+  they are never re-evaluated.
+
+In short: render JinjaTurtle output exactly once. Do not feed it back through
+another templating pass.
+
+**IMPORTANT**: Always review both the original config files, then the resulting
+templates generated by JinjaTurtle, before integrating them into your config
+management system!


 ## Found a bug, have a suggestion?

-You can e-mail me (see the pyproject.toml for details) or contact me on the Fediverse:
-
-https://goto.mig5.net/@mig5
+You can e-mail me; see `pyproject.toml` for details.
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@ -1,3 +1,27 @@
+jinjaturtle (0.7.0) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * Much hardening.
+
+ -- Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net>  Sun, 5 Jul 2026 10:54:00 +1000
+
+jinjaturtle (0.5.7) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * More hardening measures
+
+ -- Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net>  Wed, 24 Jun 2026 16:13:00 +1000
+
+jinjaturtle (0.5.6) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * Try to prevent what could lead to execution of embedded jinja in original files when converting
+
+ -- Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net>  Tue, 23 Jun 2026 16:47:00 +1000
+
+jinjaturtle (0.5.5) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * erb support
+
+ -- Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net>  Sat, 20 Jun 2026 18:27:00 +1000
+
 jinjaturtle (0.5.4) unstable; urgency=medium

  * Make templates more faithful to the original file in terms of indentation, newlines, no deserialisation of things like < or >.
--- a/poetry.lock
+++ b/poetry.lock
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# This file is automatically @generated by Poetry 1.8.3 and should not be changed by hand.
+# This file is automatically @generated by Poetry 2.4.1 and should not be changed by hand.

 [[package]]
 name = "certifi"
@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ version = "2026.6.17"
 description = "Python package for providing Mozilla's CA Bundle."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.7"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "certifi-2026.6.17-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:2227dcbaafe0d2f59279d1762ddddc37783ed4354594f194ffc31d20f41fc3db"},
    {file = "certifi-2026.6.17.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:024c88eeec92ca068db80f02b8b07c9cef7b9fe261d1d535abfd5abd6f6af432"},
@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ version = "3.4.7"
 description = "The Real First Universal Charset Detector. Open, modern and actively maintained alternative to Chardet."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.7"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "charset_normalizer-3.4.7-cp310-cp310-macosx_10_9_universal2.whl", hash = "sha256:cdd68a1fb318e290a2077696b7eb7a21a49163c455979c639bf5a5dcdc46617d"},
    {file = "charset_normalizer-3.4.7-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:e17b8d5d6a8c47c85e68ca8379def1303fd360c3e22093a807cd34a71cd082b8"},
@ -155,6 +157,8 @@ version = "0.4.6"
 description = "Cross-platform colored terminal text."
 optional = false
 python-versions = "!=3.0.*,!=3.1.*,!=3.2.*,!=3.3.*,!=3.4.*,!=3.5.*,!=3.6.*,>=2.7"
+groups = ["dev"]
+markers = "sys_platform == \"win32\""
 files = [
    {file = "colorama-0.4.6-py2.py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:4f1d9991f5acc0ca119f9d443620b77f9d6b33703e51011c16baf57afb285fc6"},
    {file = "colorama-0.4.6.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:08695f5cb7ed6e0531a20572697297273c47b8cae5a63ffc6d6ed5c201be6e44"},
@ -162,124 +166,110 @@ files = [

 [[package]]
 name = "coverage"
-version = "7.14.1"
+version = "7.14.3"
 description = "Code coverage measurement for Python"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.10"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
-    {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:3e3680291c4a1d0dadfa84a2c459576a4af5133abb617905714339a0c73138cf"},
-    {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:a5274669f37f2343635a347b91a60777621341ab3378e9c6ac9335eee704bddf"},
-    {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux1_i686.manylinux_2_28_i686.manylinux_2_5_i686.whl", hash = "sha256:cfe5a5fec635799ef33428f1e5e61bafa45a92a96190ba731561ba558ccc214d"},
-    {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux1_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.manylinux_2_5_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:62a9f70b52e0b5a95cfef4a5c5641b06983cadc5e538a3feeb5c00211f523ac2"},
-    {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:3c18ebc343e15be53049b3a2dce38fe82d58f37e20ab9094b3a39c0aa4f6bb47"},
-    {file = "coverage-7.14.1-cp310-cp310-manylinux2014_ppc64le.manylinux_2_17_ppc64le.manylinux_2_28_ppc64le.whl", hash = "sha256:b84ffdf877644e7096aa936991efeed873f7f3df57b9cd001312b7668ab08550"},
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 [package.dependencies]
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 [package.extras]
-toml = ["tomli"]
+toml = ["tomli ; python_full_version <= \"3.11.0a6\""]

 [[package]]
 name = "defusedxml"
@ -287,6 +277,7 @@ version = "0.7.1"
 description = "XML bomb protection for Python stdlib modules"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=2.7, !=3.0.*, !=3.1.*, !=3.2.*, !=3.3.*, !=3.4.*"
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 description = "A library for working with .desktop files"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.10"
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 description = "Backport of PEP 654 (exception groups)"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.7"
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 files = [
    {file = "exceptiongroup-1.3.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:a7a39a3bd276781e98394987d3a5701d0c4edffb633bb7a5144577f82c773598"},
    {file = "exceptiongroup-1.3.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:8b412432c6055b0b7d14c310000ae93352ed6754f70fa8f7c34141f91c4e3219"},
@ -329,6 +323,7 @@ version = "3.18"
 description = "Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.9"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "idna-3.18-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:7f952cbe720b688055e3f87de14f5c3e5fdaa8bc3928985c4077ca689de849a2"},
    {file = "idna-3.18.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:ffb385a7e039654cef1ab9ef32c6fafe283c0c0467bba1d9029738ce4a14a848"},
@ -343,6 +338,7 @@ version = "2.3.0"
 description = "brain-dead simple config-ini parsing"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.10"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "iniconfig-2.3.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:f631c04d2c48c52b84d0d0549c99ff3859c98df65b3101406327ecc7d53fbf12"},
    {file = "iniconfig-2.3.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:c76315c77db068650d49c5b56314774a7804df16fee4402c1f19d6d15d8c4730"},
@ -354,6 +350,7 @@ version = "3.1.6"
 description = "A very fast and expressive template engine."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.7"
+groups = ["main"]
 files = [
    {file = "jinja2-3.1.6-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:85ece4451f492d0c13c5dd7c13a64681a86afae63a5f347908daf103ce6d2f67"},
    {file = "jinja2-3.1.6.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:0137fb05990d35f1275a587e9aee6d56da821fc83491a0fb838183be43f66d6d"},
@ -371,6 +368,7 @@ version = "3.0.3"
 description = "Safely add untrusted strings to HTML/XML markup."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.9"
+groups = ["main"]
 files = [
    {file = "markupsafe-3.0.3-cp310-cp310-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:2f981d352f04553a7171b8e44369f2af4055f888dfb147d55e42d29e29e74559"},
    {file = "markupsafe-3.0.3-cp310-cp310-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:e1c1493fb6e50ab01d20a22826e57520f1284df32f2d8601fdd90b6304601419"},
@ -469,6 +467,7 @@ version = "26.2"
 description = "Core utilities for Python packages"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.8"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "packaging-26.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:5fc45236b9446107ff2415ce77c807cee2862cb6fac22b8a73826d0693b0980e"},
    {file = "packaging-26.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:ff452ff5a3e828ce110190feff1178bb1f2ea2281fa2075aadb987c2fb221661"},
@ -480,6 +479,7 @@ version = "1.6.0"
 description = "plugin and hook calling mechanisms for python"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.9"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "pluggy-1.6.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:e920276dd6813095e9377c0bc5566d94c932c33b27a3e3945d8389c374dd4746"},
    {file = "pluggy-1.6.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:7dcc130b76258d33b90f61b658791dede3486c3e6bfb003ee5c9bfb396dd22f3"},
@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ version = "2.20.0"
 description = "Pygments is a syntax highlighting package written in Python."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.9"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "pygments-2.20.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:81a9e26dd42fd28a23a2d169d86d7ac03b46e2f8b59ed4698fb4785f946d0176"},
    {file = "pygments-2.20.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:6757cd03768053ff99f3039c1a36d6c0aa0b263438fcab17520b30a303a82b5f"},
@ -509,6 +510,7 @@ version = "4.2"
 description = "Generate AppImages from your Python projects"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.9"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "pyproject_appimage-4.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:d6892643db5759dc06531a4546bdab404a519c63814c060f8749979a8625d9cc"},
    {file = "pyproject_appimage-4.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:6b6387250cb1e6ecbb08a13f5810749396ebe8637f2f35bf2296bfdd5e65cd6e"},
@ -525,6 +527,7 @@ version = "8.4.2"
 description = "pytest: simple powerful testing with Python"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.9"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "pytest-8.4.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:872f880de3fc3a5bdc88a11b39c9710c3497a547cfa9320bc3c5e62fbf272e79"},
    {file = "pytest-8.4.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:86c0d0b93306b961d58d62a4db4879f27fe25513d4b969df351abdddb3c30e01"},
@ -548,6 +551,7 @@ version = "5.0.0"
 description = "Pytest plugin for measuring coverage."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.8"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "pytest-cov-5.0.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:5837b58e9f6ebd335b0f8060eecce69b662415b16dc503883a02f45dfeb14857"},
    {file = "pytest_cov-5.0.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:4f0764a1219df53214206bf1feea4633c3b558a2925c8b59f144f682861ce652"},
@ -566,6 +570,7 @@ version = "6.0.3"
 description = "YAML parser and emitter for Python"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.8"
+groups = ["main"]
 files = [
    {file = "PyYAML-6.0.3-cp38-cp38-macosx_10_13_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:c2514fceb77bc5e7a2f7adfaa1feb2fb311607c9cb518dbc378688ec73d8292f"},
    {file = "PyYAML-6.0.3-cp38-cp38-manylinux2014_aarch64.manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl", hash = "sha256:9c57bb8c96f6d1808c030b1687b9b5fb476abaa47f0db9c0101f5e9f394e97f4"},
@ -648,6 +653,7 @@ version = "2.34.2"
 description = "Python HTTP for Humans."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.10"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "requests-2.34.2-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:2a0d60c172f83ac6ab31e4554906c0f3b3588d37b5cb939b1c061f4907e278e0"},
    {file = "requests-2.34.2.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:f288924cae4e29463698d6d60bc6a4da69c89185ad1e0bcc4104f584e960b9ed"},
@ -669,6 +675,7 @@ version = "2.4.1"
 description = "A lil' TOML parser"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.8"
+groups = ["main", "dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "tomli-2.4.1-cp311-cp311-macosx_10_9_x86_64.whl", hash = "sha256:f8f0fc26ec2cc2b965b7a3b87cd19c5c6b8c5e5f436b984e85f486d652285c30"},
    {file = "tomli-2.4.1-cp311-cp311-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl", hash = "sha256:4ab97e64ccda8756376892c53a72bd1f964e519c77236368527f758fbc36a53a"},
@ -718,6 +725,7 @@ files = [
    {file = "tomli-2.4.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:0d85819802132122da43cb86656f8d1f8c6587d54ae7dcaf30e90533028b49fe"},
    {file = "tomli-2.4.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:7c7e1a961a0b2f2472c1ac5b69affa0ae1132c39adcb67aba98568702b9cc23f"},
 ]
+markers = {main = "python_version == \"3.10\"", dev = "python_full_version <= \"3.11.0a6\""}

 [[package]]
 name = "typing-extensions"
@ -725,6 +733,8 @@ version = "4.15.0"
 description = "Backported and Experimental Type Hints for Python 3.9+"
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.9"
+groups = ["dev"]
+markers = "python_version == \"3.10\""
 files = [
    {file = "typing_extensions-4.15.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:f0fa19c6845758ab08074a0cfa8b7aecb71c999ca73d62883bc25cc018c4e548"},
    {file = "typing_extensions-4.15.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:0cea48d173cc12fa28ecabc3b837ea3cf6f38c6d1136f85cbaaf598984861466"},
@ -736,18 +746,19 @@ version = "2.7.0"
 description = "HTTP library with thread-safe connection pooling, file post, and more."
 optional = false
 python-versions = ">=3.10"
+groups = ["dev"]
 files = [
    {file = "urllib3-2.7.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:9fb4c81ebbb1ce9531cce37674bbc6f1360472bc18ca9a553ede278ef7276897"},
    {file = "urllib3-2.7.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:231e0ec3b63ceb14667c67be60f2f2c40a518cb38b03af60abc813da26505f4c"},
 ]

 [package.extras]
-brotli = ["brotli (>=1.2.0)", "brotlicffi (>=1.2.0.0)"]
+brotli = ["brotli (>=1.2.0) ; platform_python_implementation == \"CPython\"", "brotlicffi (>=1.2.0.0) ; platform_python_implementation != \"CPython\""]
 h2 = ["h2 (>=4,<5)"]
 socks = ["pysocks (>=1.5.6,!=1.5.7,<2.0)"]
-zstd = ["backports-zstd (>=1.0.0)"]
+zstd = ["backports-zstd (>=1.0.0) ; python_version < \"3.14\""]

 [metadata]
-lock-version = "2.0"
-python-versions = "^3.10"
-content-hash = "026c4acd254e889b70bb8c25ffb5e6323eee86380f54f2d8ef02f59ae9307529"
+lock-version = "2.1"
+python-versions = ">=3.10,<4.0"
+content-hash = "161dfd9b44e1063656bacea8e8fb08a2614361a8262d8f665240e4f391732e1b"
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@ -1,36 +1,40 @@
-[tool.poetry]
+[project]
 name = "jinjaturtle"
-version = "0.5.4"
+version = "0.7.0"
 description = "Convert config files into Ansible defaults and Jinja2 templates."
-authors = ["Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net>"]
+authors = [
+    { name = "Miguel Jacq", email = "mig@mig5.net" },
+]
 license = "GPL-3.0-or-later"
 readme = "README.md"
-packages = [{ include = "jinjaturtle", from = "src" }]
-
+requires-python = ">=3.10,<4.0"
 keywords = ["ansible", "jinja2", "config", "toml", "ini", "yaml", "json", "devops"]
+dependencies = [
+    "PyYAML (>=6.0,<7.0)",
+    "defusedxml (>=0.7.1,<0.8.0)",
+    "jinja2 (>=3.1.6,<4.0.0)",
+    "tomli (>=2.0.0,<3.0.0) ; python_version < '3.11'",
+]

+[project.urls]
 homepage = "https://git.mig5.net/mig5/jinjaturtle"
 repository = "https://git.mig5.net/mig5/jinjaturtle"

-[tool.poetry.dependencies]
-python = "^3.10"
-PyYAML = "^6.0"
-tomli = { version = "^2.0.0", python = "<3.11" }
-defusedxml = "^0.7.1"
-jinja2 = "^3.1.6"
-
-[tool.poetry.scripts]
+[project.scripts]
 jinjaturtle = "jinjaturtle.cli:main"

+[tool.poetry]
+packages = [{ include = "jinjaturtle", from = "src" }]
+
+[tool.poetry.group.dev.dependencies]
+pytest = "^8"
+pytest-cov = "^5"
+pyproject-appimage = "^4.2"
+
 [build-system]
-requires = ["poetry-core>=1.0.0"]
+requires = ["poetry-core>=2.0.0"]
 build-backend = "poetry.core.masonry.api"

 [tool.pyproject-appimage]
 script = "jinjaturtle"
 output = "JinjaTurtle.AppImage"
-
-[tool.poetry.dev-dependencies]
-pytest = "^8"
-pytest-cov = "^5"
-pyproject-appimage = "^4.2"
--- a/release.sh
+++ b/release.sh
@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ filedust -y .

 # Publish to Pypi
 poetry build
-poetry publish
-
-# Make AppImage
-poetry run pyproject-appimage
-mv JinjaTurtle.AppImage dist/

 # Sign packages
 for file in `ls -1 dist/`; do qubes-gpg-client --batch  --armor --detach-sign dist/$file > dist/$file.asc; done
@ -52,7 +47,6 @@ REMOTE="ashpool.mig5.net:/opt/repo_rpm"

 DISTS=(
  fedora:43
-  fedora:42
 )

 for dist in ${DISTS[@]}; do
@ -87,6 +81,9 @@ for dist in ${DISTS[@]}; do
  qubes-gpg-client --local-user "$KEYID" --detach-sign --armor "$RPM_REPO/repodata/repomd.xml" > "$RPM_REPO/repodata/repomd.xml.asc"
 done

+# If we got this far, we can publish to PyPI
+poetry publish
+
 echo "==> Syncing repo to server..."
 rsync -aHPvz --exclude=.git --delete "$REPO_ROOT/" "$REMOTE/"

--- a/rpm/jinjaturtle.spec
+++ b/rpm/jinjaturtle.spec
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%global upstream_version 0.5.4
+%global upstream_version 0.7.0

 Name:           jinjaturtle
 Version:        %{upstream_version}
@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ Convert config files into Ansible defaults and Jinja2 templates.
 %{_bindir}/jinjaturtle

 %changelog
+* Sun Jul 05 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
+- Much hardening
+* Wed Jun 24 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
+- More hardening
+* Tue Jun 23 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
+- Try to prevent what could lead to execution of embedded jinja in original files when converting
+* Sat Jun 20 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
+- erb support
 * Sat Jun 20 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
 - Make templates more faithful to the original file in terms of indentation, newlines, no deserialisation of things like < or >.
 - More test coverage
@ -51,7 +59,7 @@ Convert config files into Ansible defaults and Jinja2 templates.
 - Fix indentation problems with nested dicts
 * Fri Jun 19 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
 - Empty dicts and lists are now emitted as leaf defaults.
-* Tue May 11 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
+* Mon May 11 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
 - Support ssh configs
 * Tue Jan 06 2026 Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net> - %{version}-%{release}
 - Support converting systemd files and postfix main.cf
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/cli.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/cli.py
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import argparse
 import sys
 from defusedxml import defuse_stdlib
+from defusedxml.common import DefusedXmlException
 from pathlib import Path

 from . import j2
@ -12,11 +13,12 @@ from .core import (
    flatten_config,
    generate_ansible_yaml,
    generate_jinja2_template,
-    generate_puppet_hiera_yaml,
-    generate_erb_template,
+    ConfigParseError,
 )

 from .multi import process_directory
+from .safety import TemplateSafetyError
+from .output_safety import OutputPathError, ensure_safe_directory, write_text_safely


 def _build_arg_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
@ -58,24 +60,47 @@ def _build_arg_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
        "--template-output",
        help="Path to write the generated config template. If omitted, template is printed to stdout.",
    )
-    ap.add_argument(
-        "--template-engine",
-        choices=[j2.NAME, "erb"],
-        default=j2.NAME,
-        help="Template syntax to generate (default: jinja2). Use erb for Puppet templates.",
-    )
-    ap.add_argument(
-        "--puppet-class",
-        help=(
-            "Puppet class/Hiera namespace to use with --template-engine erb. "
-            "Defaults to --role-name. This lets tools use a file-specific "
-            "variable prefix while writing Hiera keys under the real Puppet class."
-        ),
-    )
    return ap


 def _main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    try:
+        return _run(argv)
+    except TemplateSafetyError as exc:
+        # The output safety gate refused to emit a template because it contained
+        # a construct JinjaTurtle never produces -- i.e. attacker-influenced
+        # source text became live template code.  Fail closed with a clear
+        # message and a non-zero exit code; never write the unsafe template.
+        print(
+            f"jinjaturtle: refusing to generate unsafe template: {exc}", file=sys.stderr
+        )
+        return 2
+    except OutputPathError as exc:
+        print(f"jinjaturtle: refusing unsafe output path: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    except DefusedXmlException as exc:
+        # defusedxml rejected the XML because it attempted a DTD, entity
+        # expansion, or external reference (XXE / billion-laughs class attack).
+        # This is a deliberately-blocked attack, not a benign malformed file, so
+        # core.parse_config lets it propagate unchanged rather than folding it
+        # into ConfigParseError. Report it as a refused unsafe input with a
+        # non-zero exit code instead of leaking an internal traceback.
+        print(
+            "jinjaturtle: refusing unsafe XML input: the document uses a DTD, "
+            f"entity expansion, or external reference ({exc.__class__.__name__}). "
+            "This is blocked to prevent XXE / entity-expansion attacks.",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+        return 2
+    except ConfigParseError as exc:
+        # The source file could not be parsed as its (detected or forced)
+        # format. This is expected for malformed/attacker-influenced input;
+        # fail cleanly with a non-zero exit code instead of a traceback.
+        print(f"jinjaturtle: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+
+def _run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
    defuse_stdlib()
    parser = _build_arg_parser()
    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
@ -90,36 +115,23 @@ def _main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:

