Hardening: use unsafe for ansible vars, ensure API use of JinjaTurtle uses safe XML parsing, avoid symlinks

README.md

@@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ By default it generates:
 - an **Ansible defaults YAML** file containing the variables used by that
   template.
 
-It can also generate **ERB** templates and **Puppet Hiera-style YAML** data for
-Puppet workflows.
-
 JinjaTurtle does not try to replace configuration-management tools. Its job is
 to speed up the boring first pass: take a real config file, discover the values
 inside it, replace those values with variables, and write the corresponding
@@ -37,16 +34,6 @@ For the default Jinja2/Ansible mode:
 5. An Ansible defaults YAML file is generated with those variables and the
    original values.
 
-For ERB/Puppet mode:
-
-1. The same parse/flatten/loop analysis is used.
-2. An ERB template is generated with Puppet-style instance variables such as
-   `<%= @memory_limit %>`.
-3. The variables file is written as Puppet Hiera-style data, such as
-   `php::memory_limit: 256M`.
-4. If `--puppet-class` is supplied, that class name is used as the Hiera
-   namespace while `--role-name` remains the local variable prefix.
-
 By default, the generated variable data and template are printed to stdout. Use
 `--defaults-output` and `--template-output` to write them to files.
 
@@ -80,78 +67,6 @@ and defaults data like:
 php_memory_limit: 256M
 ```
 
-## ERB / Puppet example
-
-Use `--template-engine erb` when you want Puppet ERB output:
-
-```shell
-jinjaturtle php.ini \
-  --role-name php \
-  --template-engine erb \
-  --defaults-output data/common.yaml \
-  --template-output templates/php.ini.erb
-```
-
-Given the same source value:
-
-```ini
-memory_limit = 256M
-```
-
-JinjaTurtle will produce an ERB template value like:
-
-```erb
-memory_limit = <%= @memory_limit %>
-```
-
-and Hiera-style data like:
-
-```yaml
-php::memory_limit: 256M
-```
-
-The `--defaults-output` option name is retained for CLI compatibility, but in
-ERB mode the file is intended to be Puppet Hiera data rather than Ansible role
-defaults.
-
-JinjaTurtle does **not** generate Puppet classes or `file` resources. A Puppet
-module, should still declare the class parameters and call the template, for
-example with Puppet's `template()` function.
-
-## Using `--puppet-class`
-
-Most direct usage can simply use the same value for the role name and Puppet
-class name:
-
-```shell
-jinjaturtle php.ini --role-name php --template-engine erb
-```
-
-This creates Hiera keys such as:
-
-```yaml
-php::memory_limit: 256M
-```
-
-and local ERB variables such as:
-
-```erb
-<%= @memory_limit %>
-```
-
-For generated systems, it can be useful to make `--role-name` more specific
-while keeping the Hiera keys under the real Puppet class. For example:
-
-```shell
-jinjaturtle php.ini \
-  --role-name php_etc_php_ini \
-  --puppet-class php \
-  --template-engine erb
-```
-
-In that case the variable prefix can stay file-specific, while the Hiera data
-is still written under `php::...`.
-
 ## What sort of config files can it handle?
 
 JinjaTurtle supports common structured and semi-structured config formats:
@@ -176,8 +91,8 @@ homogeneous enough. If it is not confident, it falls back to flattened scalar
 variables.
 
 Some very complex files will still need manual cleanup. The goal is to speed up
-conversion into Jinja2 or ERB templates, not to guarantee a perfect final module
-without review.
+conversion into Jinja2 templates, not to guarantee a perfect final module without
+review.
 
 ## JSON, quoting, and type preservation
 
@@ -196,17 +111,7 @@ when the correct rendered JSON should be:
 {"enabled": true}
 ```
 
-In Jinja2 mode this uses Ansible-style JSON filters. In ERB mode it emits Ruby
-JSON generation where required, for example:
-
-```erb
-<% require 'json' -%>
-{
-  "enabled": <%= JSON.generate(@enabled) %>
-}
-```
-
-That is expected for JSON ERB templates.
+This uses Ansible-style JSON filters.
 
 ## Can I convert multiple files at once?
 
@@ -287,8 +192,6 @@ poetry install
 usage: jinjaturtle [-h] [-r ROLE_NAME] [--recursive]
                    [-f {ini,json,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd,ssh}]
                    [-d DEFAULTS_OUTPUT] [-t TEMPLATE_OUTPUT]
-                   [--template-engine {jinja2,erb}]
-                   [--puppet-class PUPPET_CLASS]
                    config
 
 Convert a config file into an Ansible defaults file and Jinja2 template.
@@ -302,8 +205,7 @@ options:
   -h, --help            show this help message and exit
   -r, --role-name ROLE_NAME
                         Role name / variable prefix. In Jinja2 mode this is
-                        usually the Ansible role name. In ERB mode it is used
-                        as the local variable prefix. Defaults to jinjaturtle.
+                        usually the Ansible role name. Defaults to jinjaturtle.
   --recursive           When CONFIG is a folder, recurse into subfolders.
   -f, --format {ini,json,toml,yaml,xml,postfix,systemd,ssh}
                         Force config format instead of auto-detecting from
@@ -314,12 +216,6 @@ options:
   -t, --template-output TEMPLATE_OUTPUT
                         Path to write the generated config template. If omitted,
                         it is printed to stdout.
-  --template-engine {jinja2,erb}
-                        Template syntax to generate. Defaults to jinja2. Use
-                        erb for Puppet templates.
-  --puppet-class PUPPET_CLASS
-                        Puppet class / Hiera namespace to use with
-                        --template-engine erb. Defaults to --role-name.
 ```
 
 ## Additional supported formats
@@ -346,16 +242,16 @@ Two guarantees matter:
 
 1. **Values are data, never code.** Every config *value* is replaced with a
    `{{ variable }}` placeholder in the template, and the original value is stored
-   separately in the defaults/Hiera data. When the template is later rendered,
+   separately in the defaults data. When the template is later rendered,
    the placeholder prints the value as a literal string; Jinja2 does not
    recursively render the *contents* of a variable, so a payload sitting inside
-   a value (for example `motd = {{ salt['cmd.run']('id') }}`) is inert.
+   a value is inert.
 
 2. **Verbatim text is neutralised.** To preserve formatting, JinjaTurtle copies
    comments, blank lines, headers and any unrecognised lines from the source
    into the template. Any template metacharacters in that copied text
-   (`{{ }}`, `{% %}`, `{# #}` for Jinja2; `<% %>` for ERB) are escaped so they
-   render as the literal characters the author wrote, rather than executing.
+   (`{{ }}`, `{% %}`, `{# #}` ) are escaped so they render as the literal
+   characters the author wrote, rather than executing.
 
 ### Consumer responsibilities
 
@@ -368,11 +264,6 @@ which is the normal case:
   default. If you build your own var structures from this data and pass them
   through additional templating, mark untrusted values with the `!unsafe` tag so
   they are never re-evaluated.
-- **Salt**: use the generated file as a `file.managed` template
-  (`template: jinja`). Do **not** place JinjaTurtle output where Salt would
-  render it a second time as part of SLS/pillar rendering, which is a separate
-  Jinja pass and would re-evaluate any embedded expressions.
-- **Puppet/ERB**: render with the standard `template()`/`epp()` flow.
 
 In short: render JinjaTurtle output exactly once. Do not feed it back through
 another templating pass.

src/jinjaturtle/cli.py

@@ -12,12 +12,11 @@ from .core import (
     flatten_config,
     generate_ansible_yaml,
     generate_jinja2_template,
-    generate_puppet_hiera_yaml,
-    generate_erb_template,
 )
 
 from .multi import process_directory
-from .safety import TemplateSafetyError, verify_erb_template_safe
+from .safety import TemplateSafetyError
+from .output_safety import OutputPathError, ensure_safe_directory, write_text_safely
 
 
 def _build_arg_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
@@ -59,20 +58,6 @@ def _build_arg_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
         "--template-output",
         help="Path to write the generated config template. If omitted, template is printed to stdout.",
     )
-    ap.add_argument(
-        "--template-engine",
-        choices=[j2.NAME, "erb"],
-        default=j2.NAME,
-        help="Template syntax to generate (default: jinja2). Use erb for Puppet templates.",
-    )
-    ap.add_argument(
-        "--puppet-class",
-        help=(
-            "Puppet class/Hiera namespace to use with --template-engine erb. "
-            "Defaults to --role-name. This lets tools use a file-specific "
-            "variable prefix while writing Hiera keys under the real Puppet class."
-        ),
-    )
     return ap
 
 
@@ -88,6 +73,9 @@ def _main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
             f"jinjaturtle: refusing to generate unsafe template: {exc}", file=sys.stderr
         )
         return 2
+    except OutputPathError as exc:
+        print(f"jinjaturtle: refusing unsafe output path: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
 
 
 def _run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
@@ -105,37 +93,23 @@ def _run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
 
         # Write defaults
         if args.defaults_output:
-            Path(args.defaults_output).write_text(defaults_yaml, encoding="utf-8")
+            write_text_safely(Path(args.defaults_output), defaults_yaml)
         else:
             print("# defaults/main.yml")
             print(defaults_yaml, end="")
 
-        # Optionally translate folder-mode templates to ERB.  Folder mode keeps
-        # the existing data shape; single-file mode below is the preferred
-        # Puppet path because it can produce class-parameter Hiera keys.
-        if args.template_engine == "erb":
-            from .erb import translate_jinja2_to_erb
-
-            for o in outputs:
-                o.template = translate_jinja2_to_erb(
-                    o.template,
-                    role_prefix=args.role_name,
-                    puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name,
-                )
-                verify_erb_template_safe(o.template)
-
-        template_ext = "erb" if args.template_engine == "erb" else j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION
+        template_ext = j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION
 
         # Write templates
         if args.template_output:
             out_path = Path(args.template_output)
             if len(outputs) == 1 and not out_path.is_dir():
-                out_path.write_text(outputs[0].template, encoding="utf-8")
+                write_text_safely(out_path, outputs[0].template)
             else:
-                out_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+                ensure_safe_directory(out_path)
                 for o in outputs:
-                    (out_path / f"config.{o.fmt}.{template_ext}").write_text(
-                        o.template, encoding="utf-8"
+                    write_text_safely(
+                        out_path / f"config.{o.fmt}.{template_ext}", o.template
                     )
         else:
             for o in outputs:
@@ -161,51 +135,28 @@ def _run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     # Flatten config (excluding loop paths if loops are detected)
     flat_items = flatten_config(fmt, parsed, loop_candidates)
 
-    if args.template_engine == "erb":
-        ansible_yaml = generate_puppet_hiera_yaml(
-            args.role_name,
-            flat_items,
-            loop_candidates,
-            puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name,
-        )
-        template_str = generate_erb_template(
-            fmt,
-            parsed,
-            args.role_name,
-            original_text=config_text,
-            loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-            flat_items=flat_items,
-            puppet_class=args.puppet_class or args.role_name,
-        )
-    else:
-        # Generate defaults YAML (with loop collections if detected)
-        ansible_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml(
-            args.role_name, flat_items, loop_candidates
-        )
+    # Generate defaults YAML (with loop collections if detected)
+    ansible_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml(args.role_name, flat_items, loop_candidates)
 
-        # Generate template (with loops if detected)
-        template_str = generate_jinja2_template(
-            fmt,
-            parsed,
-            args.role_name,
-            original_text=config_text,
-            loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-        )
+    # Generate template (with loops if detected)
+    template_str = generate_jinja2_template(
+        fmt,
+        parsed,
+        args.role_name,
+        original_text=config_text,
+        loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
+    )
 
     if args.defaults_output:
-        Path(args.defaults_output).write_text(ansible_yaml, encoding="utf-8")
+        write_text_safely(Path(args.defaults_output), ansible_yaml)
     else:
         print("# defaults/main.yml")
         print(ansible_yaml, end="")
 
     if args.template_output:
-        Path(args.template_output).write_text(template_str, encoding="utf-8")
+        write_text_safely(Path(args.template_output), template_str)
     else:
-        print(
-            "# config.erb"
-            if args.template_engine == "erb"
-            else f"# config.{j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION}"
-        )
+        print(f"# config.{j2.TEMPLATE_EXTENSION}")
         print(template_str, end="")
 
     return 0

src/jinjaturtle/core.py

@@ -8,10 +8,9 @@ import re
 import yaml
 
 from .loop_analyzer import LoopAnalyzer, LoopCandidate
-from .erb import puppet_class_name, puppet_local_var_name, translate_jinja2_to_erb
 from .safety import (
-    verify_erb_template_safe,
     verify_jinja2_template_safe,
+    verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys,
 )
 from .handlers import (
     BaseHandler,
@@ -34,6 +33,22 @@ class QuotedString(str):
     pass
 
 
+class AnsibleUnsafeString(str):
+    """Marker type emitted with Ansible's !unsafe YAML tag.