        # Write defaults
        if args.defaults_output:
-            Path(args.defaults_output).write_text(defaults_yaml, encoding="utf-8")
+            write_text_safely(Path(args.defaults_output), defaults_yaml)
        else:
            print("# defaults/main.yml")
            print(defaults_yaml, end="")

-        # Optionally translate folder-mode templates to ERB.  Folder mode keeps
-        # the existing data shape; single-file mode below is the preferred
-        # Puppet path because it can produce class-parameter Hiera keys.
-        if args.template_engine == "erb":
-            from .erb import translate_jinja2_to_erb
-
-            for o in outputs:
-                o.template = translate_jinja2_to_erb(
-                    o.template,
-                    role_prefix=args.role_name,
-                    puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name,
-                )
-
-        template_ext = "erb" if args.template_engine == "erb" else j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION
+        template_ext = j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION

        # Write templates
        if args.template_output:
            out_path = Path(args.template_output)
            if len(outputs) == 1 and not out_path.is_dir():
-                out_path.write_text(outputs[0].template, encoding="utf-8")
+                write_text_safely(out_path, outputs[0].template)
            else:
-                out_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+                ensure_safe_directory(out_path)
                for o in outputs:
-                    (out_path / f"config.{o.fmt}.{template_ext}").write_text(
-                        o.template, encoding="utf-8"
+                    write_text_safely(
+                        out_path / f"config.{o.fmt}.{template_ext}", o.template
                    )
        else:
            for o in outputs:
@ -145,51 +157,28 @@ def _main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
    # Flatten config (excluding loop paths if loops are detected)
    flat_items = flatten_config(fmt, parsed, loop_candidates)

-    if args.template_engine == "erb":
-        ansible_yaml = generate_puppet_hiera_yaml(
-            args.role_name,
-            flat_items,
-            loop_candidates,
-            puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name,
-        )
-        template_str = generate_erb_template(
-            fmt,
-            parsed,
-            args.role_name,
-            original_text=config_text,
-            loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-            flat_items=flat_items,
-            puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name,
-        )
-    else:
-        # Generate defaults YAML (with loop collections if detected)
-        ansible_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml(
-            args.role_name, flat_items, loop_candidates
-        )
+    # Generate defaults YAML (with loop collections if detected)
+    ansible_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml(args.role_name, flat_items, loop_candidates)

-        # Generate template (with loops if detected)
-        template_str = generate_jinja2_template(
-            fmt,
-            parsed,
-            args.role_name,
-            original_text=config_text,
-            loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-        )
+    # Generate template (with loops if detected)
+    template_str = generate_jinja2_template(
+        fmt,
+        parsed,
+        args.role_name,
+        original_text=config_text,
+        loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
+    )

    if args.defaults_output:
-        Path(args.defaults_output).write_text(ansible_yaml, encoding="utf-8")
+        write_text_safely(Path(args.defaults_output), ansible_yaml)
    else:
        print("# defaults/main.yml")
        print(ansible_yaml, end="")

    if args.template_output:
-        Path(args.template_output).write_text(template_str, encoding="utf-8")
+        write_text_safely(Path(args.template_output), template_str)
    else:
-        print(
-            "# config.erb"
-            if args.template_engine == "erb"
-            else f"# config.{j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION}"
-        )
+        print(f"# config.{j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION}")
        print(template_str, end="")

    return 0
@ -199,4 +188,8 @@ def main() -> None:
    """
    Console-script entry point.
    """
-    _main(sys.argv[1:])
+    sys.exit(_main(sys.argv[1:]))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/core.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/core.py
@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ import re
 import yaml

 from .loop_analyzer import LoopAnalyzer, LoopCandidate
-from .erb import puppet_class_name, puppet_local_var_name, translate_jinja2_to_erb
+from .safety import (
+    verify_jinja2_template_safe,
+    verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys,
+)
 from .handlers import (
    BaseHandler,
    IniHandler,
@ -30,6 +33,22 @@ class QuotedString(str):
    pass


+class AnsibleUnsafeString(str):
+    """Marker type emitted with Ansible's !unsafe YAML tag.
+
+    Ansible recursively templates string values by default.  Source-derived
+    config values that contain Jinja delimiters must therefore be marked
+    unsafe in defaults/main.yml, otherwise a harvested value such as
+    ``{{ lookup('pipe', 'id') }}`` becomes executable on the Ansible
+    controller when the generated role is applied.
+    """
+
+    pass
+
+
+_JINJA_STARTS = ("{{", "{%", "{#")
+
+
 def _fallback_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: Any):
    """
    Fallback for objects the dumper doesn't know about.
@ -49,7 +68,33 @@ def _quoted_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: QuotedString):
    return dumper.represent_scalar("tag:yaml.org,2002:str", str(data), style='"')


+def _ansible_unsafe_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: AnsibleUnsafeString):
+    return dumper.represent_scalar("!unsafe", str(data), style="'")
+
+
+def _needs_ansible_unsafe(value: str) -> bool:
+    return any(marker in value for marker in _JINJA_STARTS)
+
+
+def _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(obj: Any) -> Any:
+    """Recursively mark mapping/list values containing Jinja as !unsafe.
+
+    Mapping keys are intentionally left alone: they are variable names or YAML
+    structure, not Ansible-templated values.  Values nested in folder-mode item
+    lists, including source-derived ``id`` values, are protected.
+    """
+
+    if isinstance(obj, dict):
+        return {k: _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(v) for k, v in obj.items()}
+    if isinstance(obj, list):
+        return [_mark_ansible_unsafe_values(v) for v in obj]
+    if isinstance(obj, str) and _needs_ansible_unsafe(obj):
+        return AnsibleUnsafeString(obj)
+    return obj
+
+
 _TurtleDumper.add_representer(QuotedString, _quoted_str_representer)
+_TurtleDumper.add_representer(AnsibleUnsafeString, _ansible_unsafe_str_representer)
 # Use our fallback for any unknown object types
 _TurtleDumper.add_representer(None, _fallback_str_representer)

@ -81,8 +126,9 @@ def dump_yaml(data: Any, *, sort_keys: bool = True) -> str:

    This is used by both the single-file and multi-file code paths.
    """
+    safe_data = _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(data)
    return yaml.dump(
-        data,
+        safe_data,
        Dumper=_TurtleDumper,
        sort_keys=sort_keys,
        default_flow_style=False,
@ -259,6 +305,66 @@ def detect_format(path: Path, explicit: str | None = None) -> str:
    return "ini"


+class ConfigParseError(Exception):
+    """Raised when a source config file cannot be parsed as its format.
+
+    Each underlying parser (json, tomllib, PyYAML, defusedxml/ElementTree,
+    configparser) raises its own exception type on malformed input. Without a
+    single normalised error, a malformed file -- which is entirely expected when
+    JinjaTurtle is pointed at harvested, attacker-influenceable config -- would
+    escape as an unhandled traceback (e.g. ``xml.etree.ElementTree.ParseError``
+    on an XML file whose element name is not well-formed). ``parse_config``
+    converts every such failure into this one type so the CLI can fail closed
+    with a clean message and a non-zero exit code, and so library callers (such
+    as Enroll, which falls back to copying the raw file) have a single, stable
+    exception to catch.
+
+    Note: defusedxml's *security* exceptions (``EntitiesForbidden``,
+    ``DTDForbidden``, ...) are intentionally NOT folded into this type. They
+    signal an attempted XXE/entity-expansion attack rather than a benign
+    malformed file, and must propagate unchanged so callers can tell the two
+    apart.
+    """
+
+
+def _build_malformed_config_errors() -> tuple[type[BaseException], ...]:
+    """Return the concrete "this file is malformed" exception types to catch.
+
+    Deliberately specific. In particular we must avoid catching plain
+    ``ValueError``: defusedxml's ``EntitiesForbidden``/``DTDForbidden`` subclass
+    ``ValueError``, and those are security signals that must NOT be swallowed.
+    """
+
+    import configparser
+    import json
+    from xml.etree.ElementTree import ParseError as _XMLParseError  # nosec
+
+    import yaml as _yaml
+
+    errs: list[type[BaseException]] = [
+        _XMLParseError,
+        json.JSONDecodeError,
+        configparser.Error,
+        _yaml.YAMLError,
+        UnicodeDecodeError,
+    ]
+    try:
+        import tomllib
+
+        errs.append(tomllib.TOMLDecodeError)
+    except ModuleNotFoundError:  # pragma: no cover - Python < 3.11 fallback
+        try:
+            import tomli  # type: ignore
+
+            errs.append(tomli.TOMLDecodeError)
+        except ModuleNotFoundError:
+            pass
+    return tuple(errs)
+
+
+_MALFORMED_CONFIG_ERRORS = _build_malformed_config_errors()
+
+
 def parse_config(path: Path, fmt: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, Any]:
    """
    Parse config file into a Python object.
@ -267,9 +373,38 @@ def parse_config(path: Path, fmt: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, Any]:
    handler = _HANDLERS.get(fmt)
    if handler is None:
        raise ValueError(f"Unsupported config format: {fmt}")
-    parsed = handler.parse(path)
-    # Make sure datetime objects are treated as strings (TOML, YAML)
-    parsed = _stringify_timestamps(parsed)
+    try:
+        parsed = handler.parse(path)
+        # Make sure datetime objects are treated as strings (TOML, YAML). This
+        # walks the parsed object recursively, so keep it inside the try where a
+        # RecursionError from a pathological structure is normalised below.
+        parsed = _stringify_timestamps(parsed)
+    except ConfigParseError:
+        raise
+    except _MALFORMED_CONFIG_ERRORS as exc:
+        # Normalise the per-parser "this file is malformed" errors into one
+        # json.JSONDecodeError / tomllib.TOMLDecodeError (ValueError
+        # subclasses), PyYAML's YAMLError, configparser.Error, and
+        # xml.etree.ElementTree.ParseError (raised by defusedxml on XML whose
+        # structure/element name is not well-formed). A bad input file is
+        # expected when parsing harvested config, so fail closed with a clean
+        # error instead of an unhandled traceback.
+        #
+        # IMPORTANT: this deliberately does NOT catch defusedxml's security
+        # exceptions (EntitiesForbidden, DTDForbidden, ...). Those signal an
+        # attempted XXE/entity-expansion attack and must propagate unchanged so
+        # callers (and tests) can distinguish "malformed" from "malicious".
+        raise ConfigParseError(f"could not parse {path} as {fmt}: {exc}") from exc
+    except RecursionError as exc:
+        # A deeply-nested or self-referential structure (e.g. a recursive YAML
+        # anchor) can exhaust the Python stack while walking the parsed object.
+        # The YAML handler already rejects reference cycles up front; this is a
+        # format-agnostic backstop so any such input fails closed with a clean
+        # message instead of a stack-overflow traceback.
+        raise ConfigParseError(
+            f"could not parse {path} as {fmt}: input is too deeply nested "
+            "or self-referential"
+        ) from exc

    return fmt, parsed

@ -378,93 +513,28 @@ def generate_jinja2_template(

    # Check if handler supports loop-aware generation
    if hasattr(handler, "generate_jinja2_template_with_loops") and loop_candidates:
-        return handler.generate_jinja2_template_with_loops(
+        template = handler.generate_jinja2_template_with_loops(
            parsed, role_prefix, original_text, loop_candidates
        )
+    else:
+        # Fallback to original scalar-only generation
+        template = handler.generate_jinja2_template(
+            parsed, role_prefix, original_text=original_text
+        )

-    # Fallback to original scalar-only generation
-    return handler.generate_jinja2_template(
-        parsed, role_prefix, original_text=original_text
-    )
+    # Defence in depth: independently verify that the finished template contains
+    # only JinjaTurtle-emitted constructs.  If any handler failed to neutralise
+    # verbatim source text, the un-escaped payload shows up here as a live tag
+    # and generation aborts instead of emitting an injectable template.
+    verify_jinja2_template_safe(template)

+    # Format-specific backstop: JinjaTurtle never emits Jinja inside a JSON object
+    # key, so a live construct in key position means source key text leaked into
+    # the template unescaped. This is independent of per-handler escaping.
+    if fmt == "json":
+        verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(template)

-def _template_variable_names(
-    role_prefix: str,
-    flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]],
-    loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None,
-) -> set[str]:
-    names = {make_var_name(role_prefix, path) for path, _value in flat_items}
-    if loop_candidates:
-        for candidate in loop_candidates:
-            names.add(make_var_name(role_prefix, candidate.path))
-    return names
-
-
-def generate_puppet_hiera_yaml(
-    role_prefix: str,
-    flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]],
-    loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None,
-    *,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Create Puppet Hiera data suitable for Automatic Parameter Lookup.
-
-    ``role_prefix`` remains the source variable prefix used by JinjaTurtle while
-    ``puppet_class`` is the Puppet class/Hiera namespace.  In the normal case
-    they are the same, so ``php_memory_limit`` becomes ``php::memory_limit``.
-    Enroll may pass a file-specific role prefix and a separate Puppet class to
-    avoid parameter-name collisions inside one generated Puppet module.
-    """
-
-    klass = puppet_class_name(puppet_class or role_prefix)
-    data: dict[str, Any] = {}
-
-    for path, value in flat_items:
-        generated = make_var_name(role_prefix, path)
-        local = puppet_local_var_name(role_prefix, generated, puppet_class=klass)
-        data[f"{klass}::{local}"] = value
-
-    if loop_candidates:
-        for candidate in loop_candidates:
-            generated = make_var_name(role_prefix, candidate.path)
-            local = puppet_local_var_name(role_prefix, generated, puppet_class=klass)
-            data[f"{klass}::{local}"] = candidate.items
-
-    return dump_yaml(data, sort_keys=True)
-
-
-def generate_erb_template(
-    fmt: str,
-    parsed: Any,
-    role_prefix: str,
-    *,
-    original_text: str | None = None,
-    loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None,
-    flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]] | None = None,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Generate a Puppet ERB template from JinjaTurtle's renderer-neutral data.
-
-    The first implementation intentionally translates the Jinja2 subset emitted
-    by JinjaTurtle's existing format handlers.  This keeps parsing, formatting
-    preservation, and loop detection identical between Jinja2 and ERB output
-    while still producing Puppet-native ``@parameter`` references.
-    """
-
-    jinja_template = generate_jinja2_template(
-        fmt,
-        parsed,
-        role_prefix,
-        original_text=original_text,
-        loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-    )
-    names = _template_variable_names(role_prefix, flat_items or [], loop_candidates)
-    return translate_jinja2_to_erb(
-        jinja_template,
-        role_prefix=role_prefix,
-        puppet_class=puppet_class or role_prefix,
-        variable_names=names,
-    )
+    return template