+
+    Ansible recursively templates string values by default.  Source-derived
+    config values that contain Jinja delimiters must therefore be marked
+    unsafe in defaults/main.yml, otherwise a harvested value such as
+    ``{{ lookup('pipe', 'id') }}`` becomes executable on the Ansible
+    controller when the generated role is applied.
+    """
+
+    pass
+
+
+_JINJA_STARTS = ("{{", "{%", "{#")
+
+
 def _fallback_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: Any):
     """
     Fallback for objects the dumper doesn't know about.
@@ -53,7 +68,33 @@ def _quoted_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: QuotedString):
     return dumper.represent_scalar("tag:yaml.org,2002:str", str(data), style='"')
 
 
+def _ansible_unsafe_str_representer(dumper: yaml.SafeDumper, data: AnsibleUnsafeString):
+    return dumper.represent_scalar("!unsafe", str(data), style="'")
+
+
+def _needs_ansible_unsafe(value: str) -> bool:
+    return any(marker in value for marker in _JINJA_STARTS)
+
+
+def _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(obj: Any) -> Any:
+    """Recursively mark mapping/list values containing Jinja as !unsafe.
+
+    Mapping keys are intentionally left alone: they are variable names or YAML
+    structure, not Ansible-templated values.  Values nested in folder-mode item
+    lists, including source-derived ``id`` values, are protected.
+    """
+
+    if isinstance(obj, dict):
+        return {k: _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(v) for k, v in obj.items()}
+    if isinstance(obj, list):
+        return [_mark_ansible_unsafe_values(v) for v in obj]
+    if isinstance(obj, str) and _needs_ansible_unsafe(obj):
+        return AnsibleUnsafeString(obj)
+    return obj
+
+
 _TurtleDumper.add_representer(QuotedString, _quoted_str_representer)
+_TurtleDumper.add_representer(AnsibleUnsafeString, _ansible_unsafe_str_representer)
 # Use our fallback for any unknown object types
 _TurtleDumper.add_representer(None, _fallback_str_representer)
 
@@ -85,8 +126,9 @@ def dump_yaml(data: Any, *, sort_keys: bool = True) -> str:
 
     This is used by both the single-file and multi-file code paths.
     """
+    safe_data = _mark_ansible_unsafe_values(data)
     return yaml.dump(
-        data,
+        safe_data,
         Dumper=_TurtleDumper,
         sort_keys=sort_keys,
         default_flow_style=False,
@@ -396,6 +438,13 @@ def generate_jinja2_template(
     # verbatim source text, the un-escaped payload shows up here as a live tag
     # and generation aborts instead of emitting an injectable template.
     verify_jinja2_template_safe(template)
+
+    # Format-specific backstop: JinjaTurtle never emits Jinja inside a JSON object
+    # key, so a live construct in key position means source key text leaked into
+    # the template unescaped. This is independent of per-handler escaping.
+    if fmt == "json":
+        verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(template)
+
     return template
 
 
@@ -411,74 +460,6 @@ def _template_variable_names(
     return names
 
 
-def generate_puppet_hiera_yaml(
-    role_prefix: str,
-    flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]],
-    loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None,
-    *,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Create Puppet Hiera data suitable for Automatic Parameter Lookup.
-
-    ``role_prefix`` remains the source variable prefix used by JinjaTurtle while
-    ``puppet_class`` is the Puppet class/Hiera namespace.  In the normal case
-    they are the same, so ``php_memory_limit`` becomes ``php::memory_limit``.
-    """
-
-    klass = puppet_class_name(puppet_class or role_prefix)
-    data: dict[str, Any] = {}
-
-    for path, value in flat_items:
-        generated = make_var_name(role_prefix, path)
-        local = puppet_local_var_name(role_prefix, generated, puppet_class=klass)
-        data[f"{klass}::{local}"] = value
-
-    if loop_candidates:
-        for candidate in loop_candidates:
-            generated = make_var_name(role_prefix, candidate.path)
-            local = puppet_local_var_name(role_prefix, generated, puppet_class=klass)
-            data[f"{klass}::{local}"] = candidate.items
-
-    return dump_yaml(data, sort_keys=True)
-
-
-def generate_erb_template(
-    fmt: str,
-    parsed: Any,
-    role_prefix: str,
-    *,
-    original_text: str | None = None,
-    loop_candidates: list[LoopCandidate] | None = None,
-    flat_items: list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]] | None = None,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Generate a Puppet ERB template from JinjaTurtle's renderer-neutral data.
-
-    The first implementation intentionally translates the Jinja2 subset emitted
-    by JinjaTurtle's existing format handlers.  This keeps parsing, formatting
-    preservation, and loop detection identical between Jinja2 and ERB output
-    while still producing Puppet-native ``@parameter`` references.
-    """
-
-    jinja_template = generate_jinja2_template(
-        fmt,
-        parsed,
-        role_prefix,
-        original_text=original_text,
-        loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-    )
-    names = _template_variable_names(role_prefix, flat_items or [], loop_candidates)
-    erb_template = translate_jinja2_to_erb(
-        jinja_template,
-        role_prefix=role_prefix,
-        puppet_class=puppet_class or role_prefix,
-        variable_names=names,
-    )
-    # Defence in depth: no live Jinja2 delimiter may survive translation.
-    verify_erb_template_safe(erb_template)
-    return erb_template
-
-
 def _stringify_timestamps(obj: Any) -> Any:
     """
     Recursively walk a parsed config and turn any datetime/date/time objects

src/jinjaturtle/erb.py

@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import re
-
-from .escape import escape_erb_literal
-
-
-def _safe_name(raw: str, *, fallback: str = "var") -> str:
-    text = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]+", "_", str(raw or fallback)).strip("_").lower()
-    text = re.sub(r"_+", "_", text)
-    if not text:
-        text = fallback
-    if not re.match(r"^[a-z_]", text):
-        text = f"{fallback}_{text}"
-    return text
-
-
-def puppet_class_name(raw: str) -> str:
-    """Return a conservative Puppet class/Hiera namespace name."""
-
-    text = _safe_name(raw, fallback="jinjaturtle")
-    if not re.match(r"^[a-z]", text):
-        text = f"jinjaturtle_{text}"
-    return text
-
-
-def _role_prefix_name(raw: str) -> str:
-    return _safe_name(raw, fallback="jinjaturtle")
-
-
-def puppet_local_var_name(
-    role_prefix: str,
-    jinja_var_name: str,
-    *,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Map a generated JinjaTurtle variable to a Puppet class parameter.
-
-    For the common case where ``--role-name php`` also means class ``php``, a
-    generated Jinja variable such as ``php_memory_limit`` becomes Puppet local
-    parameter ``memory_limit`` and Hiera key ``php::memory_limit``.
-
-    When ``puppet_class`` differs from ``role_prefix`` we keep the full
-    generated variable name as the local parameter and only use ``puppet_class``
-    as the Hiera namespace.
-    """
-
-    var_name = _safe_name(jinja_var_name, fallback="value")
-    prefix = _role_prefix_name(role_prefix)
-    klass = puppet_class_name(puppet_class or role_prefix)
-    if klass == prefix and var_name.startswith(prefix + "_"):
-        stripped = var_name[len(prefix) + 1 :]
-        return stripped or var_name
-    return var_name
-
-
-class ErbTranslator:
-    """Translate the Jinja2 subset emitted by JinjaTurtle into Puppet ERB."""
-
-    _TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"({{.*?}}|{%.*?%})", re.S)
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        role_prefix: str,
-        puppet_class: str | None = None,
-        variable_names: set[str] | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.role_prefix = role_prefix
-        self.puppet_class = puppet_class or role_prefix
-        self.variable_names = set(variable_names or set())
-        self.loop_stack: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = []
-        self.needs_json = False
-
-    # Matches a JinjaTurtle ``{% raw %} ... {% endraw %}`` block (non-greedy).
-    # JinjaTurtle emits raw blocks only to carry verbatim, security-escaped
-    # source text (comments and unrecognised lines), so the *contents* must be
-    # treated as literal output, never translated as Jinja tokens.
-    _RAW_BLOCK_RE = re.compile(
-        r"{%[-+]?\s*raw\s*[-+]?%}(.*?){%[-+]?\s*endraw\s*[-+]?%}", re.S
-    )
-
-    def translate(self, template_text: str) -> str:
-        # Split out raw blocks first.  Their inner text is literal and must be
-        # carried through as literal ERB (with ERB delimiters re-escaped), rather
-        # than tokenised -- otherwise an escaped Jinja payload inside a comment
-        # would be "re-animated" into live ERB during translation.
-        segments = self._RAW_BLOCK_RE.split(template_text)
-        out: list[str] = []
-        # re.split with one capture group yields: [text, raw_inner, text, ...].
-        for idx, segment in enumerate(segments):
-            if idx % 2 == 1:
-                # Captured raw-block contents: emit as literal ERB text.
-                out.append(escape_erb_literal(segment))
-            else:
-                out.append(self._translate_tokens(segment))
-
-        rendered = "".join(out)
-        if self.needs_json and "require 'json'" not in rendered:
-            rendered = "<% require 'json' -%>\n" + rendered
-        return rendered
-
-    def _translate_tokens(self, template_text: str) -> str:
-        parts = self._TOKEN_RE.split(template_text)
-        out: list[str] = []
-        for token in parts:
-            if not token:
-                continue
-            if token.startswith("{{") and token.endswith("}}"):
-                expr = token[2:-2].strip()
-                out.append(f"<%= {self.expr_to_ruby(expr)} %>")
-                continue
-            if token.startswith("{%") and token.endswith("%}"):
-                stmt = token[2:-2].strip()
-                out.append(self.statement_to_erb(stmt))
-                continue
-            out.append(token)
-        return "".join(out)
-
-    def local_var(self, name: str) -> str:
-        return puppet_local_var_name(
-            self.role_prefix, name, puppet_class=self.puppet_class
-        )
-
-    def ruby_value(self, expr: str) -> str:
-        expr = expr.strip()
-        if expr in {"true", "True"}:
-            return "true"
-        if expr in {"false", "False"}:
-            return "false"
-        if expr in {"none", "None", "null"}:
-            return "nil"
-        if re.match(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$", expr):
-            if any(expr == loop_var for loop_var, _idx, _coll in self.loop_stack):
-                return expr
-            return f"@{self.local_var(expr)}"
-        m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$", expr)
-        if m:
-            base, key = m.groups()
-            if any(base == loop_var for loop_var, _idx, _coll in self.loop_stack):
-                return f"{base}[{key!r}]"
-            return f"@{self.local_var(base)}[{key!r}]"
-        return expr
-
-    def expr_to_ruby(self, expr: str) -> str:
-        expr = expr.strip()
-
-        # JinjaTurtle emits these YAML-preserving ternaries for booleans/nulls.