 def _stringify_timestamps(obj: Any) -> Any:
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/erb.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/erb.py
@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import re
-
-
-def _safe_name(raw: str, *, fallback: str = "var") -> str:
-    text = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]+", "_", str(raw or fallback)).strip("_").lower()
-    text = re.sub(r"_+", "_", text)
-    if not text:
-        text = fallback
-    if not re.match(r"^[a-z_]", text):
-        text = f"{fallback}_{text}"
-    return text
-
-
-def puppet_class_name(raw: str) -> str:
-    """Return a conservative Puppet class/Hiera namespace name."""
-
-    text = _safe_name(raw, fallback="jinjaturtle")
-    if not re.match(r"^[a-z]", text):
-        text = f"jinjaturtle_{text}"
-    return text
-
-
-def _role_prefix_name(raw: str) -> str:
-    return _safe_name(raw, fallback="jinjaturtle")
-
-
-def puppet_local_var_name(
-    role_prefix: str,
-    jinja_var_name: str,
-    *,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Map a generated JinjaTurtle variable to a Puppet class parameter.
-
-    For the common case where ``--role-name php`` also means class ``php``, a
-    generated Jinja variable such as ``php_memory_limit`` becomes Puppet local
-    parameter ``memory_limit`` and Hiera key ``php::memory_limit``.
-
-    Enroll sometimes needs a file-specific variable prefix to avoid collisions
-    inside a generated module.  When ``puppet_class`` differs from
-    ``role_prefix`` we keep the full generated variable name as the local
-    parameter and only use ``puppet_class`` as the Hiera namespace.
-    """
-
-    var_name = _safe_name(jinja_var_name, fallback="value")
-    prefix = _role_prefix_name(role_prefix)
-    klass = puppet_class_name(puppet_class or role_prefix)
-    if klass == prefix and var_name.startswith(prefix + "_"):
-        stripped = var_name[len(prefix) + 1 :]
-        return stripped or var_name
-    return var_name
-
-
-class ErbTranslator:
-    """Translate the Jinja2 subset emitted by JinjaTurtle into Puppet ERB."""
-
-    _TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"({{.*?}}|{%.*?%})", re.S)
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        role_prefix: str,
-        puppet_class: str | None = None,
-        variable_names: set[str] | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.role_prefix = role_prefix
-        self.puppet_class = puppet_class or role_prefix
-        self.variable_names = set(variable_names or set())
-        self.loop_stack: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = []
-        self.needs_json = False
-
-    def translate(self, template_text: str) -> str:
-        parts = self._TOKEN_RE.split(template_text)
-        out: list[str] = []
-        for token in parts:
-            if not token:
-                continue
-            if token.startswith("{{") and token.endswith("}}"):
-                expr = token[2:-2].strip()
-                out.append(f"<%= {self.expr_to_ruby(expr)} %>")
-                continue
-            if token.startswith("{%") and token.endswith("%}"):
-                stmt = token[2:-2].strip()
-                out.append(self.statement_to_erb(stmt))
-                continue
-            out.append(token)
-
-        rendered = "".join(out)
-        if self.needs_json and "require 'json'" not in rendered:
-            rendered = "<% require 'json' -%>\n" + rendered
-        return rendered
-
-    def local_var(self, name: str) -> str:
-        return puppet_local_var_name(
-            self.role_prefix, name, puppet_class=self.puppet_class
-        )
-
-    def ruby_value(self, expr: str) -> str:
-        expr = expr.strip()
-        if expr in {"true", "True"}:
-            return "true"
-        if expr in {"false", "False"}:
-            return "false"
-        if expr in {"none", "None", "null"}:
-            return "nil"
-        if re.match(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$", expr):
-            if any(expr == loop_var for loop_var, _idx, _coll in self.loop_stack):
-                return expr
-            return f"@{self.local_var(expr)}"
-        m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$", expr)
-        if m:
-            base, key = m.groups()
-            if any(base == loop_var for loop_var, _idx, _coll in self.loop_stack):
-                return f"{base}[{key!r}]"
-            return f"@{self.local_var(base)}[{key!r}]"
-        return expr
-
-    def expr_to_ruby(self, expr: str) -> str:
-        expr = expr.strip()
-
-        # JinjaTurtle emits these YAML-preserving ternaries for booleans/nulls.
-        m = re.match(
-            r"^(['\"])(true|false)\1\s+if\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+else\s+(['\"])(true|false)\4$",
-            expr,
-        )
-        if m:
-            truthy = m.group(2)
-            cond = self.ruby_value(m.group(3))
-            falsy = m.group(5)
-            return f"{cond} ? {truthy!r} : {falsy!r}"
-
-        m = re.match(
-            r"^(['\"])(null)\1\s+if\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+none\s+else\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)$",
-            expr,
-        )
-        if m:
-            value = self.ruby_value(m.group(3))
-            fallback = self.ruby_value(m.group(4))
-            return f"{value}.nil? ? 'null' : {fallback}"
-
-        if "|" in expr:
-            base, *filters = [part.strip() for part in expr.split("|")]
-            ruby = self.ruby_value(base)
-            for filt in filters:
-                if filt.startswith("lower"):
-                    ruby = f"{ruby}.to_s.downcase"
-                elif filt.startswith("to_json") or filt.startswith("tojson"):
-                    self.needs_json = True
-                    if "indent" in filt:
-                        ruby = f"JSON.pretty_generate({ruby})"
-                    else:
-                        ruby = f"JSON.generate({ruby})"
-            return ruby
-
-        return self.ruby_value(expr)
-
-    def statement_to_erb(self, stmt: str) -> str:
-        if stmt.endswith("-"):
-            stmt = stmt[:-1].rstrip()
-
-        if stmt.startswith("for "):
-            m = re.match(
-                r"^for\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s+in\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$",
-                stmt,
-            )
-            if m:
-                loop_var, collection = m.groups()
-                idx_var = f"__jt_idx_{len(self.loop_stack)}"
-                collection_ruby = self.ruby_value(collection)
-                self.loop_stack.append((loop_var, idx_var, collection_ruby))
-                return f"<% {collection_ruby}.each_with_index do |{loop_var}, {idx_var}| -%>"
-
-        if stmt == "endfor":
-            if self.loop_stack:
-                self.loop_stack.pop()
-            return "<% end %>"
-
-        if stmt.startswith("if "):
-            cond = stmt[3:].strip()
-            if cond == "not loop.last" and self.loop_stack:
-                _loop_var, idx_var, collection_ruby = self.loop_stack[-1]
-                return f"<% if {idx_var} < ({collection_ruby}.length - 1) -%>"
-            m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+defined$", cond)
-            if m:
-                return f"<% unless {self.ruby_value(m.group(1))}.nil? -%>"
-            m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+none$", cond)
-            if m:
-                return f"<% if {self.ruby_value(m.group(1))}.nil? -%>"
-            return f"<% if {self.expr_to_ruby(cond)} -%>"
-
-        if stmt == "else":
-            return "<% else -%>"
-
-        if stmt.startswith("elif "):
-            return f"<% elsif {self.expr_to_ruby(stmt[5:].strip())} -%>"
-
-        if stmt == "endif":
-            return "<% end -%>"
-
-        # Preserve unknown Jinja statements visibly as an ERB comment so the
-        # generated template does not contain invalid Jinja syntax.
-        return f"<%# Unsupported JinjaTurtle statement: {stmt} %>"
-
-
-def translate_jinja2_to_erb(
-    template_text: str,
-    *,
-    role_prefix: str,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-    variable_names: set[str] | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    return ErbTranslator(
-        role_prefix=role_prefix,
-        puppet_class=puppet_class,
-        variable_names=variable_names,
-    ).translate(template_text)
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/escape.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/escape.py
@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+"""Neutralise template metacharacters in text copied verbatim from source files.
+
+JinjaTurtle preserves formatting by copying parts of the *original* config file
+straight into the generated template: comments, blank lines, section headers,
+and any line it does not recognise as ``key = value``.  Config *values* are
+always replaced with ``{{ var }}`` placeholders and parked in the defaults data,
+so a payload inside a value is inert.  Verbatim text is different: if the source
+contains ``{{ ... }}``, ``{% ... %}`` or ``{# ... #}`` (Jinja2), or ``<%= %>`` /
+``<% %>`` (ERB), that text becomes *live template code* in the output and is
+executed when Ansible later renders the template.
+
+Because JinjaTurtle is frequently fed harvested, attacker-influenceable config
+(hostnames, banners, GECOS-derived comments, "Managed by" notes), this is a
+template-injection / SSTI vector that can lead to remote code execution on the
+configuration-management control node.
+
+The functions here render those metacharacters as literal text so they survive a
+later template render as the characters the source author actually wrote, rather
+than as executable template syntax.
+
+Design notes:
+  * We only ever escape text that originates from the *source file*.  We never
+    pass JinjaTurtle's own generated placeholders (``{{ role_var }}``) through
+    these helpers, so the placeholders keep working.
+  * Jinja2 literal text is wrapped in a single ``{% raw %} ... {% endraw %}``
+    block.  ``raw`` disables *all* tag interpretation inside it -- expressions,
+    statements and ``{# #}`` comments alike -- so one wrap neutralises every
+    Jinja construct.  The only way to break out of a raw block is a literal
+    ``{% endraw %}`` in the source, so we defang the token ``endraw`` (in any
+    internal spacing) before wrapping.
+"""
+
+import re
+
+# Jinja2 delimiters we must neutralise.  Engine-default; JinjaTurtle never
+# configures custom delimiters.
+_JINJA_MARKERS = ("{{", "}}", "{%", "%}", "{#", "#}")
+
+# ERB delimiters.  Longer markers first so "<%=" matches before "<%".
+_ERB_OPEN_MARKERS = ("<%=", "<%-", "<%#", "<%")
+_ERB_CLOSE_MARKERS = ("-%>", "%>")
+
+# Matches a Jinja2 endraw tag in any internal spacing and with any
+# whitespace-control marker on either side.  Jinja2 accepts "-", "+", or no
+# marker adjacent to the "%}"/"{%" of a block tag (e.g. "{%endraw%}",
+# "{%  endraw  %}", "{%- endraw -%}", "{%+ endraw +%}"), and ALL of these close
+# a raw block.  The control marker must be matched so a "{%+ endraw %}" in
+# attacker-influenced source text cannot survive defanging and break out of our
+# {% raw %} wrapper.  [-+]? appears on both sides accordingly.
+_ENDRAW_RE = re.compile(r"{%[-+]?\s*endraw\s*[-+]?%}")
+
+# Sentinel inserted between "end" and "raw" to break the endraw keyword without
+# changing the visible characters.  We use a Jinja comment-free approach: insert
+# the two halves across a raw boundary so the literal text still reads "endraw"
+# to a human but is never a valid tag.  See escape_jinja_literal for usage.
+
+
+def contains_jinja_markup(text: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if *text* contains any Jinja2 delimiter."""
+    return any(m in text for m in _JINJA_MARKERS)
+
+
+def _defang_endraw(text: str) -> str:
+    """Rewrite any literal ``{% endraw %}`` so it cannot close our raw wrapper.
+
+    We turn each endraw tag into ``{% endraw %}{{ '{% endraw %}' }}{% raw %}``...
+    no -- that would re-introduce live tags.  Instead we keep everything literal:
+    we break the keyword by emitting the tag's text in two raw segments split
+    inside the word ``endraw``.  The result, when later rendered, reproduces the
+    exact original characters ``{% endraw %}`` while never being a parseable tag.
+    """
+
+    def _replace(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
+        tag = match.group(0)
+        # Split the keyword "endraw" as "end" + "raw"; close and reopen the raw
+        # block between them.  Each half is plain text inside a raw block, so the
+        # reconstructed output is byte-identical to the original tag, but at no
+        # point does the token "{% endraw %}" exist contiguously to close raw.
+        idx = tag.lower().index("endraw")
+        head = tag[: idx + 3]  # up to and including "end"
+        tail = tag[idx + 3 :]  # "raw...%}"
+        return f"{head}{{% endraw %}}{{% raw %}}{tail}"
+
+    return _ENDRAW_RE.sub(_replace, text)
+
+
+def escape_jinja_literal(text: str) -> str:
+    """Make *text* render as literal characters under a later Jinja2 render.
+
+    Text with no Jinja metacharacters is returned unchanged so the common case
+    stays byte-for-byte identical to the source.  Otherwise the text is wrapped
+    in a single ``{% raw %}`` block, with any embedded ``endraw`` defanged.
+    """
+    if not text or not contains_jinja_markup(text):
+        return text
+    return "{% raw %}" + _defang_endraw(text) + "{% endraw %}"
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/base.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/base.py
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

+import re
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Iterable

@ -57,8 +58,20 @@ class BaseHandler:
          role_prefix_section_subsection_key

        Sanitises parts to lowercase [a-z0-9_] and strips extras.
+
+        Consecutive separators are collapsed to a single underscore. This is
+        required for correctness, not just aesthetics: a source key such as
+        ``log..level`` or ``cache--size`` would otherwise sanitise to a name
+        containing a double underscore (``log__level``). The output safety gate
+        in ``safety.py`` deliberately rejects *any* ``__`` in a generated
+        identifier because ``__`` is the gateway to every Jinja2 SSTI gadget
+        (``__class__``/``__globals__``/...). Emitting a dunder here would make
+        JinjaTurtle's own gate reject JinjaTurtle's own placeholder, aborting
+        generation on entirely benign config. Collapsing runs keeps every
+        generated name a plain single-underscore-delimited identifier that the
+        gate accepts.
        """
-        role_prefix = role_prefix.strip().lower()
+        role_prefix = re.sub(r"_+", "_", role_prefix.strip().lower())
        clean_parts: list[str] = []

        for part in path:
@ -70,7 +83,9 @@ class BaseHandler:
                    cleaned_chars.append(c.lower())
                else:
                    cleaned_chars.append("_")
-            cleaned_part = "".join(cleaned_chars).strip("_")
+            # Collapse runs of underscores (from adjacent separators) to a
+            # single "_" so the result can never contain a forbidden "__".
+            cleaned_part = re.sub(r"_+", "_", "".join(cleaned_chars)).strip("_")
            if cleaned_part:
                clean_parts.append(cleaned_part)

--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ini.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ini.py
@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from typing import Any

 from . import BaseHandler
 from .. import j2
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal


 class IniHandler(BaseHandler):
@ -84,16 +85,18 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler):
            line = raw_line
            stripped = line.lstrip()

-            # Blank or pure comment: keep as-is
+            # Blank or pure comment: keep formatting, but neutralise any
+            # template metacharacters so attacker-controlled comment text cannot
+            # become live template code in the output.
            if not stripped or stripped[0] in {"#", ";"}:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Section header
            if stripped.startswith("[") and "]" in stripped:
                header_inner = stripped[1 : stripped.index("]")]
                current_section = header_inner.strip()
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Work without newline so we can re-attach it exactly
@ -108,8 +111,9 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler):

            eq_index = content.find("=")
            if eq_index == -1:
-                # Not a simple key=value line: leave untouched
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                # Not a simple key=value line: leave content intact but escape
+                # any template metacharacters.
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            before_eq = content[:eq_index]
@ -117,7 +121,7 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler):

            key = before_eq.strip()
            if not key:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Whitespace after '='
@ -146,8 +150,16 @@ class IniHandler(BaseHandler):
            else:
                replacement_value = j2.variable(var_name)

+            # ``before_eq`` (key + surrounding whitespace) and ``comment_part``
+            # both originate from the source file and may carry template
+            # metacharacters; escape each independently so the safe
+            # ``replacement_value`` placeholder between them is preserved.
            new_content = (
-                before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part
+                escape_jinja_literal(before_eq)
+                + "="
+                + leading_ws
+                + replacement_value
+                + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)
            )
            out_lines.append(new_content + newline)

--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/json.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/json.py
@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ from typing import Any

 from . import DictLikeHandler
 from .. import j2
-from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal
+from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate, is_safe_loop_field_key


 class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
@ -109,10 +110,18 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
        chunks: list[str] = []
        pos = 0
        for path, start, end in spans:
-            chunks.append(text[pos:start])
+            # Text between scalar values (object keys, structural punctuation,
+            # whitespace, and any comment-like trailing text) is copied verbatim
+            # from the source file. Like every other text-emitting handler, this
+            # verbatim text must be neutralised: if it contains Jinja2 markup it
+            # would otherwise become live template code at apply time. The value
+            # itself is replaced with a safe placeholder below. ``escape_jinja_literal``
+            # is a no-op on text without Jinja markers, so benign JSON is unchanged
+            # byte-for-byte and a later render reproduces the original characters.
+            chunks.append(escape_jinja_literal(text[pos:start]))
            chunks.append(self._json_value_expr(self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path)))
            pos = end
-        chunks.append(text[pos:])
+        chunks.append(escape_jinja_literal(text[pos:]))
        return "".join(chunks)

    def _collect_json_scalar_spans(
@ -213,7 +222,12 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):

        def _walk(obj: Any, path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> Any:
            if isinstance(obj, dict):
-                return {k: _walk(v, path + (str(k),)) for k, v in obj.items()}
+                # Keys are emitted verbatim into the template, so neutralise any
+                # Jinja markup in them (see _generate_json_template_from_text).
+                return {
+                    escape_jinja_literal(str(k)): _walk(v, path + (str(k),))
+                    for k, v in obj.items()
+                }
            if isinstance(obj, list):
                return [_walk(v, path + (str(i),)) for i, v in enumerate(obj)]
            # scalar - use marker that will be replaced with to_json
@ -261,7 +275,12 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    return f"__LOOP_DICT__{collection_var}__{item_var}__"

            if isinstance(obj, dict):
-                return {k: _walk(v, current_path + (str(k),)) for k, v in obj.items()}
+                # Keys are emitted verbatim into the template, so neutralise any
+                # Jinja markup in them (see _generate_json_template_from_text).
+                return {
+                    escape_jinja_literal(str(k)): _walk(v, current_path + (str(k),))
+                    for k, v in obj.items()
+                }
            if isinstance(obj, list):
                # Check if this list is a loop candidate
                if current_path in loop_paths:
@ -364,8 +383,21 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
        ]  # first line has no indent; we prepend `inner` when emitting
        for i, key in enumerate(keys):
            comma = "," if i < len(keys) - 1 else ""
+            # Defence in depth: never interpolate a raw source key into an
+            # ``item_var.key`` reference. A key such as ``a }}{{ x`` would break
+            # out of the value placeholder and inject a live construct that the
+            # output-safety gate cannot distinguish from a legitimate variable.
+            if not is_safe_loop_field_key(key):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"refusing to emit loop-item field reference for unsafe key: {key!r}"
+                )
+            # The literal key text is emitted verbatim into the template; escape any
+            # Jinja markup in it. The value side ({item_var}.{key}) is constrained by
+            # the output safety gate's dotted-name allowlist, which fails closed on
+            # anything that is not a plain identifier path.
            dict_lines.append(
-                f'{field}"{key}": ' f"{j2.to_json(f'{item_var}.{key}')}{comma}"
+                f'{field}"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}": '
+                f"{j2.to_json(f'{item_var}.{key}')}{comma}"
            )
        # Comma between *items* goes after the closing brace.
        dict_lines.append(f"{inner}}}{j2.if_not_loop_last()},{j2.endif()}")
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/postfix.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/postfix.py
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ from typing import Any

 from . import BaseHandler
 from .. import j2
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal


 class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler):
@ -108,16 +109,16 @@ class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler):

            stripped = content.strip()
            if not stripped:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                i += 1
                continue
            if stripped.startswith("#"):
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                i += 1
                continue

            if "=" not in content:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                i += 1
                continue

@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler):

            key = before_eq.strip()
            if not key:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                i += 1
                continue

@ -162,16 +163,21 @@ class PostfixMainHandler(BaseHandler):

            var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, (key,))
            v = value
+            # ``before_eq`` (key) and ``comment_part`` are source-derived and may
+            # contain template metacharacters; escape each around the safe
+            # placeholder.
+            safe_before = escape_jinja_literal(before_eq)
+            safe_comment = escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)
            quoted = len(v) >= 2 and v[0] == v[-1] and v[0] in {'"', "'"}
            if quoted:
                replacement = (
-                    f"{before_eq}={leading_ws}{j2.quoted_variable(var)}"
-                    f"{comment_part}{newline}"
+                    f"{safe_before}={leading_ws}{j2.quoted_variable(var)}"
+                    f"{safe_comment}{newline}"
                )
            else:
                replacement = (
-                    f"{before_eq}={leading_ws}{j2.variable(var)}"
-                    f"{comment_part}{newline}"
+                    f"{safe_before}={leading_ws}{j2.variable(var)}"
+                    f"{safe_comment}{newline}"
                )

            out_lines.append(replacement)
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ssh.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/ssh.py
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from typing import Any

 from . import BaseHandler
 from .. import j2
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal


 _SECTION_KEYWORDS = {"host", "match"}
@ -255,12 +256,12 @@ class SshConfigHandler(BaseHandler):
        out_lines: list[str] = []
        for ln in parsed.lines:
            if ln.kind != "kv":
-                out_lines.append(ln.raw)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(ln.raw))
                continue

            path = self._path_for_line(ln)
            if not path:
-                out_lines.append(ln.raw)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(ln.raw))
                continue

            var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path)
@ -270,9 +271,12 @@ class SshConfigHandler(BaseHandler):
            else:
                replacement_value = j2.variable(var)