-        m = re.match(
-            r"^(['\"])(true|false)\1\s+if\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+else\s+(['\"])(true|false)\4$",
-            expr,
-        )
-        if m:
-            truthy = m.group(2)
-            cond = self.ruby_value(m.group(3))
-            falsy = m.group(5)
-            return f"{cond} ? {truthy!r} : {falsy!r}"
-
-        m = re.match(
-            r"^(['\"])(null)\1\s+if\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+none\s+else\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)$",
-            expr,
-        )
-        if m:
-            value = self.ruby_value(m.group(3))
-            fallback = self.ruby_value(m.group(4))
-            return f"{value}.nil? ? 'null' : {fallback}"
-
-        if "|" in expr:
-            base, *filters = [part.strip() for part in expr.split("|")]
-            ruby = self.ruby_value(base)
-            for filt in filters:
-                if filt.startswith("lower"):
-                    ruby = f"{ruby}.to_s.downcase"
-                elif filt.startswith("to_json") or filt.startswith("tojson"):
-                    self.needs_json = True
-                    if "indent" in filt:
-                        ruby = f"JSON.pretty_generate({ruby})"
-                    else:
-                        ruby = f"JSON.generate({ruby})"
-            return ruby
-
-        return self.ruby_value(expr)
-
-    def statement_to_erb(self, stmt: str) -> str:
-        if stmt.endswith(("-", "+")):
-            stmt = stmt[:-1].rstrip()
-
-        if stmt.startswith("for "):
-            m = re.match(
-                r"^for\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s+in\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$",
-                stmt,
-            )
-            if m:
-                loop_var, collection = m.groups()
-                idx_var = f"__jt_idx_{len(self.loop_stack)}"
-                collection_ruby = self.ruby_value(collection)
-                self.loop_stack.append((loop_var, idx_var, collection_ruby))
-                return f"<% {collection_ruby}.each_with_index do |{loop_var}, {idx_var}| -%>"
-
-        if stmt == "endfor":
-            if self.loop_stack:
-                self.loop_stack.pop()
-            return "<% end %>"
-
-        if stmt.startswith("if "):
-            cond = stmt[3:].strip()
-            if cond == "not loop.last" and self.loop_stack:
-                _loop_var, idx_var, collection_ruby = self.loop_stack[-1]
-                return f"<% if {idx_var} < ({collection_ruby}.length - 1) -%>"
-            m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+defined$", cond)
-            if m:
-                return f"<% unless {self.ruby_value(m.group(1))}.nil? -%>"
-            m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\.]*)\s+is\s+none$", cond)
-            if m:
-                return f"<% if {self.ruby_value(m.group(1))}.nil? -%>"
-            return f"<% if {self.expr_to_ruby(cond)} -%>"
-
-        if stmt == "else":
-            return "<% else -%>"
-
-        if stmt.startswith("elif "):
-            return f"<% elsif {self.expr_to_ruby(stmt[5:].strip())} -%>"
-
-        if stmt == "endif":
-            return "<% end -%>"
-
-        # Preserve unknown Jinja statements visibly as an ERB comment so the
-        # generated template does not contain invalid Jinja syntax.
-        return f"<%# Unsupported JinjaTurtle statement: {stmt} %>"
-
-
-def translate_jinja2_to_erb(
-    template_text: str,
-    *,
-    role_prefix: str,
-    puppet_class: str | None = None,
-    variable_names: set[str] | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    return ErbTranslator(
-        role_prefix=role_prefix,
-        puppet_class=puppet_class,
-        variable_names=variable_names,
-    ).translate(template_text)

src/jinjaturtle/escape.py

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ always replaced with ``{{ var }}`` placeholders and parked in the defaults data,
 so a payload inside a value is inert.  Verbatim text is different: if the source
 contains ``{{ ... }}``, ``{% ... %}`` or ``{# ... #}`` (Jinja2), or ``<%= %>`` /
 ``<% %>`` (ERB), that text becomes *live template code* in the output and is
-executed when Salt/Ansible/Puppet later renders the template.
+executed when Ansible later renders the template.
 
 Because JinjaTurtle is frequently fed harvested, attacker-influenceable config
 (hostnames, banners, GECOS-derived comments, "Managed by" notes), this is a
@@ -30,14 +30,6 @@ Design notes:
     Jinja construct.  The only way to break out of a raw block is a literal
     ``{% endraw %}`` in the source, so we defang the token ``endraw`` (in any
     internal spacing) before wrapping.
-  * The ERB translator (``erb.py``) is raw-aware: it copies the *contents* of a
-    JinjaTurtle raw block through as literal ERB text and re-escapes any ERB
-    delimiters found there.  That keeps a Jinja-escaped comment inert after the
-    Jinja2 -> ERB translation step, instead of the payload being "re-animated"
-    as ERB.
-  * ``escape_erb_literal`` exists for completeness / direct ERB emission: it
-    rewrites each ERB delimiter into an ERB expression that prints the delimiter
-    characters literally.
 """
 
 import re
@@ -70,11 +62,6 @@ def contains_jinja_markup(text: str) -> bool:
     return any(m in text for m in _JINJA_MARKERS)
 
 
-def contains_erb_markup(text: str) -> bool:
-    """Return True if *text* contains any ERB delimiter."""
-    return any(m in text for m in (*_ERB_OPEN_MARKERS, *_ERB_CLOSE_MARKERS))
-
-
 def _defang_endraw(text: str) -> str:
     """Rewrite any literal ``{% endraw %}`` so it cannot close our raw wrapper.
 
@@ -109,45 +96,3 @@ def escape_jinja_literal(text: str) -> str:
     if not text or not contains_jinja_markup(text):
         return text
     return "{% raw %}" + _defang_endraw(text) + "{% endraw %}"
-
-
-def escape_erb_literal(text: str) -> str:
-    """Make *text* render as literal characters under a later ERB render.
-
-    ERB has no ``raw`` block, so each opening/closing delimiter is rewritten as
-    an ERB expression that prints the delimiter literally.  Text with no ERB
-    metacharacters is returned unchanged.
-    """
-    if not text or not contains_erb_markup(text):
-        return text
-
-    result: list[str] = []
-    i = 0
-    n = len(text)
-    while i < n:
-        matched = None
-        for marker in (*_ERB_CLOSE_MARKERS, *_ERB_OPEN_MARKERS):
-            if text.startswith(marker, i):
-                matched = marker
-                break
-        if matched is not None:
-            escaped = matched.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
-            result.append('<%= "' + escaped + '" %>')
-            i += len(matched)
-        else:
-            result.append(text[i])
-            i += 1
-    return "".join(result)
-
-
-def escape_literal(text: str, *, engine: str = "jinja2") -> str:
-    """Escape verbatim *text* for the target template *engine*.