+            # ``before_value`` (keyword + spacing) and ``comment`` are
+            # source-derived; escape around the safe placeholder.
            rendered = (
-                f"{ln.before_value}{replacement_value}"
-                f"{ln.whitespace_before_comment}{ln.comment}{ln.newline}"
+                f"{escape_jinja_literal(ln.before_value)}{replacement_value}"
+                f"{ln.whitespace_before_comment}"
+                f"{escape_jinja_literal(ln.comment)}{ln.newline}"
            )
            out_lines.append(rendered)

--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/systemd.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/systemd.py
@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from typing import Any

 from . import BaseHandler
 from .. import j2
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal


@dataclass
@ -157,7 +158,13 @@ class SystemdUnitHandler(BaseHandler):
        out_lines: list[str] = []
        for ln in parsed.lines:
            if ln.kind != "kv" or not ln.section or not ln.key:
-                out_lines.append(ln.raw)
+                # Verbatim lines (blank/comment/section/unrecognised "raw")
+                # originate from the source file.  Escape template
+                # metacharacters so they cannot become live template code.
+                # This is the only handler that emits unrecognised lines, which
+                # is where Jinja *statement* injection (``{% ... %}``) was
+                # possible, so escaping here is essential.
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(ln.raw))
                continue

            path: tuple[str, ...] = (ln.section, ln.key)
@ -166,16 +173,18 @@ class SystemdUnitHandler(BaseHandler):
            var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path)

            v = (ln.value or "").strip()
+            safe_before = escape_jinja_literal(ln.before_eq)
+            safe_comment = escape_jinja_literal(ln.comment)
            quoted = len(v) >= 2 and v[0] == v[-1] and v[0] in {'"', "'"}
            if quoted:
                repl = (
-                    f"{ln.before_eq}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}"
-                    f"{j2.quoted_variable(var)}{ln.comment}"
+                    f"{safe_before}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}"
+                    f"{j2.quoted_variable(var)}{safe_comment}"
                )
            else:
                repl = (
-                    f"{ln.before_eq}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}"
-                    f"{j2.variable(var)}{ln.comment}"
+                    f"{safe_before}={ln.leading_ws_after_eq}"
+                    f"{j2.variable(var)}{safe_comment}"
                )

            newline = "\n" if ln.raw.endswith("\n") else ""
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/toml.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/toml.py
@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ from typing import Any

 from . import DictLikeHandler
 from .. import j2
-from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal
+from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate, is_safe_loop_field_key

 try:
    import tomllib
@ -77,19 +78,25 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
        def emit_kv(path: tuple[str, ...], key: str, value: Any) -> None:
            var_name = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,))
            if isinstance(value, str):
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}"
+                )
            elif isinstance(value, bool):
                # Booleans need | lower filter (Python True/False → TOML true/false)
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}"
+                )
            else:
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}"
+                )

        def walk(obj: dict[str, Any], path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None:
            scalar_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if not isinstance(v, dict)}
            nested_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if isinstance(v, dict)}

            if path:
-                header = ".".join(path)
+                header = ".".join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in path)
                lines.append(f"[{header}]")

            for key, val in scalar_items.items():
@ -130,10 +137,14 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
        def emit_kv(path: tuple[str, ...], key: str, value: Any) -> None:
            var_name = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,))
            if isinstance(value, str):
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(var_name)}"
+                )
            elif isinstance(value, bool):
                # Booleans need | lower filter (Python True/False → TOML true/false)
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}"
+                )
            elif isinstance(value, list):
                # Check if this list is a loop candidate
                if path + (key,) in loop_paths:
@ -157,19 +168,26 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    elif candidate.item_schema in ("simple_dict", "nested"):
                        # Dict list loop - TOML array of tables
                        # This is complex for TOML, using simplified approach
-                        lines.append(f"{key} = " f"{j2.to_json(var_name)}")
+                        lines.append(
+                            f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = "
+                            f"{j2.to_json(var_name)}"
+                        )
                else:
                    # Not a loop, treat as regular variable
-                    lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}")
+                    lines.append(
+                        f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}"
+                    )
            else:
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(var_name, value)}"
+                )

        def walk(obj: dict[str, Any], path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None:
            scalar_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if not isinstance(v, dict)}
            nested_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if isinstance(v, dict)}

            if path:
-                header = ".".join(path)
+                header = ".".join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in path)
                lines.append(f"[{header}]")

            for key, val in scalar_items.items():
@ -217,7 +235,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):

            # Blank or pure comment
            if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"):
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Table header: [server] or [server.tls] or [[array.of.tables]]
@ -230,7 +248,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    inner = inner.strip("[]")  # handle [[table]] as well
                    parts = [p.strip() for p in inner.split(".") if p.strip()]
                    current_table = tuple(parts)
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Try key = value
@ -245,7 +263,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):

            eq_index = content.find("=")
            if eq_index == -1:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            before_eq = content[:eq_index]
@ -253,7 +271,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):

            key = before_eq.strip()
            if not key:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Whitespace after '='
@ -289,19 +307,23 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                        nested_var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, nested_path)
                        if isinstance(sub_val, str):
                            inner_bits.append(
-                                f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}"
+                                f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}"
                            )
                        elif isinstance(sub_val, bool):
                            inner_bits.append(
-                                f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
+                                f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
                            )
                        else:
                            inner_bits.append(
-                                f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
+                                f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
                            )
                    replacement_value = "{ " + ", ".join(inner_bits) + " }"
                    new_content = (
-                        before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part
+                        escape_jinja_literal(before_eq)
+                        + "="
+                        + leading_ws
+                        + replacement_value
+                        + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)
                    )
                    out_lines.append(new_content + newline)
                    continue
@ -327,7 +349,11 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                replacement_value = j2.variable(var_name)

            new_content = (
-                before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part
+                escape_jinja_literal(before_eq)
+                + "="
+                + leading_ws
+                + replacement_value
+                + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)
            )
            out_lines.append(new_content + newline)

@ -355,7 +381,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
            if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"):
                # Only output if we're not skipping
                if not skip_until_next_table:
-                    out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                    out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Table header: [server] or [server.tls] or [[array.of.tables]]
@ -404,25 +430,39 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                            out_lines.append(
                                f"{j2.for_start(item_var, collection_var)}\n"
                            )
-                            out_lines.append(f"[[{'.'.join(table_path)}]]\n")
+                            out_lines.append(
+                                f"[[{'.'.join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in table_path)}]]\n"
+                            )

                            # Add fields from sample item
                            for key, value in sample_item.items():
                                if key == "_key":
                                    continue
+                                # Defence in depth: the loop analyzer refuses a
+                                # dict-loop whose items contain a non-identifier
+                                # key, so ``key`` is always a plain identifier
+                                # here. Never interpolate a raw key into an
+                                # ``item_var.key`` reference: a key such as
+                                # ``a }}{{ x`` would break out of the placeholder
+                                # and inject a live construct.
+                                if not is_safe_loop_field_key(key):
+                                    raise ValueError(
+                                        "refusing to emit loop-item field "
+                                        f"reference for unsafe key: {key!r}"
+                                    )
                                if isinstance(value, str):
                                    out_lines.append(
-                                        f"{key} = "
+                                        f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = "
                                        f"{self._toml_quoted_expr(f'{item_var}.{key}')}\n"
                                    )
                                elif isinstance(value, bool):
                                    out_lines.append(
-                                        f"{key} = "
+                                        f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = "
                                        f"{self._toml_value_expr(f'{item_var}.{key}', value)}\n"
                                    )
                                else:
                                    out_lines.append(
-                                        f"{key} = "
+                                        f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))} = "
                                        f"{self._toml_value_expr(f'{item_var}.{key}', value)}\n"
                                    )

@ -437,7 +477,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                            skip_until_next_table = False
                        current_table = table_path

-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # If we're inside a skipped array-of-tables section, skip this line
@ -456,7 +496,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):

            eq_index = content.find("=")
            if eq_index == -1:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            before_eq = content[:eq_index]
@ -464,7 +504,7 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):

            key = before_eq.strip()
            if not key:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Whitespace after '='
@ -501,7 +541,11 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    replacement_value = j2.to_json(collection_var)

                new_content = (
-                    before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part
+                    escape_jinja_literal(before_eq)
+                    + "="
+                    + leading_ws
+                    + replacement_value
+                    + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)
                )
                out_lines.append(new_content + newline)
                continue
@ -526,19 +570,23 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                        nested_var = self.make_var_name(role_prefix, nested_path)
                        if isinstance(sub_val, str):
                            inner_bits.append(
-                                f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}"
+                                f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_quoted_expr(nested_var)}"
                            )
                        elif isinstance(sub_val, bool):
                            inner_bits.append(
-                                f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
+                                f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
                            )
                        else:
                            inner_bits.append(
-                                f"{sub_key} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
+                                f"{escape_jinja_literal(str(sub_key))} = {self._toml_value_expr(nested_var, sub_val)}"
                            )
                    replacement_value = "{ " + ", ".join(inner_bits) + " }"
                    new_content = (
-                        before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part
+                        escape_jinja_literal(before_eq)
+                        + "="
+                        + leading_ws
+                        + replacement_value
+                        + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)
                    )
                    out_lines.append(new_content + newline)
                    continue
@ -564,7 +612,11 @@ class TomlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                replacement_value = j2.variable(var_name)

            new_content = (
-                before_eq + "=" + leading_ws + replacement_value + comment_part
+                escape_jinja_literal(before_eq)
+                + "="
+                + leading_ws
+                + replacement_value
+                + escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)
            )
            out_lines.append(new_content + newline)

--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/xml.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/xml.py
@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 from collections import Counter, defaultdict
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
-import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET  # nosec
+import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET  # nosec B405 - safe trees only; parsing uses defusedxml
+import defusedxml.ElementTree as DET

 from .base import BaseHandler
 from .. import j2
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal
 from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate


@ -19,11 +21,11 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler):

    def parse(self, path: Path) -> ET.Element:
        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        parser = ET.XMLParser(
-            target=ET.TreeBuilder(insert_comments=False)
-        )  # nosec B314
-        parser.feed(text)
-        root = parser.close()
+        # Security must live in the handler, not only in the CLI entry point:
+        # callers may import JinjaTurtle as a library and invoke parse_config()
+        # directly.  defusedxml rejects DTD/entity abuse and also discards
+        # comments by default, matching the previous TreeBuilder behaviour.
+        root = DET.fromstring(text)
        return root

    def flatten(self, parsed: Any) -> list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]]:
@ -230,6 +232,37 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler):

        walk(root, ())

+    # Internal marker prefixes used by JinjaTurtle's own comment nodes.  These
+    # must NOT be escaped (they are converted into real Jinja control structures
+    # downstream).  Source-file comments have none of these prefixes.
+    _MARKER_PREFIXES = ("LOOP:", "IF:", "ENDIF:")
+
+    def _is_jt_marker(self, comment_text: str) -> bool:
+        stripped = (comment_text or "").lstrip()
+        return any(stripped.startswith(p) for p in self._MARKER_PREFIXES)
+
+    def _escape_source_comments(self, root: ET.Element) -> None:
+        """Escape template metacharacters in comments preserved from the source.
+
+        XML comments are re-emitted verbatim by ``ET.tostring`` (the tree is
+        parsed with ``insert_comments=True``).  Attacker-controlled comment text
+        such as ``<!-- {{ cmd.run('id') }} -->`` would otherwise become live
+        template code.  Element/attribute *names* cannot carry Jinja delimiters
+        (XML naming rules forbid the characters and the parser rejects them), and
+        text/attribute *values* are already replaced with ``{{ var }}``
+        placeholders, so comments (and the prolog, handled separately) are the
+        only XML injection vector.
+
+        JinjaTurtle's own internal marker comments are left untouched so they can
+        be converted into real loops/conditionals later.
+        """
+        # ET represents comments with a callable tag (ET.Comment).  Iterate all
+        # descendants and escape comment text that is not one of our markers.
+        for elem in root.iter():
+            if elem.tag is ET.Comment:
+                if not self._is_jt_marker(elem.text or ""):
+                    elem.text = escape_jinja_literal(elem.text or "")
+
    def _generate_xml_template_from_text(self, role_prefix: str, text: str) -> str:
        """Generate scalar-only Jinja2 template."""
        prolog, body = self._split_xml_prolog(text)
@ -240,12 +273,16 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler):

        self._apply_jinja_to_xml_tree(role_prefix, root)

+        # Neutralise template metacharacters in any comments preserved from the
+        # source file before serialising.
+        self._escape_source_comments(root)
+
        indent = getattr(ET, "indent", None)
        if indent is not None:
            indent(root, space="  ")  # type: ignore[arg-type]

        xml_body = ET.tostring(root, encoding="unicode")
-        return prolog + xml_body
+        return escape_jinja_literal(prolog) + xml_body

    def _generate_xml_template_with_loops_from_text(
        self,
@ -265,6 +302,11 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler):
        # Apply Jinja transformations (including loop markers)
        self._apply_jinja_to_xml_tree(role_prefix, root, loop_candidates)

+        # Escape comments preserved from the source.  JinjaTurtle's own
+        # LOOP/IF/ENDIF marker comments are recognised and left intact so they
+        # can be converted into real Jinja control structures below.
+        self._escape_source_comments(root)
+
        # Convert to string
        indent = getattr(ET, "indent", None)
        if indent is not None:
@ -275,7 +317,7 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler):
        # Post-process to replace loop markers with actual Jinja loops
        xml_body = self._insert_xml_loops(xml_body, role_prefix, loop_candidates, root)

-        return prolog + xml_body
+        return escape_jinja_literal(prolog) + xml_body

    def _insert_xml_loops(
        self,
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/yaml.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/handlers/yaml.py
@ -6,9 +6,41 @@ from typing import Any

 from .dict import DictLikeHandler
 from .. import j2
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal
+from ..loop_analyzer import is_safe_loop_field_key
 from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate


+def _reject_recursive_structure(obj: Any) -> None:
+    """Raise ``yaml.YAMLError`` if *obj* contains a reference cycle.
+
+    A recursive YAML anchor (``a: &a [*a]``) produces a container that contains
+    itself. Every consumer in JinjaTurtle walks the parsed object depth-first,
+    so a cycle would raise ``RecursionError`` deep in unrelated code. Detect it
+    up front by tracking the ``id()`` of containers on the current descent path;
+    a repeat means a cycle. ``yaml.YAMLError`` is raised so ``parse_config``
+    normalises it into a clean ``ConfigParseError`` like any other malformed
+    input, rather than surfacing a stack-overflow traceback.
+    """
+
+    on_path: set[int] = set()
+
+    def walk(node: Any) -> None:
+        if isinstance(node, (dict, list)):
+            marker = id(node)
+            if marker in on_path:
+                raise yaml.YAMLError(
+                    "recursive/self-referential YAML structure is not supported"
+                )
+            on_path.add(marker)
+            children = node.values() if isinstance(node, dict) else node
+            for child in children:
+                walk(child)
+            on_path.discard(marker)
+
+    walk(obj)
+
+
 class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
    """
    YAML handler that can generate both scalar templates and loop-based templates.
@ -19,7 +51,16 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):

    def parse(self, path: Path) -> Any:
        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        return yaml.safe_load(text) or {}
+        parsed = yaml.safe_load(text) or {}
+        # PyYAML's safe_load happily builds *recursive* structures from an anchor
+        # that references itself (e.g. ``a: &a [*a]``). Downstream flattening,
+        # timestamp-stringifying and template generation all walk the parsed
+        # object recursively and would blow the Python stack (RecursionError) on
+        # such input. JinjaTurtle is regularly pointed at harvested,
+        # attacker-influenceable config, so reject a self-referential document
+        # cleanly here rather than crashing later.
+        _reject_recursive_structure(parsed)
+        return parsed

    def generate_jinja2_template(
        self,
@ -102,7 +143,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
            indent = len(raw_line) - len(stripped)

            if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"):
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            while stack and indent < stack[-1][0]:
@ -112,7 +153,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                key_part, rest = stripped.split(":", 1)
                key = key_part.strip()
                if not key:
-                    out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                    out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                    continue

                rest_stripped = rest.lstrip(" \t")
@ -125,7 +166,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                stack.append((indent, path, "map"))

                if not has_value:
-                    out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                    out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                    continue

                value_part, comment_part = self._split_inline_comment(
@ -147,8 +188,8 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value)

                leading = rest[: len(rest) - len(rest.lstrip(" \t"))]
-                new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{comment_part}"
-                new_stripped = f"{key}:{new_rest}"
+                new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}"
+                new_stripped = f"{escape_jinja_literal(key)}:{new_rest}"
                out_lines.append(
                    " " * indent
                    + new_stripped
@ -185,7 +226,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                else:
                    replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value)

-                new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{comment_part}"
+                new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}"
                out_lines.append(
                    " " * indent
                    + new_stripped
@ -193,7 +234,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                )
                continue

-            out_lines.append(raw_line)
+            out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))

        return "".join(out_lines)

@ -275,7 +316,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    next_line = next_significant_line(line_index)
                    if next_line is None:
                        skip_until_indent = None
-                        out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                        out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                    else:
                        next_indent, next_stripped = next_line
                        still_in_collection = next_indent > skip_until_indent or (
@ -284,12 +325,12 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                        )
                        if not still_in_collection:
                            skip_until_indent = None
-                            out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                            out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                    continue
                if is_comment:
                    if indent <= skip_until_indent:
                        skip_until_indent = None
-                        out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                        out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                    # Comments/blank lines indented beneath the replaced
                    # collection are considered part of that collection and
                    # cannot be placed safely inside a generated loop.
@ -303,7 +344,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):

            # Blank or comment lines
            if is_blank or is_comment:
-                out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                continue

            # Adjust stack based on indent
@ -315,7 +356,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                key_part, rest = stripped.split(":", 1)
                key = key_part.strip()
                if not key:
-                    out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                    out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                    continue

                rest_stripped = rest.lstrip(" \t")
@ -353,7 +394,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    continue

                if not has_value:
-                    out_lines.append(raw_line)
+                    out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))
                    continue

                # Scalar value - replace with variable
@ -376,8 +417,8 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                    replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value)

                leading = rest[: len(rest) - len(rest.lstrip(" \t"))]
-                new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{comment_part}"
-                new_stripped = f"{key}:{new_rest}"
+                new_rest = f"{leading}{replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}"
+                new_stripped = f"{escape_jinja_literal(key)}:{new_rest}"
                out_lines.append(
                    " " * indent
                    + new_stripped
@ -439,7 +480,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                else:
                    replacement = self._yaml_scalar_expr(var_name, raw_value)

-                new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{comment_part}"
+                new_stripped = f"- {replacement}{escape_jinja_literal(comment_part)}"
                out_lines.append(
                    " " * indent
                    + new_stripped
@ -447,7 +488,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                )
                continue

-            out_lines.append(raw_line)
+            out_lines.append(escape_jinja_literal(raw_line))

        return "".join(out_lines)