-
-    ``engine`` is ``"jinja2"`` (default) or ``"erb"``.  Unknown engines fall back
-    to Jinja2 escaping.  In JinjaTurtle's pipeline ERB output is produced by
-    translating Jinja2 output, and the translator is raw-aware, so handlers can
-    always Jinja-escape and rely on the translator to keep the literal inert.
-    """
-    if engine == "erb":
-        return escape_erb_literal(text)
-    return escape_jinja_literal(text)

src/jinjaturtle/handlers/json.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from typing import Any
 
 from . import DictLikeHandler
 from .. import j2
+from ..escape import escape_jinja_literal
 from ..loop_analyzer import LoopCandidate
 
 
@@ -109,10 +110,18 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
         chunks: list[str] = []
         pos = 0
         for path, start, end in spans:
-            chunks.append(text[pos:start])
+            # Text between scalar values (object keys, structural punctuation,
+            # whitespace, and any comment-like trailing text) is copied verbatim
+            # from the source file. Like every other text-emitting handler, this
+            # verbatim text must be neutralised: if it contains Jinja2 markup it
+            # would otherwise become live template code at apply time. The value
+            # itself is replaced with a safe placeholder below. ``escape_jinja_literal``
+            # is a no-op on text without Jinja markers, so benign JSON is unchanged
+            # byte-for-byte and a later render reproduces the original characters.
+            chunks.append(escape_jinja_literal(text[pos:start]))
             chunks.append(self._json_value_expr(self.make_var_name(role_prefix, path)))
             pos = end
-        chunks.append(text[pos:])
+        chunks.append(escape_jinja_literal(text[pos:]))
         return "".join(chunks)
 
     def _collect_json_scalar_spans(
@@ -213,7 +222,12 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
 
         def _walk(obj: Any, path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> Any:
             if isinstance(obj, dict):
-                return {k: _walk(v, path + (str(k),)) for k, v in obj.items()}
+                # Keys are emitted verbatim into the template, so neutralise any
+                # Jinja markup in them (see _generate_json_template_from_text).
+                return {
+                    escape_jinja_literal(str(k)): _walk(v, path + (str(k),))
+                    for k, v in obj.items()
+                }
             if isinstance(obj, list):
                 return [_walk(v, path + (str(i),)) for i, v in enumerate(obj)]
             # scalar - use marker that will be replaced with to_json
@@ -261,7 +275,12 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
                     return f"__LOOP_DICT__{collection_var}__{item_var}__"
 
             if isinstance(obj, dict):
-                return {k: _walk(v, current_path + (str(k),)) for k, v in obj.items()}
+                # Keys are emitted verbatim into the template, so neutralise any
+                # Jinja markup in them (see _generate_json_template_from_text).
+                return {
+                    escape_jinja_literal(str(k)): _walk(v, current_path + (str(k),))
+                    for k, v in obj.items()
+                }
             if isinstance(obj, list):
                 # Check if this list is a loop candidate
                 if current_path in loop_paths:
@@ -364,8 +383,13 @@ class JsonHandler(DictLikeHandler):
         ]  # first line has no indent; we prepend `inner` when emitting
         for i, key in enumerate(keys):
             comma = "," if i < len(keys) - 1 else ""
+            # The literal key text is emitted verbatim into the template; escape any
+            # Jinja markup in it. The value side ({item_var}.{key}) is constrained by
+            # the output safety gate's dotted-name allowlist, which fails closed on
+            # anything that is not a plain identifier path.
             dict_lines.append(
-                f'{field}"{key}": ' f"{j2.to_json(f'{item_var}.{key}')}{comma}"
+                f'{field}"{escape_jinja_literal(str(key))}": '
+                f"{j2.to_json(f'{item_var}.{key}')}{comma}"
             )
         # Comma between *items* goes after the closing brace.
         dict_lines.append(f"{inner}}}{j2.if_not_loop_last()},{j2.endif()}")

src/jinjaturtle/handlers/xml.py

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 from collections import Counter, defaultdict
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
-import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET  # nosec
+import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET  # nosec B405 - safe trees only; parsing uses defusedxml
+import defusedxml.ElementTree as DET
 
 from .base import BaseHandler
 from .. import j2
@@ -20,11 +21,11 @@ class XmlHandler(BaseHandler):
 
     def parse(self, path: Path) -> ET.Element:
         text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        parser = ET.XMLParser(
-            target=ET.TreeBuilder(insert_comments=False)
-        )  # nosec B314
-        parser.feed(text)
-        root = parser.close()
+        # Security must live in the handler, not only in the CLI entry point:
+        # callers may import JinjaTurtle as a library and invoke parse_config()
+        # directly.  defusedxml rejects DTD/entity abuse and also discards
+        # comments by default, matching the previous TreeBuilder behaviour.
+        root = DET.fromstring(text)
         return root
 
     def flatten(self, parsed: Any) -> list[tuple[tuple[str, ...], Any]]:

src/jinjaturtle/multi.py

@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ Notes:
 
 from collections import Counter, defaultdict
 from copy import deepcopy
+import os
 import configparser
+import stat
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Iterable
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET  # nosec
 from . import j2
 from .core import dump_yaml, flatten_config, make_var_name, parse_config
 from .handlers.xml import XmlHandler
-from .safety import verify_jinja2_template_safe
+from .safety import verify_jinja2_template_safe, verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys
 from .escape import escape_jinja_literal
 
 
@@ -44,8 +46,23 @@ SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES: dict[str, set[str]] = {
 }
 
 
+def _lstat(path: Path) -> os.stat_result:
+    return path.lstat()
+
+
 def is_supported_file(path: Path) -> bool:
-    if not path.is_file():
+    """Return True only for real regular files with supported suffixes.
+
+    pathlib.Path.is_file() follows symlinks.  Folder mode must not follow
+    attacker-controlled symlinks when run over an untrusted tree, especially if
+    an administrator accidentally runs the CLI as root.