@ -480,7 +521,7 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
        lines: list[str] = []
        if not is_list:
            key = candidate.path[-1] if candidate.path else "items"
-            lines.append(f"{indent_str}{key}:")
+            lines.append(f"{indent_str}{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}:")

        item_lines: list[str] = []
        if candidate.items:
@ -510,10 +551,10 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
            # into the rendered YAML and nesting the next top-level key.
            lines.append(f"{j2.for_start(item_var, collection_var)}{item_lines[0]}")
            lines.extend(item_lines[1:])
-            lines.append(j2.for_end())
+            lines.append(j2.for_end(keep_trailing_newline=True))
        else:
            lines.append(j2.for_start(item_var, collection_var))
-            lines.append(j2.for_end())
+            lines.append(j2.for_end(keep_trailing_newline=True))

        return "\n".join(lines)

@ -546,15 +587,31 @@ class YamlHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                # Special key for dict collections - output as comment or skip
                continue

+            # Defence in depth: the loop analyzer already refuses a dict-loop
+            # whose items contain a non-identifier key (see _analyze_dict_schema),
+            # so ``key`` should always be a plain identifier here. Assert it
+            # rather than interpolate a raw key into a Jinja reference: a key such
+            # as ``a }}{{ x`` would otherwise close the placeholder and inject a
+            # live construct that the output gate cannot distinguish from a
+            # legitimate variable.
+            if not is_safe_loop_field_key(key):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"refusing to emit loop-item field reference for unsafe key: {key!r}"
+                )
+
            if first_key and is_list_item:
                # First key gets the list marker
                value_expr = self._yaml_value_expr(f"{loop_var}.{key}", value)
-                lines.append(f"{indent_str}- {key}: {value_expr}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{indent_str}- {escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}: {value_expr}"
+                )
                first_key = False
            else:
                # Subsequent keys are indented
                sub_indent = indent + 2 if is_list_item else indent
                value_expr = self._yaml_value_expr(f"{loop_var}.{key}", value)
-                lines.append(f"{' ' * sub_indent}{key}: {value_expr}")
+                lines.append(
+                    f"{' ' * sub_indent}{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}: {value_expr}"
+                )

        return lines
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/j2.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/j2.py
@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations

 from typing import Any

-NAME = "jinja2"
 TEMPLATE_EXTENSION = "j2"
 JSON_VALUE_FILTER = "to_json(ensure_ascii=False)"

@ -43,10 +42,19 @@ def to_json(
    return filtered(value, f"to_json({', '.join(args)})")


-def statement(value: str, *, trim_right: bool = False) -> str:
+def statement(
+    value: str,
+    *,
+    trim_right: bool = False,
+    keep_trailing_newline: bool = False,
+) -> str:
    """Return a Jinja2 statement tag for an already-built statement body."""
+    if trim_right and keep_trailing_newline:
+        raise ValueError("trim_right and keep_trailing_newline are mutually exclusive")
    if trim_right:
        return f"{{% {value} -%}}"
+    if keep_trailing_newline:
+        return f"{{% {value} +%}}"
    return f"{{% {value} %}}"


@ -66,8 +74,12 @@ def for_start(item_var: str, collection_var: str) -> str:
    return statement(f"for {item_var} in {collection_var}")


-def for_end(*, trim_right: bool = False) -> str:
-    return statement("endfor", trim_right=trim_right)
+def for_end(*, trim_right: bool = False, keep_trailing_newline: bool = False) -> str:
+    return statement(
+        "endfor",
+        trim_right=trim_right,
+        keep_trailing_newline=keep_trailing_newline,
+    )


 def yaml_scalar_expression(var_name: str, raw_value: str | None = None) -> str:
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/loop_analyzer.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/loop_analyzer.py
@ -7,10 +7,34 @@ instead of flattened scalar variables.

 from __future__ import annotations

+import re
 from collections import Counter
 from typing import Any, Literal


+# A dict-loop emits per-item field references of the form ``loopvar.<field>``.
+# ``<field>`` is derived from a source key, which is attacker-influenceable when
+# JinjaTurtle is fed harvested config. The output-safety gate only accepts a
+# reference whose every hop matches this identifier class, so a key must reduce
+# to exactly this shape before it can be used as a loop-item field. Anything else
+# (a key containing ``}}``, quotes, ``.``, ``__``, ...) must not be turned into a
+# loop; the caller falls back to scalar generation, where every value goes through
+# make_var_name() and all verbatim text is escaped.
+_SAFE_LOOP_FIELD_RE = re.compile(r"(?!\w*__)[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\Z")
+
+
+def is_safe_loop_field_key(key: Any) -> bool:
+    """Return True if *key* is safe to emit as a ``loopvar.<key>`` field access.
+
+    The check mirrors the output-safety gate's identifier class (single
+    identifier, no double underscore). A key that does not match cannot be
+    expressed as a dotted loop-item reference without risking template
+    injection, so a loop candidate containing such a key is rejected upstream.
+    """
+
+    return bool(_SAFE_LOOP_FIELD_RE.match(str(key)))
+
+
 class LoopCandidate:
    """
    Represents a detected loop opportunity in the config structure.
@ -265,6 +289,19 @@ class LoopAnalyzer:
        if not dicts:
            return "heterogeneous"

+        # Security: a dict-loop emits ``loopvar.<key>`` field references. If any
+        # item key is not a plain identifier, it cannot be expressed safely as a
+        # dotted reference (a key such as ``a }}{{ x`` would break out of the
+        # placeholder and inject a live construct). Refuse the loop so the caller
+        # falls back to scalar generation, which escapes all verbatim text and
+        # routes every value through make_var_name().
+        for d in dicts:
+            for k in d.keys():
+                if k == "_key":
+                    continue
+                if not is_safe_loop_field_key(k):
+                    return "heterogeneous"
+
        # Get key sets from each dict
        key_sets = [set(d.keys()) for d in dicts]

--- a/src/jinjaturtle/multi.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/multi.py
@ -22,15 +22,26 @@ Notes:

 from collections import Counter, defaultdict
 from copy import deepcopy
+import os
 import configparser
+import stat
+import sys
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Iterable
 import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET  # nosec

 from . import j2
-from .core import dump_yaml, flatten_config, make_var_name, parse_config
+from .core import (
+    dump_yaml,
+    flatten_config,
+    make_var_name,
+    parse_config,
+    ConfigParseError,
+)
 from .handlers.xml import XmlHandler
+from .safety import verify_jinja2_template_safe, verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys
+from .escape import escape_jinja_literal


 SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES: dict[str, set[str]] = {
@ -42,8 +53,23 @@ SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES: dict[str, set[str]] = {
 }


+def _lstat(path: Path) -> os.stat_result:
+    return path.lstat()
+
+
 def is_supported_file(path: Path) -> bool:
-    if not path.is_file():
+    """Return True only for real regular files with supported suffixes.
+
+    pathlib.Path.is_file() follows symlinks.  Folder mode must not follow
+    attacker-controlled symlinks when run over an untrusted tree, especially if
+    an administrator accidentally runs the CLI as root.
+    """
+
+    try:
+        st = _lstat(path)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return False
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
        return False
    suffix = path.suffix.lower()
    for exts in SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES.values():
@ -53,11 +79,16 @@ def is_supported_file(path: Path) -> bool:


 def iter_supported_files(root: Path, recursive: bool) -> list[Path]:
-    if not root.exists():
+    try:
+        st = _lstat(root)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
        raise FileNotFoundError(str(root))
-    if root.is_file():
+
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+        raise ValueError(f"refusing to follow symlink: {root}")
+    if stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
        return [root] if is_supported_file(root) else []
-    if not root.is_dir():
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
        return []

    it = root.rglob("*") if recursive else root.glob("*")
@ -160,6 +191,11 @@ def _yaml_render_union(
    if isinstance(union_obj, dict):
        for key, val in union_obj.items():
            key_path = path + (str(key),)
+            # The key text is copied verbatim into the template; escape it so an
+            # attacker-influenced key (e.g. ``{{ 7*7 }}``) cannot become live
+            # template code.  ``key_path`` (used only to build sanitised var
+            # names) keeps the original key.
+            safe_key = escape_jinja_literal(str(key))
            cond_var = (
                defined_var_name(role_prefix, key_path)
                if key_path in optional_containers
@ -170,13 +206,13 @@ def _yaml_render_union(
                value = _yaml_scalar_placeholder(role_prefix, key_path, val)
                if cond_var:
                    lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(cond_var)}")
-                lines.append(f"{ind}{key}: {value}")
+                lines.append(f"{ind}{safe_key}: {value}")
                if cond_var:
                    lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.endif()}")
            else:
                if cond_var:
                    lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(cond_var)}")
-                lines.append(f"{ind}{key}:")
+                lines.append(f"{ind}{safe_key}:")
                lines.extend(
                    _yaml_render_union(
                        role_prefix,
@ -214,6 +250,7 @@ def _yaml_render_union(
                first = True
                for k, v in item.items():
                    kp = item_path + (str(k),)
+                    safe_k = escape_jinja_literal(str(k))
                    k_cond = (
                        defined_var_name(role_prefix, kp)
                        if kp in optional_containers
@ -224,14 +261,14 @@ def _yaml_render_union(
                        if first:
                            if k_cond:
                                lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(k_cond)}")
-                            lines.append(f"{ind}- {k}: {value}")
+                            lines.append(f"{ind}- {safe_k}: {value}")
                            if k_cond:
                                lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.endif()}")
                            first = False
                        else:
                            if k_cond:
                                lines.append(f"{ind}  {j2.if_defined(k_cond)}")
-                            lines.append(f"{ind}  {k}: {value}")
+                            lines.append(f"{ind}  {safe_k}: {value}")
                            if k_cond:
                                lines.append(f"{ind}  {j2.endif()}")
                    else:
@ -239,7 +276,7 @@ def _yaml_render_union(
                        if first:
                            if k_cond:
                                lines.append(f"{ind}{j2.if_defined(k_cond)}")
-                            lines.append(f"{ind}- {k}:")
+                            lines.append(f"{ind}- {safe_k}:")
                            lines.extend(
                                _yaml_render_union(
                                    role_prefix,
@ -255,7 +292,7 @@ def _yaml_render_union(
                        else:
                            if k_cond:
                                lines.append(f"{ind}  {j2.if_defined(k_cond)}")
-                            lines.append(f"{ind}  {k}:")
+                            lines.append(f"{ind}  {safe_k}:")
                            lines.extend(
                                _yaml_render_union(
                                    role_prefix,
@ -301,6 +338,7 @@ def _toml_render_union(

    def emit_kv(path: tuple[str, ...], key: str, value: Any) -> None:
        var_name = make_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,))
+        safe_key = escape_jinja_literal(str(key))
        cond = (
            defined_var_name(role_prefix, path + (key,))
            if (path + (key,)) in optional_containers
@ -309,11 +347,11 @@ def _toml_render_union(
        if cond:
            lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(cond)}")
        if isinstance(value, str):
-            lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var_name)}")
+            lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var_name)}")
        elif isinstance(value, bool):
-            lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.lower(var_name)}")
+            lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.lower(var_name)}")
        else:
-            lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.variable(var_name)}")
+            lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.variable(var_name)}")
        if cond:
            lines.append(j2.endif())

@ -326,7 +364,7 @@ def _toml_render_union(
            )
            if cond:
                lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(cond)}")
-            lines.append(f"[{'.'.join(path)}]")
+            lines.append(f"[{'.'.join(escape_jinja_literal(str(p)) for p in path)}]")

        scalar_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if not isinstance(v, dict)}
        nested_items = {k: v for k, v in obj.items() if isinstance(v, dict)}
@ -412,10 +450,11 @@ def _ini_render_union(
        )
        if sec_cond:
            lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(sec_cond)}")
-        lines.append(f"[{section}]")
+        lines.append(f"[{escape_jinja_literal(str(section))}]")
        for key, raw_val in union.items(section, raw=True):
            path = (section, key)
            var = make_var_name(role_prefix, path)
+            safe_key = escape_jinja_literal(str(key))
            key_cond = (
                defined_var_name(role_prefix, path) if path in optional_keys else None
            )
@ -424,9 +463,9 @@ def _ini_render_union(
            if key_cond:
                lines.append(f"{j2.if_defined(key_cond)}")
            if quoted:
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var)}")
+                lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.quoted_variable(var)}")
            else:
-                lines.append(f"{key} = {j2.variable(var)}")
+                lines.append(f"{safe_key} = {j2.variable(var)}")
            if key_cond:
                lines.append(j2.endif())
        lines.append("")
@ -599,7 +638,13 @@ def process_directory(
    # Parse and group by format
    grouped: dict[str, list[tuple[Path, Any]]] = defaultdict(list)
    for p in files:
-        fmt, parsed = parse_config(p, None)
+        try:
+            fmt, parsed = parse_config(p, None)
+        except ConfigParseError as exc:
+            # One malformed file should not abort processing of an entire
+            # directory. Skip it with a warning; the rest still generate.
+            print(f"jinjaturtle: skipping {p}: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+            continue
        if fmt not in FOLDER_SUPPORTED_FORMATS:
            # Directory mode only supports a subset of formats for now.
            continue
@ -769,4 +814,12 @@ def process_directory(
        defaults_doc[out.list_var] = out.items
    defaults_yaml = dump_yaml(defaults_doc, sort_keys=True)

+    # Defence in depth: folder-mode union templates are built by their own
+    # renderers (not core.generate_jinja2_template), so gate each one here too.
+    # Any un-neutralised source text that became a live tag aborts generation.
+    for out in outputs:
+        verify_jinja2_template_safe(out.template)
+        if out.fmt == "json":
+            verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(out.template)
+
    return defaults_yaml, outputs
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/output_safety.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/output_safety.py
@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+"""Safer file-output helpers for the JinjaTurtle CLI.
+
+The CLI is often used by administrators. A plain Path.write_text() follows a
+final-path symlink and can therefore be dangerous when a root-run invocation
+writes into an attacker-writable tree. These helpers validate path components,
+refuse symlink parents, reject root-run output through untrusted parent
+components, write through a temporary file in the target directory, and replace
+the final path atomically. Existing final-path symlinks are refused rather than
+followed.
+"""
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import stat
+import tempfile
+
+
+class OutputPathError(OSError):
+    """Raised when a requested output path is unsafe."""
+
+
+# Keep a reference to the real euid getter. Tests can monkeypatch
+# _effective_uid directly without changing process-wide os.geteuid behaviour.
+_OS_GETEUID = getattr(os, "geteuid", None)
+
+
+def _effective_uid() -> int | None:
+    if _OS_GETEUID is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return int(_OS_GETEUID())
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _absolute(path: Path) -> Path:
+    expanded = path.expanduser()
+    return expanded if expanded.is_absolute() else Path.cwd() / expanded
+
+
+def _chmod_private(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        os.chmod(path, 0o700)
+    except OSError:
+        # Best-effort; mkdir(mode=0o700) is already used for normal filesystems.
+        pass
+
+
+def _assert_trusted_root_parent(path: Path, st: os.stat_result) -> None:
+    """Reject root-run output through attacker-controlled parent directories.
+
+    A root-run JinjaTurtle process may write files that an administrator later
+    applies as configuration-management input. Parent directories controlled by
+    an unprivileged user are therefore not acceptable output anchors. Root-owned
+    sticky shared directories such as /tmp are allowed as a boundary, but any
+    existing child below them must be root-owned and not writable by group/other.
+    """
+
+    if _effective_uid() != 0:
+        return
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"output parent is not a directory: {path}")
+    if st.st_uid != 0:
+        raise OutputPathError(
+            f"output parent is not owned by root; refusing root-run output: {path}"
+        )
+    writable_by_group_or_other = st.st_mode & (stat.S_IWGRP | stat.S_IWOTH)
+    sticky = st.st_mode & stat.S_ISVTX
+    if writable_by_group_or_other and not sticky:
+        raise OutputPathError(
+            "output parent is writable by group/other; "
+            f"refusing root-run output: {path}"
+        )
+
+
+def _assert_existing_directory_component(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        st = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise OutputPathError(f"unable to inspect output parent: {path}") from exc
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to use symlink parent: {path}")
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"output parent is not a directory: {path}")
+    _assert_trusted_root_parent(path, st)
+
+
+def _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(path: Path) -> Path:
+    """Create/validate a directory tree one component at a time.
+
+    pathlib.mkdir(parents=True) can traverse a symlink inserted after a parent
+    pre-check. Walking one component at a time keeps every existing component
+    checked before it is used, and newly-created components are immediately
+    re-inspected.
+    """
+
+    out = _absolute(path)
+    parts = out.parts
+    if not parts:
+        return out
+
+    if out.is_absolute():
+        cur = Path(parts[0])
+        rest = parts[1:]
+        _assert_existing_directory_component(cur)
+    else:
+        # _absolute() currently always returns an absolute path, but keep this
+        # branch for clarity if that helper is ever relaxed.
+        cur = Path.cwd()
+        rest = parts
+        _assert_existing_directory_component(cur)
+
+    for part in rest:
+        cur = cur / part
+        if os.path.lexists(cur):
+            _assert_existing_directory_component(cur)
+            continue
+        try:
+            os.mkdir(cur, 0o700)
+        except FileExistsError:
+            _assert_existing_directory_component(cur)
+            continue
+        _chmod_private(cur)
+        _assert_existing_directory_component(cur)
+
+    return out
+
+
+def _check_existing_output_file(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        st = path.lstat()
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to write through symlink: {path}")
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to replace non-regular file: {path}")
+
+
+def _check_parent_components(parent: Path) -> None:
+    """Require every existing parent component to be a trusted real directory."""
+
+    _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(parent)
+
+
+def ensure_safe_directory(path: Path) -> None:
+    """Create or validate a directory tree without accepting unsafe parents."""
+
+    _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(path)
+
+
+def write_text_safely(path: Path, text: str, *, encoding: str = "utf-8") -> None:
+    """Write text without following a final-path symlink.
+
+    The target's parent is created/validated component by component. Existing
+    parent symlinks are refused for every user. When running as root, existing
+    parent components must also be root-owned and not writable by group/other,
+    except for sticky shared boundaries such as /tmp. Existing final-path
+    symlinks are refused rather than followed.
+    """
+
+    path = _absolute(path)
+    parent = _mkdir_safe_dir_tree(path.parent)
+    _check_existing_output_file(path)
+
+    fd = -1
+    tmp_name: str | None = None
+    try:
+        fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix=f".{path.name}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=str(parent), text=True
+        )
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding=encoding) as f:
+            fd = -1
+            f.write(text)
+            f.flush()
+            os.fsync(f.fileno())
+        os.chmod(tmp_name, 0o600)
+        _check_parent_components(path.parent)
+        _check_existing_output_file(path)
+        os.replace(tmp_name, path)
+        tmp_name = None
+    finally:
+        if fd >= 0:
+            os.close(fd)
+        if tmp_name is not None:
+            try:
+                os.unlink(tmp_name)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
--- a/src/jinjaturtle/safety.py
+++ b/src/jinjaturtle/safety.py
@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+"""Output safety gate for generated templates (defence in depth).
+
+JinjaTurtle's first line of defence is per-handler escaping: every piece of
+verbatim source text is meant to be wrapped/neutralised before it reaches the
+template (see ``escape.py``).  That model is correct but *fragile*: it relies on
+every handler remembering to escape at every site, and on the escaper being
+exactly right for every delimiter form.  A single forgotten call site -- or a
+new handler, or a missed delimiter variant -- silently reopens a
+template-injection / SSTI path that can become remote code execution on the
+configuration-management control node when the template is later rendered.
+
+This module adds a second, independent line of defence that does **not** depend
+on getting every escape right.  It inspects the *finished* template and proves a
+single global property:
+
+    Every *live* template construct in the output is one that JinjaTurtle itself
+    legitimately emits.  Anything else can only have originated from
+    un-neutralised source text, so generation fails loudly instead of emitting a
+    dangerous template.
+
+The check is positive/allowlist-based, which is the safe direction: unknown
+constructs are rejected, not ignored.  It runs at the single choke points in
+``core.py`` (``generate_jinja2_template``) so it covers every current handler and
+every future one automatically.
+
+Why this is robust against the escaper being wrong
+---------------------------------------------------
+We tokenise with Jinja2's own lexer.  The lexer emits a JinjaTurtle
+``{% raw %} ... {% endraw %}`` wrapper as ``raw_begin`` / inert ``data`` /
+``raw_end``: the wrapped literal text is *not* tokenised as live tags.  So the
+verifier only ever sees, as live constructs, the tags Jinja2 would actually
+execute.  If an escaped block was mis-wrapped such that a payload escapes the
+raw wrapper (the historical ``{%+ endraw %}`` bug), that payload now appears as a
+*live* token here and is rejected -- the gate catches the failure even though
+the escaper produced it.
+"""
+
+import re
+
+__all__ = [
+    "TemplateSafetyError",
+    "verify_jinja2_template_safe",
+    "verify_erb_template_safe",
+    "verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys",
+]
+
+
+class TemplateSafetyError(Exception):
+    """Raised when a generated template contains a construct JinjaTurtle would
+    never emit, indicating that un-neutralised source text became live template
+    code.  Generation must abort rather than emit the template."""
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Allowlist grammar for JinjaTurtle-emitted Jinja2.
+#
+# JinjaTurtle emits a deliberately tiny subset of Jinja2.  Each pattern below
+# describes the *full body* of a tag (the text between ``{%``/``%}`` or
+# ``{{``/``}}``), already stripped of surrounding whitespace and of any ``-``/
+# ``+`` whitespace-control markers.  Identifiers (variable names, loop vars,
+# keys) are restricted to a conservative character class; crucially this class
+# excludes characters needed for SSTI gadgets (quotes, parentheses, brackets,
+# arithmetic/operator characters, ``%``, ``|`` except in the known filter forms,
+# attribute access beyond a single dotted hop, etc.).
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+# A single identifier.  Word characters only, and -- critically -- no
+# double-underscore anywhere.  ``__`` is the gateway to every classic Jinja2
+# SSTI gadget (``__class__``, ``__init__``, ``__globals__``, ``__builtins__``),
+# and JinjaTurtle never emits a dunder, so forbidding ``__`` here removes the
+# entire attribute-traversal escape class even if such a token reached output.
+_NAME = r"(?!\w*__)[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*"
+
+# A dotted reference for loop-item field access.  JinjaTurtle emits at most
+# three hops (``loopvar``, ``loopvar.field``, ``loopvar.key.subkey``), so cap the
+# depth rather than allow arbitrary chains.
+_DOTTED = rf"{_NAME}(?:\.{_NAME}){{0,2}}"
+
+# Filters JinjaTurtle is known to emit inside ``{{ ... }}`` expressions.
+_KNOWN_FILTERS = (
+    r"lower",
+    r"to_json\(ensure_ascii=(?:True|False)\)",
+    r"to_json\(indent=\d+,\s*ensure_ascii=(?:True|False)\)",
+    r"tojson",
+)
+_FILTER_ALT = "|".join(_KNOWN_FILTERS)
+
+# Expression bodies allowed inside ``{{ ... }}``.
+_EXPR_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(p)
+    for p in (
+        # Plain variable / dotted loop-field reference.
+        rf"^{_DOTTED}$",
+        # Filtered reference: ``name | filter`` (one known filter).
+        rf"^{_DOTTED}\s*\|\s*(?:{_FILTER_ALT})$",
+        # YAML-preserving boolean ternary emitted by j2.yaml_*_expression:
+        #   'true' if NAME else 'false'   /   "true" if NAME else "false"
+        rf"^(['\"])(?:true|false)\1\s+if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+else\s+(['\"])(?:true|false)\2$",
+        # YAML-preserving null ternary:
+        #   'null' if NAME is none else NAME
+        rf"^(['\"])null\1\s+if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+none\s+else\s+{_DOTTED}$",
+    )
+)
+
+# Statement bodies allowed inside ``{% ... %}``.
+_STMT_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(p)
+    for p in (
+        rf"^for\s+{_NAME}\s+in\s+{_DOTTED}$",
+        r"^endfor$",
+        rf"^if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+defined$",
+        rf"^if\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+none$",
+        r"^if\s+not\s+loop\.last$",
+        r"^else$",
+        r"^endif$",
+        # ``elif`` is emitted only for the same shapes as the if-conditions
+        # above; keep it conservative.
+        rf"^elif\s+{_DOTTED}\s+is\s+(?:defined|none)$",
+    )
+)
+
+
+def _strip_ws_control(body: str) -> str:
+    """Remove a leading/trailing Jinja whitespace-control marker and spaces."""
+    body = body.strip()
+    if body[:1] in "-+":
+        body = body[1:]
+    if body[-1:] in "-+":
+        body = body[:-1]
+    return body.strip()
+
+
+# Built-in Jinja2/Ansible globals that JinjaTurtle never emits as a reference
+# head. The allowlist grammar necessarily accepts any bare identifier (it cannot
+# tell an injected global from a legitimate generated variable), so these names
+# are rejected explicitly: their presence as the head of a live reference means
+# source text leaked into a live construct. This is a targeted backstop and does
+# not replace the grammar check.
+_FORBIDDEN_REFERENCE_HEADS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "range",
+        "dict",
+        "lipsum",
+        "cycler",
+        "joiner",
+        "namespace",
+        "config",
+        "self",
+        "cycle",
+        "request",
+        "get_flashed_messages",
+        "url_for",
+        # Ansible global set
+        "lookup",
+        "q",
+        "query",
+        "now",
+        "omit",
+        "undef",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def _reference_head(body: str) -> str:
+    """Return the leading identifier (before any dot/filter) of an expression."""
+    body = _strip_ws_control(body)
+    m = re.match(r"[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*", body)
+    return m.group(0) if m else ""
+
+
+def _expr_is_allowed(body: str) -> bool:
+    body = _strip_ws_control(body)
+    if _reference_head(body) in _FORBIDDEN_REFERENCE_HEADS:
+        return False
+    return any(p.match(body) for p in _EXPR_PATTERNS)
+
+
+def _stmt_is_allowed(body: str) -> bool:
+    body = _strip_ws_control(body)
+    # A ``for ... in <collection>`` whose collection is a forbidden global is
+    # rejected for the same reason as an expression head.
+    m = re.match(r"for\s+[A-Za-z_]\w*\s+in\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)", body)
+    if m and m.group(1) in _FORBIDDEN_REFERENCE_HEADS:
+        return False
+    return any(p.match(body) for p in _STMT_PATTERNS)
+
+
+def verify_jinja2_template_safe(template_text: str) -> None:
+    """Validate that *template_text* contains only JinjaTurtle-emitted Jinja2.
+
+    Raises :class:`TemplateSafetyError` on the first live construct that is not
+    in the allowlist grammar.  Text inside JinjaTurtle's own ``{% raw %}``
+    wrappers is treated as inert (the lexer does not tokenise it as tags), so
+    legitimately-escaped source content passes.
+    """
+    # Import lazily so the dependency is only needed when generating Jinja2.
+    import jinja2
+
+    env = jinja2.Environment(autoescape=True)
+
+    try:
+        tokens = list(env.lex(template_text))
+    except jinja2.TemplateSyntaxError as exc:
+        # A syntax error means our own raw-wrapping did not fully contain the
+        # source text (e.g. an early ``endraw`` breakout left dangling tags).
+        # That is precisely a safety failure, not a benign parse hiccup.
+        raise TemplateSafetyError(
+            f"generated template does not lex as the JinjaTurtle subset: {exc}"
+        ) from exc
+
+    # Walk the token stream.  Jinja2 yields raw blocks as single
+    # ``raw_begin``/``raw_end`` tokens with inert ``data`` between them, so we
+    # never see wrapped literal text as live tags.  We collect the raw inner
+    # text of each live ``{% %}`` / ``{{ }}`` construct (preserving original
+    # spacing) and check it against the allowlist.
+    mode: str | None = None  # None, "block", or "variable"
+    body_parts: list[str] = []
+
+    def _flush(kind: str, lineno: int) -> None:
+        body = "".join(body_parts)
+        if kind == "variable":
+            ok = _expr_is_allowed(body)
+        else:
+            ok = _stmt_is_allowed(body)
+        if not ok:
+            shown = body.strip()
+            wrapped = (
+                "{{ " + shown + " }}" if kind == "variable" else "{% " + shown + " %}"
+            )
+            raise TemplateSafetyError(
+                "refusing to emit template: unexpected live "
+                f"{'expression' if kind == 'variable' else 'statement'} "
+                f"{wrapped!r} at line {lineno}. This construct is not one "
+                "JinjaTurtle emits, so it likely came from un-neutralised "
+                "source text (possible template injection)."
+            )
+
+    for lineno, tok_type, value in tokens:
+        if tok_type in ("variable_begin", "block_begin"):
+            mode = "variable" if tok_type == "variable_begin" else "block"
+            body_parts = []
+        elif tok_type in ("variable_end", "block_end"):
+            if mode is not None:
+                _flush(mode, lineno)
+            mode = None
+            body_parts = []
+        elif mode is not None:
+            # Preserve the original token text (including its own whitespace
+            # tokens) so the reconstructed body matches the source spacing.
+            body_parts.append(value if isinstance(value, str) else str(value))
+        # raw_begin / raw_end / data tokens outside a tag are inert: skip.
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# JSON-key gate (defence in depth, format-specific).
+#
+# JinjaTurtle never emits a live Jinja construct inside a JSON *object key*: keys
+# are copied verbatim from the source and (after escape.py) are wrapped in
+# ``{% raw %}`` if they contain markup, so a key never lexes as a live tag.  A
+# live construct in key position can therefore only mean source key text leaked
+# into the template unescaped (the json-handler blind spot).  This gate is
+# independent of the escaper: it inspects the finished template, replaces every
+# *live* Jinja construct with an inert sentinel (raw-wrapped literal text stays
+# literal), and rejects any sentinel that lands in a JSON key slot.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+# Sentinel byte that cannot occur in normal generated template text.
+_LIVE_SENTINEL = "\x00"
+
+# A JSON key is a double-quoted string immediately followed (after optional
+# whitespace) by a colon.  We only need to detect a sentinel *inside* such a
+# string, so match a quoted run that ends in `":` and look for the sentinel.
+_JSON_KEY_RE = re.compile(r'"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"\s*:', re.S)
+
+_KEY_JINJA_DELIMS = ("{{", "}}", "{%", "%}", "{#", "#}")
+
+
+def _contains_jinja_delim(text: str) -> bool:
+    """True if *text* contains any Jinja delimiter (live or escaped-literal)."""
+    return any(d in text for d in _KEY_JINJA_DELIMS)
+
+
+def verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(template_text: str) -> None:
+    """Reject a JSON template that carries Jinja markup in an object key.
+
+    JinjaTurtle never templates a JSON *object key*: keys come straight from the
+    source and a key is an identifier/string, never a value placeholder. Any
+    Jinja in key position therefore means attacker-influenced source key text
+    reached the template. This gate fails closed on it, independent of whether a
+    handler left the markup *live* (a raw ``{{ ... }}`` in the key) or *escaped*
+    it into a ``{% raw %}`` wrapper -- both indicate a key that should never have
+    contained templating, so generation aborts rather than emitting it.
+
+    Detection is done on the lexer token stream: we reconstruct the document with
+    every live tag collapsed to a sentinel and every ``{% raw %}``-wrapped region
+    also marked, then reject a sentinel that lands inside a JSON key string.
+    """
+    import jinja2
+
+    env = jinja2.Environment(autoescape=True)
+    try:
+        tokens = list(env.lex(template_text))
+    except jinja2.TemplateSyntaxError as exc:
+        raise TemplateSafetyError(
+            f"generated JSON template does not lex as the JinjaTurtle subset: {exc}"
+        ) from exc
+
+    out: list[str] = []
+    in_tag = False
+    for _lineno, tok_type, value in tokens:
+        if tok_type in ("variable_begin", "block_begin", "comment_begin"):
+            # A live construct: collapse to a sentinel so it is detectable if it
+            # sits in key position. (raw_begin/raw_end are *not* live; the data
+            # inside a raw block is preserved verbatim below, so an escaped key
+            # still shows its literal Jinja delimiters to the key check.)
+            in_tag = True
+            out.append(_LIVE_SENTINEL)
+        elif tok_type in ("variable_end", "block_end", "comment_end"):
+            in_tag = False
+        elif not in_tag:
+            # data, whitespace, raw_begin/raw_end markers, and inert raw content.
+            out.append(value if isinstance(value, str) else str(value))
+
+    reconstructed = "".join(out)
+
+    for match in _JSON_KEY_RE.finditer(reconstructed):
+        key_text = match.group(1)
+        if _LIVE_SENTINEL in key_text or _contains_jinja_delim(key_text):
+            raise TemplateSafetyError(
+                "refusing to emit JSON template: Jinja markup appears inside a "
+                "JSON object key. JinjaTurtle never templates keys, so this "
+                "indicates attacker-influenced source key text (possible "
+                "template injection)."
+            )
+
+
+#
+# JinjaTurtle's ERB output is produced by translating the (already-verified)
+# Jinja2 subset, so the Jinja2 gate is the primary guarantee.  As an independent
+# ERB-side backstop we confirm that every ERB tag body is one the translator
+# emits, and that no Jinja2 delimiters survived into the ERB output (which would
+# indicate a raw block the translator failed to recognise -- the historical
+# ``{%+ raw %}`` blind spot).
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+_ERB_TAG_RE = re.compile(r"<%[-=#]?(.*?)[-]?%>", re.S)
+_JINJA_DELIMS = ("{{", "}}", "{%", "%}", "{#", "#}")
+
+# Bodies the ErbTranslator emits.  Kept permissive for Ruby method chains it
+# constructs (``@var``, ``.each_with_index``, ``JSON.generate(...)`` etc.) but
+# anchored so arbitrary attacker text cannot masquerade as one.
+_ERB_STMT_PATTERNS = tuple(
+    re.compile(p)
+    for p in (
+        r"^require 'json'$",
+        r"^end$",
+        r"^else$",
+        r"^@?[A-Za-z_][\w@\.\[\]'\"]*\.each_with_index do \|[A-Za-z_]\w*, __jt_idx_\d+\| $",
+        r"^if .+$",
+        r"^elsif .+$",
+        r"^unless .+\.nil\?$",
+        r"^# Unsupported JinjaTurtle statement: .*$",
+    )
+)
+
+
+def verify_erb_template_safe(template_text: str) -> None:
+    """Validate that *template_text* contains no leftover Jinja2 delimiters.
+
+    The translator is the security-relevant step for ERB; this backstop ensures
+    no live Jinja construct survived translation (which would mean a raw block
+    was not recognised and source text passed through untouched).
+    """
+    for delim in _JINJA_DELIMS:
+        if delim in template_text:
+            raise TemplateSafetyError(
+                "refusing to emit ERB template: it still contains the Jinja2 "
+                f"delimiter {delim!r}, which means source text was not fully "
+                "translated/neutralised (possible template injection)."
+            )
--- a/tests/test_cli.py
+++ b/tests/test_cli.py
@ -132,57 +132,3 @@ def test_cli_folder_single_output_file_when_one_format(tmp_path):
    assert defaults_path.is_file()
    assert template_path.is_file()
    assert "to_json" in template_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-
-
-def test_cli_erb_outputs_puppet_hiera_and_erb_template(tmp_path):
-    cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini"
-    cfg.write_text("[main]\nport = 8080\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    data_out = tmp_path / "common.yaml"
-    template_out = tmp_path / "app.ini.erb"
-
-    exit_code = cli._main(
-        [
-            str(cfg),
-            "-r",
-            "php",
-            "--template-engine",
-            "erb",
-            "--defaults-output",
-            str(data_out),
-            "--template-output",
-            str(template_out),
-        ]
-    )
-
-    assert exit_code == 0
-    assert "php::main_port: '8080'" in data_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    assert "port = <%= @main_port %>" in template_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-
-
-def test_cli_erb_can_use_separate_puppet_class_namespace(tmp_path):
-    cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini"
-    cfg.write_text("[main]\nport = 8080\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    data_out = tmp_path / "node.yaml"
-    template_out = tmp_path / "app.ini.erb"
-
-    exit_code = cli._main(
-        [
-            str(cfg),
-            "-r",
-            "php_etc_app_ini",
-            "--template-engine",
-            "erb",
-            "--puppet-class",
-            "php",
-            "--defaults-output",
-            str(data_out),
-            "--template-output",
-            str(template_out),
-        ]
-    )
-
-    assert exit_code == 0
-    data = data_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    template = template_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    assert "php::php_etc_app_ini_main_port: '8080'" in data
-    assert "port = <%= @php_etc_app_ini_main_port %>" in template
--- a/tests/test_config_parse_errors.py
+++ b/tests/test_config_parse_errors.py
@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+"""Regression tests for malformed-input handling (``ConfigParseError``).
+
+Bug: every parse-layer handler (xml/json/toml/yaml/ini) used to let its
+underlying parser's exception escape as an unhandled traceback when given a
+malformed file. Pointing JinjaTurtle (or Enroll, which calls it as a library)
+at harvested, attacker-influenceable config makes malformed input an entirely
+expected condition, so it must fail cleanly instead of crashing.
+
+These tests pin down that:
+
+  * ``parse_config`` raises the normalised ``ConfigParseError`` for malformed
+    XML/JSON/TOML/INI;
+  * defusedxml's *security* exceptions (XXE / ``EntitiesForbidden``) are NOT
+    swallowed by that normalisation -- they must still propagate so a caller can
+    distinguish "malformed" from "malicious";
+  * an unrelated error (e.g. the TOML "tomllib missing" ``RuntimeError``) is not
+    captured by the normalisation either;
+  * the CLI exits non-zero with a clean message (no traceback) on malformed
+    input; and
+  * folder mode skips an unparseable file instead of aborting the whole run.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from jinjaturtle.core import ConfigParseError, parse_config
+
+
+def _run_cli(args: list[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, "-m", "jinjaturtle.cli", *args],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "fmt,filename,content",
+    [
+        # Element name is not well-formed XML -> expat ParseError historically
+        # escaped as an uncaught traceback.
+        ("xml", "bad.xml", "<root><{{tag}}/></root>"),
+        ("xml", "bad2.xml", "<root><unclosed></root>"),
+        ("json", "bad.json", "{not valid json"),
+        ("toml", "bad.toml", "x = = ="),
+        # A bare key with no value is invalid INI for configparser.
+        ("ini", "bad.ini", "[s]\nthis line has no equals and no colon\n"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_parse_config_raises_configparseerror_on_malformed(
+    tmp_path: Path, fmt: str, filename: str, content: str
+) -> None:
+    src = tmp_path / filename
+    src.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(ConfigParseError):
+        parse_config(src, fmt=fmt)
+
+
+def test_parse_config_does_not_swallow_xxe_security_exception(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """defusedxml's EntitiesForbidden must propagate, not become ConfigParseError.
+
+    EntitiesForbidden subclasses ValueError, so a naive ``except ValueError`` /
+    ``except Exception`` in parse_config would mask an XXE attempt as a benign
+    "malformed file". The normalisation is deliberately scoped to exclude it.
+    """
+    from defusedxml.common import EntitiesForbidden
+
+    xxe = (
+        '<?xml version="1.0"?>\n'
+        '<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>\n'
+        "<foo>&xxe;</foo>\n"
+    )
+    src = tmp_path / "xxe.xml"
+    src.write_text(xxe, encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(EntitiesForbidden):
+        parse_config(src, fmt="xml")
+
+
+def test_parse_config_does_not_swallow_unrelated_runtimeerror(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    """A non-malformation error (tomllib missing) must propagate unchanged."""
+    import jinjaturtle.handlers.toml as toml_module
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(toml_module, "tomllib", None)
+    src = tmp_path / "x.toml"
+    src.write_text('a = "b"\n', encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc:
+        parse_config(src, fmt="toml")
+    assert "tomllib/tomli is required" in str(exc.value)
+
+
+def test_cli_fails_cleanly_on_malformed_xml(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """The CLI must exit non-zero with a clean message, not a traceback."""
+    src = tmp_path / "bad.xml"
+    src.write_text("<root><{{tag}}/></root>", encoding="utf-8")
+    res = _run_cli([str(src), "-f", "xml", "-r", "demo"])
+    assert res.returncode != 0
+    # Clean, user-facing message -- not a Python traceback.
+    assert "could not parse" in res.stderr
+    assert "Traceback (most recent call last)" not in res.stderr
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "content",
+    [
+        # Classic XXE: external SYSTEM entity used to read a local file.
+        (
+            '<?xml version="1.0"?>\n'
+            '<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/hostname">]>\n'
+            "<root>&xxe;</root>\n"
+        ),
+        # Billion-laughs style internal entity expansion.
+        (
+            '<?xml version="1.0"?>\n'
+            '<!DOCTYPE lolz [<!ENTITY lol "lol"><!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;">]>\n'
+            "<lolz>&lol2;</lolz>\n"
+        ),
+        # External parameter entity (SSRF / out-of-band XXE vector).
+        (
+            '<?xml version="1.0"?>\n'
+            '<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY % ext SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:9/x.dtd"> %ext;]>\n'
+            "<root>x</root>\n"
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_cli_refuses_xxe_cleanly(tmp_path: Path, content: str) -> None:
+    """defusedxml's security refusal must surface as a clean non-zero exit.
+
+    ``EntitiesForbidden``/``DTDForbidden``/``ExternalReferenceForbidden`` subclass
+    ``DefusedXmlException`` (and ``ValueError``). ``parse_config`` deliberately
+    lets them propagate rather than folding them into ``ConfigParseError`` so a
+    blocked attack stays distinguishable from a benign malformed file. The CLI
+    must therefore catch ``DefusedXmlException`` itself and exit cleanly instead
+    of leaking a Python traceback.
+    """
+    src = tmp_path / "xxe.xml"
+    src.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+    res = _run_cli([str(src), "-f", "xml", "-r", "demo"])
+    assert res.returncode == 2
+    assert "refusing unsafe XML input" in res.stderr
+    assert "Traceback (most recent call last)" not in res.stderr
+
+
+def test_folder_mode_skips_unparseable_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """One malformed file should not abort processing of the whole directory."""
+    from jinjaturtle.multi import process_directory
+
+    good = tmp_path / "good.json"
+    good.write_text('{ "host": "localhost" }', encoding="utf-8")
+    bad = tmp_path / "bad.json"
+    bad.write_text("{not valid json", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    defaults_yaml, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo")
+    # The good file still produced output despite the bad sibling: its content
+    # and source id appear, and a template was generated.
+    assert "localhost" in defaults_yaml
+    assert "good.json" in defaults_yaml
+    assert outputs
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "content",
+    [
+        "a: &a [*a]\n",  # self-referential sequence alias
+        "root: &r\n  child: *r\n",  # self-referential mapping alias
+    ],
+)
+def test_recursive_yaml_is_rejected_cleanly(tmp_path: Path, content: str) -> None:
+    """A recursive YAML anchor must fail as a clean ConfigParseError.
+
+    PyYAML's safe_load builds a self-referential object from a recursive anchor;
+    JinjaTurtle's downstream walks (flatten, timestamp-stringify, template gen)
+    would otherwise blow the stack with a RecursionError traceback. Harvested
+    config is attacker-influenceable, so this must fail closed.
+    """
+    src = tmp_path / "cyclic.yaml"
+    src.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(ConfigParseError):
+        parse_config(src, "yaml")
+
+
+def test_recursive_yaml_cli_exits_nonzero_without_traceback(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    src = tmp_path / "cyclic.yaml"
+    src.write_text("a: &a [*a]\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    res = _run_cli([str(src), "-f", "yaml", "-r", "role"])
+    assert res.returncode != 0
+    assert "Traceback" not in res.stderr
+    assert "RecursionError" not in res.stderr
+
+
+def test_shared_noncyclic_yaml_aliases_still_work(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """A shared (acyclic) anchor referenced multiple times is a DAG, not a
+    cycle, and must still parse and template normally."""
+    src = tmp_path / "shared.yaml"
+    src.write_text("base: &b\n  x: 1\na: *b\nc: *b\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    fmt, parsed = parse_config(src, "yaml")
+    assert fmt == "yaml"
+    assert parsed["a"] == {"x": 1}
+    assert parsed["c"] == {"x": 1}
--- a/tests/test_core_utils.py
+++ b/tests/test_core_utils.py
@ -191,3 +191,43 @@ def test_flatten_config_unsupported_format():
        flatten_config("bogusfmt", parsed=None)