+    """
+
+    try:
+        st = _lstat(path)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return False
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
         return False
     suffix = path.suffix.lower()
     for exts in SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES.values():
@@ -55,11 +72,16 @@ def is_supported_file(path: Path) -> bool:
 
 
 def iter_supported_files(root: Path, recursive: bool) -> list[Path]:
-    if not root.exists():
+    try:
+        st = _lstat(root)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
         raise FileNotFoundError(str(root))
-    if root.is_file():
+
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+        raise ValueError(f"refusing to follow symlink: {root}")
+    if stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
         return [root] if is_supported_file(root) else []
-    if not root.is_dir():
+    if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
         return []
 
     it = root.rglob("*") if recursive else root.glob("*")
@@ -784,5 +806,7 @@ def process_directory(
     # Any un-neutralised source text that became a live tag aborts generation.
     for out in outputs:
         verify_jinja2_template_safe(out.template)
+        if out.fmt == "json":
+            verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(out.template)
 
     return defaults_yaml, outputs

src/jinjaturtle/output_safety.py

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+"""Safer file-output helpers for the JinjaTurtle CLI.
+
+The CLI is often used by administrators.  A plain Path.write_text() follows a
+final-path symlink and can therefore be dangerous when a root-run invocation
+writes into an attacker-writable tree.  These helpers validate path components,
+write through a private temporary file in the target directory, and replace the
+final path atomically.  Existing final-path symlinks are refused rather than
+followed.
+"""
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import stat
+import tempfile
+
+
+class OutputPathError(OSError):
+    """Raised when a requested output path is unsafe."""
+
+
+def _absolute(path: Path) -> Path:
+    return path if path.is_absolute() else Path.cwd() / path
+
+
+def _check_existing_path_not_symlink(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        st = path.lstat()
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to use symlink path: {path}")
+
+
+def _check_existing_output_file(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        st = path.lstat()
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to write through symlink: {path}")
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+        raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to replace non-regular file: {path}")
+
+
+def _check_parent_components(parent: Path) -> None:
+    """Require every existing parent component to be a real directory."""
+
+    parent = _absolute(parent)
+    parts = parent.parts
+    if not parts:
+        return
+
+    cur = Path(parts[0])
+    for part in parts[1:]:
+        cur = cur / part
+        try:
+            st = cur.lstat()
+        except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+            raise OutputPathError(f"output parent does not exist: {cur}") from exc
+        if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+            raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to use symlink parent: {cur}")
+        if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
+            raise OutputPathError(f"output parent is not a directory: {cur}")
+
+
+def ensure_safe_directory(path: Path) -> None:
+    """Create or validate a directory tree without accepting symlinks."""
+
+    path = _absolute(path)
+    parts = path.parts
+    if not parts:
+        return
+
+    cur = Path(parts[0])
+    for part in parts[1:]:
+        cur = cur / part
+        try:
+            st = cur.lstat()
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            cur.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+            st = cur.lstat()
+        if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
+            raise OutputPathError(f"refusing to use symlink directory: {cur}")
+        if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
+            raise OutputPathError(f"output path is not a directory: {cur}")
+
+
+def write_text_safely(path: Path, text: str, *, encoding: str = "utf-8") -> None:
+    """Write text without following a final-path symlink.
+
+    The target's parent must already exist and every parent component must be a
+    real directory.  The write is completed with os.replace(), which atomically
+    swaps the final directory entry and does not dereference a final symlink.
+    """
+
+    path = _absolute(path)
+    _check_parent_components(path.parent)
+    _check_existing_output_file(path)
+
+    fd = -1
+    tmp_name: str | None = None
+    try:
+        fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix=f".{path.name}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=str(path.parent), text=True
+        )
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding=encoding) as f:
+            fd = -1
+            f.write(text)
+            f.flush()
+            os.fsync(f.fileno())
+        os.chmod(tmp_name, 0o600)
+        _check_existing_output_file(path)
+        os.replace(tmp_name, path)
+        tmp_name = None
+    finally:
+        if fd >= 0:
+            os.close(fd)
+        if tmp_name is not None:
+            try:
+                os.unlink(tmp_name)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass

src/jinjaturtle/safety.py

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ single global property:
 
 The check is positive/allowlist-based, which is the safe direction: unknown
 constructs are rejected, not ignored.  It runs at the single choke points in
-``core.py`` (``generate_jinja2_template`` / ``generate_erb_template``), so it
-covers every current handler and every future one automatically.
+``core.py`` (``generate_jinja2_template``) so it covers every current handler and
+every future one automatically.
 
 Why this is robust against the escaper being wrong
 ---------------------------------------------------
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "TemplateSafetyError",
     "verify_jinja2_template_safe",
     "verify_erb_template_safe",
+    "verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys",
 ]
 
 
@@ -208,7 +209,88 @@ def verify_jinja2_template_safe(template_text: str) -> None:
 
 
 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# ERB gate.
+# JSON-key gate (defence in depth, format-specific).
+#
+# JinjaTurtle never emits a live Jinja construct inside a JSON *object key*: keys
+# are copied verbatim from the source and (after escape.py) are wrapped in
+# ``{% raw %}`` if they contain markup, so a key never lexes as a live tag.  A
+# live construct in key position can therefore only mean source key text leaked
+# into the template unescaped (the json-handler blind spot).  This gate is
+# independent of the escaper: it inspects the finished template, replaces every
+# *live* Jinja construct with an inert sentinel (raw-wrapped literal text stays
+# literal), and rejects any sentinel that lands in a JSON key slot.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+# Sentinel byte that cannot occur in normal generated template text.
+_LIVE_SENTINEL = "\x00"
+
+# A JSON key is a double-quoted string immediately followed (after optional
+# whitespace) by a colon.  We only need to detect a sentinel *inside* such a
+# string, so match a quoted run that ends in `":` and look for the sentinel.
+_JSON_KEY_RE = re.compile(r'"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"\s*:', re.S)
+
+_KEY_JINJA_DELIMS = ("{{", "}}", "{%", "%}", "{#", "#}")
+
+
+def _contains_jinja_delim(text: str) -> bool:
+    """True if *text* contains any Jinja delimiter (live or escaped-literal)."""