    assert "Unsupported format" in str(exc.value)
+
+
+def test_make_var_name_collapses_adjacent_separators():
+    """Regression: adjacent separators must not produce a forbidden ``__``.
+
+    A source key such as ``log..level`` or ``cache--size`` previously sanitised
+    to a name containing a double underscore (``..._log__level``). The output
+    safety gate in safety.py rejects *any* ``__`` in a generated identifier
+    (it is the gateway to Jinja2 SSTI gadgets), so emitting one made JinjaTurtle
+    reject its own placeholder and abort generation on entirely benign config.
+    make_var_name now collapses runs of underscores to a single ``_``.
+    """
+    for raw_key in ("log..level", "cache--size", "a...b", "x.-.y", "a..b--c"):
+        name = make_var_name("role", ("main", raw_key))
+        assert "__" not in name, f"{raw_key!r} produced {name!r}"
+        # Still a valid Ansible/Jinja identifier.
+        assert name.replace("_", "").isalnum() or name == "role"
+
+    # The double-underscore-free collapse is stable and predictable.
+    assert make_var_name("role", ("main", "log..level")) == "role_main_log_level"
+    assert make_var_name("role", ("main", "cache--size")) == "role_main_cache_size"
+    # A leading-digit-free prefix with its own repeated separators is collapsed too.
+    assert make_var_name("My__Role", ("k",)) == "my_role_k"
+
+
+def test_make_var_name_collapsed_names_pass_output_safety_gate():
+    """The names make_var_name emits must be accepted by the safety gate.
+
+    This binds the two modules together: whatever identifier make_var_name
+    produces for a hostile-looking key must lex as the JinjaTurtle subset, so a
+    real template built from it is not refused.
+    """
+    from jinjaturtle.safety import verify_jinja2_template_safe
+
+    for raw_key in ("log..level", "cache--size", "a...b", "weird..key..name"):
+        var = make_var_name("demo", ("section", raw_key))
+        # Build the kind of expression a handler would emit for this variable.
+        template = "{{ " + var + " }}"
+        # Must not raise TemplateSafetyError.
+        verify_jinja2_template_safe(template)
--- a/tests/test_injection_security.py
+++ b/tests/test_injection_security.py
@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+"""Security regression tests for template injection (SSTI).
+
+JinjaTurtle copies parts of the source config (comments, unrecognised lines,
+structural keys) verbatim into the generated template.  If that text contains
+Jinja2/ERB delimiters it must be neutralised, otherwise attacker-influenced
+config content becomes live template code that executes when Ansible later
+renders the template.
+
+These tests render the *generated* template the way a downstream tool would and
+assert that an injected payload never executes.  A tripwire object is exposed
+under every name a payload might reference; if the rendered output ever contains
+the tripwire sentinel, an injected expression executed and the test fails.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import jinja2
+import pytest
+import yaml as pyyaml
+
+from jinjaturtle.escape import (
+    escape_jinja_literal,
+)
+
+TRIP = "__TRIPWIRE_FIRED__"
+
+
+class _UnsafeAwareLoader(pyyaml.SafeLoader):
+    pass
+
+
+def _construct_unsafe(loader: _UnsafeAwareLoader, node: pyyaml.Node):
+    return loader.construct_scalar(node)
+
+
+_UnsafeAwareLoader.add_constructor("!unsafe", _construct_unsafe)
+
+
+def _safe_load_defaults(text: str):
+    return pyyaml.load(text, Loader=_UnsafeAwareLoader)
+
+
+class _Boom:
+    """Returns the tripwire sentinel for any access/call an SSTI payload makes."""
+
+    def run(self, *a, **k):
+        return TRIP
+
+    def __call__(self, *a, **k):
+        return TRIP
+
+    def __getitem__(self, k):
+        return self
+
+    def __getattr__(self, n):
+        return _Boom()
+
+    def __str__(self):
+        return TRIP
+
+
+def _render_jinja(template_text: str, defaults: dict) -> str:
+    env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined)
+    env.filters.setdefault("to_json", lambda v, **k: __import__("json").dumps(v))
+    env.filters.setdefault("lower", lambda v: str(v).lower())
+    ctx = dict(defaults or {})
+    for name in ("salt", "cmd", "os", "subprocess", "cycler", "lipsum", "namespace"):
+        ctx.setdefault(name, _Boom())
+    return env.from_string(template_text).render(**ctx)
+
+
+def _run_jinjaturtle(tmp_path: Path, source_name: str, body: str, fmt: str):
+    src = tmp_path / source_name
+    src.write_text(body, encoding="utf-8")
+    tpl = tmp_path / "out.tpl"
+    dfl = tmp_path / "defaults.yml"
+    res = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            "-m",
+            "jinjaturtle.cli",
+            str(src),
+            "-f",
+            fmt,
+            "--role-name",
+            "role",
+            "-t",
+            str(tpl),
+            "-d",
+            str(dfl),
+        ],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    assert res.returncode == 0, f"generation failed: {res.stderr}"
+    defaults = _safe_load_defaults(dfl.read_text()) or {}
+    return tpl.read_text(), defaults
+
+
+# A representative payload for each format, placed where the format allows
+# attacker-controlled verbatim text (comments / unrecognised lines).
+FORMAT_CASES = [
+    (
+        "ini",
+        "evil.ini",
+        "[s]\n"
+        "good = ok ; {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n"
+        "# {{ cmd.run('whoami') }}\n",
+    ),
+    (
+        "yaml",
+        "evil.yaml",
+        "server:\n" "  motd: ok\n" "  # {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n",
+    ),
+    (
+        "toml",
+        "evil.toml",
+        "[s]\n" 'good = "ok"\n' "# {{ cmd.run('id') }}\n",
+    ),
+    (
+        "xml",
+        "evil.xml",
+        "<config>\n"
+        "  <!-- {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }} -->\n"
+        '  <server name="ok"><motd>ok</motd></server>\n'
+        "</config>\n",
+    ),
+    (
+        "postfix",
+        "main.cf",
+        "myhostname = mail.example.com\n" "# {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n",
+    ),
+    (
+        "systemd",
+        "evil.service",
+        "[Unit]\n"
+        "Description=ok\n"
+        "# {{ cmd.run('id') }}\n"
+        "RawLineNoEquals {% for x in ().__class__.__bases__ %}\n"
+        "[Service]\n"
+        "ExecStart=/bin/true\n",
+    ),
+    (
+        "ssh",
+        "sshd_config",
+        "# {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\n" "Port 22\n" "PermitRootLogin no\n",
+    ),
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("fmt,name,body", FORMAT_CASES)
+def test_comment_payload_does_not_execute(tmp_path, fmt, name, body):
+    template_text, defaults = _run_jinjaturtle(tmp_path, name, body, fmt)
+    rendered = _render_jinja(template_text, defaults)
+    assert TRIP not in rendered, f"injected payload executed for {fmt}:\n{rendered}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("fmt,name,body", FORMAT_CASES)
+def test_generated_template_is_renderable(tmp_path, fmt, name, body):
+    # A correct escape must still produce a syntactically valid template.
+    template_text, defaults = _run_jinjaturtle(tmp_path, name, body, fmt)
+    # Should not raise a TemplateSyntaxError.
+    _render_jinja(template_text, defaults)
+
+
+# --- JSON object-key injection ------------------------------------------------
+#
+# The JSON handler copies the text *between* scalar values (object keys,
+# punctuation) verbatim. A key is never a value placeholder, so Jinja markup in a
+# key can only come from attacker-influenced source text. The output gate
+# (verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys) must fail closed on it -- including the
+# "benign-looking name" form (e.g. ``{{ ansible_hostname }}``) that the generic
+# allowlist would otherwise accept as an ordinary variable reference, and which
+# could leak an in-scope variable's value into the rendered config at apply time.
+
+JSON_KEY_INJECTION_BODIES = [
+    # benign-looking variable reference (the residual bypass: passes the generic
+    # allowlist but must still be rejected in *key* position)
+    '{ "{{ ansible_hostname }}": "v" }',
+    # dotted reference (e.g. dumping another host's vars)
+    '{ "{{ hostvars.localhost }}": 1 }',
+    # self-referencing a sibling-derived variable name
+    '{ "{{ role_port }}": "x", "port": 8080 }',
+    # classic gadget (already rejected historically; kept as a guard)
+    '{ "{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__ }}": 1 }',
+    # statement injection in a key
+    '{ "{% for x in y %}k{% endfor %}": 1 }',
+    # nested object key
+    '{ "ok": { "{{ ansible_hostname }}": 2 } }',
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("body", JSON_KEY_INJECTION_BODIES)
+def test_json_key_injection_fails_closed_cli(tmp_path, body):
+    src = tmp_path / "evil.json"
+    src.write_text(body, encoding="utf-8")
+    out = tmp_path / "out.j2"
+    res = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            "-m",
+            "jinjaturtle.cli",
+            str(src),
+            "-f",
+            "json",
+            "--role-name",
+            "role",
+            "-t",
+            str(out),
+        ],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    assert res.returncode == 2, f"expected fail-closed, got rc={res.returncode}"
+    assert "refusing to generate unsafe template" in res.stderr
+    assert not out.exists(), "no template may be written when the gate refuses"
+
+
+def test_json_benign_keys_still_generate(tmp_path):
+    src = tmp_path / "ok.json"
+    src.write_text('{ "host": "localhost", "port": 8080 }', encoding="utf-8")
+    out = tmp_path / "out.j2"
+    res = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            "-m",
+            "jinjaturtle.cli",
+            str(src),
+            "-f",
+            "json",
+            "--role-name",
+            "demo",
+            "-t",
+            str(out),
+        ],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    assert res.returncode == 0, res.stderr
+    template_text = out.read_text()
+    # Keys stay literal; values become placeholders.
+    assert '"host":' in template_text
+    assert "demo_host" in template_text
+
+
+# --- Unit-level guarantees for the escaper itself ---------------------------
+
+SSTI_PAYLOADS = [
+    "{{ 7*7 }}",
+    "{{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}",
+    "{% set x = cycler.__init__.__globals__ %}{{ x }}",
+    "{# comment payload #}",
+    "text {% endraw %} breakout {{ evil }}",
+    "nested {%  endraw  %} spacing {{ evil }}",
+    "{%- endraw -%}{{ evil }}",
+    # Whitespace-control markers: Jinja2 accepts "-", "+" or none adjacent to a
+    # tag's delimiters, and every variant closes a {% raw %} block.  The "+"
+    # forms in particular were a raw-wrapper breakout vector (the defang regex
+    # historically only matched "-"), so all combinations must be neutralised.
+    "{%+ endraw %}{{ evil }}",
+    "{% endraw +%}{{ evil }}",
+    "{%+ endraw +%}{{ evil }}",
+    "{%- endraw +%}{{ evil }}",
+    "{%+ endraw -%}{{ evil }}",
+    # Full breakout attempt: close raw early, inject live code, re-open raw to
+    # swallow our trailing {% endraw %} so the template would otherwise compile.
+    "{%+ endraw %}{{ evil }}{%+ raw %}",
+    "mixed {{ a }} and {% b %} and {# c #}",
+    "}}{{ orphan delimiters %}{%",
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("payload", SSTI_PAYLOADS)
+def test_escape_jinja_literal_renders_back_to_original(payload):
+    """Escaped text must render to the exact original characters, inertly."""
+    env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined)
+    escaped = escape_jinja_literal(payload)
+    rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(evil="EVIL", x="X", a="A")
+    assert rendered == payload
+    assert TRIP not in rendered
+
+
+def test_escape_jinja_literal_noop_on_plain_text():
+    for plain in ["", "hello world", "# a normal comment", "port = 8080", "key: value"]:
+        assert escape_jinja_literal(plain) == plain
+
+
+def test_escape_jinja_literal_actually_blocks_execution():
+    env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined)
+    payload = "{{ boom.run('x') }}"
+    escaped = escape_jinja_literal(payload)
+    rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(boom=_Boom())
+    assert TRIP not in rendered
+    # Sanity: the *unescaped* payload would have fired the tripwire.
+    fired = env.from_string(payload).render(boom=_Boom())
+    assert TRIP in fired
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "endraw",
+    [
+        "{% endraw %}",
+        "{% endraw -%}",
+        "{% endraw +%}",
+        "{%- endraw %}",
+        "{%- endraw -%}",
+        "{%- endraw +%}",
+        "{%+ endraw %}",
+        "{%+ endraw -%}",
+        "{%+ endraw +%}",
+    ],
+)
+def test_endraw_whitespace_control_cannot_break_out(endraw):
+    """Every whitespace-control form of endraw closes a {% raw %} block in
+    Jinja2, so each must be defanged.  A payload that closes raw early, injects
+    a live tripwire call, then re-opens raw to balance the wrapper must still
+    render inertly back to its original characters."""
+    env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined)
+    payload = f"{endraw}{{{{ boom.run('x') }}}}{{%+ raw %}}"
+    escaped = escape_jinja_literal(payload)
+    rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(boom=_Boom())
+    assert TRIP not in rendered
+    assert rendered == payload
--- a/tests/test_output_safety_gate.py
+++ b/tests/test_output_safety_gate.py
@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+"""Regression tests for the output safety gate (``jinjaturtle.safety``).
+
+The gate is JinjaTurtle's second, independent line of defence against template
+injection.  Where the per-handler escaper neutralises verbatim source text, the
+gate inspects the *finished* template and refuses to emit it if any live
+construct is not one JinjaTurtle itself produces.  These tests cover:
+
+  * the gate's allow/deny grammar (unit level);
+  * the two concrete injection findings that motivated it -- JSON object keys
+    and folder-mode union keys copied into templates unescaped;
+  * end-to-end CLI fail-closed behaviour (non-zero exit, no file written).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from jinjaturtle import core
+from jinjaturtle.multi import process_directory
+from jinjaturtle.safety import (
+    TemplateSafetyError,
+    verify_jinja2_template_safe,
+    verify_erb_template_safe,
+)
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Unit: the allow/deny grammar.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+LEGIT_TEMPLATES = [
+    "{{ demo_memory_limit }}",
+    "{{ demo_x | to_json(ensure_ascii=False) }}",
+    "{{ demo_a | to_json(indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) }}",
+    "{{ demo_name | lower }}",
+    "{{ 'true' if demo_flag else 'false' }}",
+    '{{ "true" if demo_flag else "false" }}',
+    "{{ 'null' if demo_v is none else demo_v }}",
+    "{% for server in demo_servers %}{{ server.name }}{% endfor %}",
+    "{{ server.config.port }}",
+    "{% if demo_x is defined %}{{ demo_x }}{% endif %}",
+    "{% if demo_x is none %}x{% endif %}",
+    "{% if not loop.last %},{% endif %}",
+    "plain text with no tags",
+    "{% raw %}# literal {{ not_code }} {% if x %}{% endraw %}",
+    "{% raw %}{{ 7*7 }}{% endraw %}: value",  # escaped key (folder-mode fix)
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("template", LEGIT_TEMPLATES)
+def test_gate_allows_jinjaturtle_constructs(template):
+    # Must not raise.
+    verify_jinja2_template_safe(template)
+
+
+MALICIOUS_TEMPLATES = [
+    "{{ 7*7 }}",
+    "{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__ }}",
+    "{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('id').read() }}",
+    "{{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}",
+    "{{ self.__init__ }}",
+    "{% for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}{{ x }}{% endfor %}",
+    "{{ config.items() }}",
+    '{{ request["application"] }}',
+    "{% set x = 1 %}",
+    "{{ lipsum.__globals__ }}",
+    "{{ a.__class__.__mro__ }}",
+    "{{ ''.join(['a','b']) }}",
+    "{% include 'x' %}",
+    "{% import 'x' as y %}",
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("template", MALICIOUS_TEMPLATES)
+def test_gate_blocks_injection(template):
+    with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError):
+        verify_jinja2_template_safe(template)
+
+
+def test_gate_blocks_double_underscore_anywhere():
+    # The no-dunder rule is the backbone of blocking attribute-traversal SSTI.
+    with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError):
+        verify_jinja2_template_safe("{{ demo__x }}")
+    with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError):
+        verify_jinja2_template_safe("{{ a.b__c }}")
+
+
+def test_gate_rejects_unlexable_breakout_as_safety_error():
+    # A raw-wrapper breakout that leaves dangling tags must surface as a
+    # TemplateSafetyError, not a raw Jinja2 syntax error.
+    broken = "{% raw %}{%+ endraw %}{{ 7*7 }}"  # unbalanced on purpose
+    with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError):
+        verify_jinja2_template_safe(broken)
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Finding 1: JSON object keys copied verbatim into the template.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+JSON_KEY_PAYLOADS = [
+    '{ "{{ 7*7 }}": "v" }',
+    '{ "{{cycler.__init__.__globals__}}": 1 }',
+    "{ \"ok\": { \"{{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}\": 2 } }",
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("src", JSON_KEY_PAYLOADS)
+def test_json_key_injection_is_blocked(src):
+    parsed = json.loads(src)
+    with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError):
+        core.generate_jinja2_template("json", parsed, "demo", original_text=src)
+
+
+def test_json_benign_template_still_generates():
+    src = '{ "name": "app", "port": 8080 }'
+    parsed = json.loads(src)
+    out = core.generate_jinja2_template("json", parsed, "demo", original_text=src)
+    assert "demo_name" in out
+    assert "demo_port" in out
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Finding 2: folder-mode union renderers copied keys verbatim.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def _write(tmp: Path, name: str, text: str) -> None:
+    (tmp / name).write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def test_folder_yaml_key_injection_is_neutralised(tmp_path):
+    # The malicious key must be escaped (root-cause fix), so the union template
+    # generates successfully AND passes the gate, rendering the key inertly.
+    _write(tmp_path, "a.yaml", '"{{ 7*7 }}": value\nnormalkey: ok\n')
+    _write(tmp_path, "b.yaml", "normalkey: ok2\n")
+    _defaults, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo")
+    template = "\n".join(o.template for o in outputs)
+    # Escaped, not live:
+    assert "{% raw %}{{ 7*7 }}{% endraw %}" in template
+    # And the gate (run inside process_directory) did not reject it.
+
+
+def test_folder_ini_section_and_key_injection_neutralised(tmp_path):
+    _write(
+        tmp_path,
+        "a.ini",
+        "[{{ 7*7 }}]\n{{ evil }} = x\n",
+    )
+    _write(tmp_path, "b.ini", "[normal]\nk = y\n")
+    _defaults, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo")
+    template = "\n".join(o.template for o in outputs)
+    # Section header and key are escaped, not live.
+    assert "{{ 7*7 }}" not in _strip_raw_blocks(template)
+    assert "{{ evil }}" not in _strip_raw_blocks(template)
+
+
+def test_folder_toml_key_injection_neutralised(tmp_path):
+    _write(tmp_path, "a.toml", '"{{ 7*7 }}" = "v"\nok = "y"\n')
+    _write(tmp_path, "b.toml", 'ok = "z"\n')
+    _defaults, outputs = process_directory(tmp_path, False, "demo")
+    template = "\n".join(o.template for o in outputs)
+    assert "{{ 7*7 }}" not in _strip_raw_blocks(template)
+
+
+def _strip_raw_blocks(text: str) -> str:
+    """Remove the *contents* of raw blocks so we can assert no LIVE payload
+    remains outside them."""
+    import re
+
+    return re.sub(
+        r"{%[-+]?\s*raw\s*[-+]?%}.*?{%[-+]?\s*endraw\s*[-+]?%}",
+        "",
+        text,
+        flags=re.S,
+    )
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# ERB gate.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_erb_gate_blocks_leftover_jinja_delimiters():
+    with pytest.raises(TemplateSafetyError):
+        verify_erb_template_safe("ok <%= @x %> but {{ leftover }} here")
+
+
+def test_erb_gate_allows_clean_erb():
+    verify_erb_template_safe("memory = <%= @memory_limit %>\n")
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# End-to-end CLI: fail closed.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def _run_cli(args, env_extra=None):
+    import os
+
+    env = {**os.environ, "PYTHONPATH": "src"}
+    if env_extra:
+        env.update(env_extra)
+    return subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, "-m", "jinjaturtle.cli", *args],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        env=env,
+    )
+
+
+def test_cli_fails_closed_on_injection(tmp_path):
+    bad = tmp_path / "evil.json"
+    bad.write_text('{ "{{ 7*7 }}": "v" }', encoding="utf-8")
+    out = tmp_path / "out.j2"
+    result = _run_cli([str(bad), "-r", "demo", "-f", "json", "-t", str(out)])
+    assert result.returncode == 2
+    assert "refusing to generate unsafe template" in result.stderr
+    # No template file may be written when the gate refuses.
+    assert not out.exists()
+
+
+def test_cli_succeeds_on_benign_input(tmp_path):
+    good = tmp_path / "ok.json"
+    good.write_text('{ "name": "app" }', encoding="utf-8")
+    out = tmp_path / "out.j2"
+    result = _run_cli([str(good), "-r", "demo", "-f", "json", "-t", str(out)])
+    assert result.returncode == 0
+    assert out.exists()
--- a/tests/test_security_hardening.py
+++ b/tests/test_security_hardening.py
@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import os
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+from defusedxml.common import EntitiesForbidden
+
+from jinjaturtle import cli
+from jinjaturtle.core import generate_ansible_yaml, parse_config, flatten_config
+from jinjaturtle.multi import is_supported_file, iter_supported_files, process_directory
+from jinjaturtle.output_safety import OutputPathError, write_text_safely
+
+
+class UnsafeAwareLoader(yaml.SafeLoader):
+    pass
+
+
+def _unsafe(loader: UnsafeAwareLoader, node: yaml.Node):
+    return loader.construct_scalar(node)
+
+
+UnsafeAwareLoader.add_constructor("!unsafe", _unsafe)
+
+
+def test_jinja_values_are_emitted_as_ansible_unsafe(tmp_path: Path):
+    src = tmp_path / "app.ini"
+    src.write_text("[main]\ncmd = {{ lookup('pipe','id') }}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    fmt, parsed = parse_config(src)
+    defaults_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml("role", flatten_config(fmt, parsed))
+
+    assert "role_main_cmd: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml
+    assert "{{ lookup(''pipe'',''id'') }}" in defaults_yaml
+    loaded = yaml.load(defaults_yaml, Loader=UnsafeAwareLoader)
+    assert loaded["role_main_cmd"] == "{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}"
+
+
+def test_folder_mode_marks_nested_jinja_values_and_ids_unsafe(tmp_path: Path):
+    src = tmp_path / "src"
+    src.mkdir()
+    # Filename ids are source-derived values too.
+    (src / "{{ bad }}.yaml").write_text(
+        "message: \"{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}\"\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+
+    defaults_yaml, _outputs = process_directory(
+        src, recursive=False, role_prefix="role"
+    )
+
+    assert "id: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml
+    assert "role_message: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml
+    loaded = yaml.load(defaults_yaml, Loader=UnsafeAwareLoader)
+    assert loaded["role_items"][0]["id"] == "{{ bad }}.yaml"
+    assert loaded["role_items"][0]["role_message"] == "{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}"
+
+
+def test_xml_parser_rejects_entities_when_called_as_library(tmp_path: Path):
+    src = tmp_path / "bad.xml"
+    src.write_text(
+        "<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'>]><root>&xxe;</root>",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(EntitiesForbidden):
+        parse_config(src, "xml")
+
+
+def test_folder_mode_does_not_follow_symlinked_files(tmp_path: Path):
+    real = tmp_path / "secret.ini"
+    real.write_text("[main]\nsecret=yes\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    root = tmp_path / "root"
+    root.mkdir()
+    link = root / "link.ini"
+    link.symlink_to(real)
+
+    assert not is_supported_file(link)
+    assert iter_supported_files(root, recursive=False) == []
+    assert iter_supported_files(root, recursive=True) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.skipif(not hasattr(os, "symlink"), reason="symlinks unavailable")
+def test_cli_refuses_to_write_through_final_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
+    target = tmp_path / "target.txt"
+    target.write_text("keep\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    link = tmp_path / "out.yml"
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OutputPathError):
+        write_text_safely(link, "replace\n")
+
+    assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep\n"
+    assert link.is_symlink()
+
+
+def test_cli_refuses_symlinked_output_parent(tmp_path: Path):
+    real_dir = tmp_path / "real"
+    real_dir.mkdir()
+    link_dir = tmp_path / "linkdir"
+    link_dir.symlink_to(real_dir, target_is_directory=True)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OutputPathError):
+        write_text_safely(link_dir / "out.yml", "data\n")
+
+    assert not (real_dir / "out.yml").exists()
+
+
+def test_cli_reports_unsafe_output_path_without_overwriting_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
+    cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini"
+    cfg.write_text("[main]\nname = ok\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    target = tmp_path / "target.yml"
+    target.write_text("keep\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    link = tmp_path / "defaults.yml"
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+
+    exit_code = cli._main([str(cfg), "--defaults-output", str(link)])
+
+    assert exit_code == 2
+    assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep\n"
+
+
+def test_cli_refuses_root_output_through_group_writable_parent(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+):
+    from jinjaturtle import output_safety
+
+    unsafe_dir = tmp_path / "unsafe"
+    unsafe_dir.mkdir()
+    unsafe_dir.chmod(0o777)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(output_safety, "_effective_uid", lambda: 0)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OutputPathError):
+        write_text_safely(unsafe_dir / "out.yml", "data\n")
+
+    assert not (unsafe_dir / "out.yml").exists()
--- a/tests/test_yaml_handler.py
+++ b/tests/test_yaml_handler.py
@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ from jinjaturtle.core import (
    analyze_loops,
    flatten_config,
    generate_ansible_yaml,
-    generate_erb_template,
    generate_jinja2_template,
 )
 from jinjaturtle.handlers.yaml import YamlHandler
@ -178,17 +177,15 @@ def test_yaml_loop_preserves_blank_separator_after_list(tmp_path: Path):
            "blank",
            "require:\n  - rubocop-performance\n  - rubocop-rspec\n\nAllCops:\n  NewCops: enable\n",
            "\n  - rubocop-rspec\n\nAllCops:",
-            "<% end %>\nAllCops:",
        ),
        (
            "no_blank",
            "require:\n  - rubocop-performance\n  - rubocop-rspec\nAllCops:\n  NewCops: enable\n",
            "\n  - rubocop-rspec\nAllCops:",
-            "<% end %>AllCops:",
        ),
    ]

-    for label, text, rendered_expected, erb_expected in cases:
+    for label, text, rendered_expected in cases:
        path = tmp_path / f"{label}.yml"
        path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")

@ -205,19 +202,9 @@ def test_yaml_loop_preserves_blank_separator_after_list(tmp_path: Path):
        rendered = Template(template).render(**defaults)
        assert rendered_expected in rendered

-        erb_template = generate_erb_template(
-            fmt,
-            parsed,
-            "role",
-            original_text=text,
-            loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-            flat_items=flat_items,
-        )
-        assert erb_expected in erb_template
-

 def test_yaml_loop_preserves_following_top_level_comments(tmp_path: Path):
-    from jinja2 import Template
+    from jinja2 import Environment, Template

    from jinjaturtle.core import analyze_loops

@ -248,10 +235,15 @@ def test_yaml_loop_preserves_following_top_level_comments(tmp_path: Path):
        fmt, parsed, "role", original_text=text, loop_candidates=loop_candidates
    )
    rendered = Template(template).render(**defaults)
+    ansible_rendered = (
+        Environment(trim_blocks=True).from_string(template).render(**defaults)
+    )

    assert "# Offense count: 2" in rendered
    assert "# This cop supports unsafe autocorrection" in rendered
+    assert "spec.rb\n\n# Offense count: 2" in ansible_rendered
    assert yaml.safe_load(rendered) == yaml.safe_load(text)
+    assert yaml.safe_load(ansible_rendered) == yaml.safe_load(text)


 def test_yaml_scalar_loop_preserves_quoted_list_items(tmp_path: Path):
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Miguel Jacq	a712b19a45	Remove Fediverse link All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 44s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m23s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 36s Details	2026-07-24 10:58:23 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	d3694240da	0.7.0 All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 52s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m40s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 50s Details	2026-07-05 10:54:37 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	f9332879ba	More hardening All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 1m21s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m33s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 41s Details	2026-07-03 12:23:52 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	c6ce0311ed	Forbid the ansible globals All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 51s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m36s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 42s Details	2026-07-02 14:52:09 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	054b90ebde	Don't reference built-in globals via loop-items in Jinja2 into keys All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 52s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m31s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 43s Details	2026-07-02 14:22:07 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	575c2b79f9	Fix catching of defusedxml exception All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 48s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m29s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 39s Details	2026-07-01 12:23:19 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	d4fd42522d	Fix bandit alert All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 49s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m32s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 40s Details	2026-06-29 20:53:15 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	42321a8ec9	Catch malformed config errors gracefully Some checks failed CI / test (push) Successful in 49s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m28s Details Lint / test (push) Failing after 39s Details	2026-06-29 20:47:05 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	3573e8e750	Make var name collapse underscores	2026-06-29 20:46:07 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	5ae85ad11e	Fix tests All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 47s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m25s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 37s Details	2026-06-29 14:44:39 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	bc4af135b4	Fix tests Some checks failed CI / test (push) Successful in 49s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Failing after 1m22s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 37s Details	2026-06-29 14:31:39 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	0e052a073a	Harden output	2026-06-29 14:30:46 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	70be0f7e33	Hardening: use unsafe for ansible vars, ensure API use of JinjaTurtle uses safe XML parsing, avoid symlinks Some checks failed CI / test (push) Successful in 48s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m27s Details Lint / test (push) Failing after 39s Details	2026-06-29 08:51:53 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	4a1f2ac15e	More JSON defenses	2026-06-28 20:33:12 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	661320558c	Go back to just jinja2	2026-06-25 17:07:58 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	094c4d2274	Fixes All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 47s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m19s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 37s Details	2026-06-24 17:42:18 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	a9d56b66c5	Fixes for releasing All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 46s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m18s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 38s Details	2026-06-23 18:03:29 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	c5375b180f	0.5.6 All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 47s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m20s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 38s Details	2026-06-23 17:15:02 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	383a529016	fix test All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 46s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m19s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 40s Details	2026-06-23 15:57:17 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	a5f8e7c481	Attempt to fix python bin Some checks failed CI / test (push) Successful in 47s Details CI / test (debian, docker.io/library/debian:13, python3) (push) Successful in 1m22s Details Lint / test (push) Failing after 39s Details	2026-06-23 15:42:42 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	15770c8e3d	Upgrade to poetry2 and update dependencies Some checks failed CI / test (push) Failing after 53s Details Lint / test (push) Failing after 42s Details	2026-06-23 14:30:42 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	a5ca5f2974	Try to prevent what could lead to execution of embedded jinja in original files when converting	2026-06-23 14:20:05 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	f5de32b778	Rewrite the README All checks were successful CI / test (push) Successful in 1m6s Details Lint / test (push) Successful in 1m6s Details	2026-06-20 20:17:28 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	13d1a2b972	0.5.5	2026-06-20 18:28:19 +10:00
Miguel Jacq	00d0064362	Fixes for newlines in yaml	2026-06-20 18:27:22 +10:00