+    return any(d in text for d in _KEY_JINJA_DELIMS)
+
+
+def verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys(template_text: str) -> None:
+    """Reject a JSON template that carries Jinja markup in an object key.
+
+    JinjaTurtle never templates a JSON *object key*: keys come straight from the
+    source and a key is an identifier/string, never a value placeholder. Any
+    Jinja in key position therefore means attacker-influenced source key text
+    reached the template. This gate fails closed on it, independent of whether a
+    handler left the markup *live* (a raw ``{{ ... }}`` in the key) or *escaped*
+    it into a ``{% raw %}`` wrapper -- both indicate a key that should never have
+    contained templating, so generation aborts rather than emitting it.
+
+    Detection is done on the lexer token stream: we reconstruct the document with
+    every live tag collapsed to a sentinel and every ``{% raw %}``-wrapped region
+    also marked, then reject a sentinel that lands inside a JSON key string.
+    """
+    import jinja2
+
+    env = jinja2.Environment(autoescape=True)
+    try:
+        tokens = list(env.lex(template_text))
+    except jinja2.TemplateSyntaxError as exc:
+        raise TemplateSafetyError(
+            f"generated JSON template does not lex as the JinjaTurtle subset: {exc}"
+        ) from exc
+
+    out: list[str] = []
+    in_tag = False
+    for _lineno, tok_type, value in tokens:
+        if tok_type in ("variable_begin", "block_begin", "comment_begin"):
+            # A live construct: collapse to a sentinel so it is detectable if it
+            # sits in key position. (raw_begin/raw_end are *not* live; the data
+            # inside a raw block is preserved verbatim below, so an escaped key
+            # still shows its literal Jinja delimiters to the key check.)
+            in_tag = True
+            out.append(_LIVE_SENTINEL)
+        elif tok_type in ("variable_end", "block_end", "comment_end"):
+            in_tag = False
+        elif not in_tag:
+            # data, whitespace, raw_begin/raw_end markers, and inert raw content.
+            out.append(value if isinstance(value, str) else str(value))
+
+    reconstructed = "".join(out)
+
+    for match in _JSON_KEY_RE.finditer(reconstructed):
+        key_text = match.group(1)
+        if _LIVE_SENTINEL in key_text or _contains_jinja_delim(key_text):
+            raise TemplateSafetyError(
+                "refusing to emit JSON template: Jinja markup appears inside a "
+                "JSON object key. JinjaTurtle never templates keys, so this "
+                "indicates attacker-influenced source key text (possible "
+                "template injection)."
+            )
+
+
 #
 # JinjaTurtle's ERB output is produced by translating the (already-verified)
 # Jinja2 subset, so the Jinja2 gate is the primary guarantee.  As an independent

tests/test_cli.py

@@ -132,57 +132,3 @@ def test_cli_folder_single_output_file_when_one_format(tmp_path):
     assert defaults_path.is_file()
     assert template_path.is_file()
     assert "to_json" in template_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-
-
-def test_cli_erb_outputs_puppet_hiera_and_erb_template(tmp_path):
-    cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini"
-    cfg.write_text("[main]\nport = 8080\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    data_out = tmp_path / "common.yaml"
-    template_out = tmp_path / "app.ini.erb"
-
-    exit_code = cli._main(
-        [
-            str(cfg),
-            "-r",
-            "php",
-            "--template-engine",
-            "erb",
-            "--defaults-output",
-            str(data_out),
-            "--template-output",
-            str(template_out),
-        ]
-    )
-
-    assert exit_code == 0
-    assert "php::main_port: '8080'" in data_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    assert "port = <%= @main_port %>" in template_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-
-
-def test_cli_erb_can_use_separate_puppet_class_namespace(tmp_path):
-    cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini"
-    cfg.write_text("[main]\nport = 8080\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    data_out = tmp_path / "node.yaml"
-    template_out = tmp_path / "app.ini.erb"
-
-    exit_code = cli._main(
-        [
-            str(cfg),
-            "-r",
-            "php_etc_app_ini",
-            "--template-engine",
-            "erb",
-            "--puppet-class",
-            "php",
-            "--defaults-output",
-            str(data_out),
-            "--template-output",
-            str(template_out),
-        ]
-    )
-
-    assert exit_code == 0
-    data = data_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    template = template_out.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    assert "php::php_etc_app_ini_main_port: '8080'" in data
-    assert "port = <%= @php_etc_app_ini_main_port %>" in template

tests/test_injection_security.py

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 JinjaTurtle copies parts of the source config (comments, unrecognised lines,
 structural keys) verbatim into the generated template.  If that text contains
 Jinja2/ERB delimiters it must be neutralised, otherwise attacker-influenced
-config content becomes live template code that executes when Salt/Ansible/Puppet
-later renders the template.
+config content becomes live template code that executes when Ansible later
+renders the template.
 
 These tests render the *generated* template the way a downstream tool would and
 assert that an injected payload never executes.  A tripwire object is exposed
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ the tripwire sentinel, an injected expression executed and the test fails.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import re
 import subprocess
 import sys
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -25,13 +24,26 @@ import yaml as pyyaml
 
 from jinjaturtle.escape import (
     escape_jinja_literal,
-    escape_erb_literal,
-    escape_literal,
 )
 
 TRIP = "__TRIPWIRE_FIRED__"
 
 
+class _UnsafeAwareLoader(pyyaml.SafeLoader):
+    pass
+
+
+def _construct_unsafe(loader: _UnsafeAwareLoader, node: pyyaml.Node):
+    return loader.construct_scalar(node)
+
+
+_UnsafeAwareLoader.add_constructor("!unsafe", _construct_unsafe)
+
+
+def _safe_load_defaults(text: str):
+    return pyyaml.load(text, Loader=_UnsafeAwareLoader)
+
+
 class _Boom:
     """Returns the tripwire sentinel for any access/call an SSTI payload makes."""
 
@@ -85,7 +97,7 @@ def _run_jinjaturtle(tmp_path: Path, source_name: str, body: str, fmt: str):
         text=True,
     )
     assert res.returncode == 0, f"generation failed: {res.stderr}"
-    defaults = pyyaml.safe_load(dfl.read_text()) or {}
+    defaults = _safe_load_defaults(dfl.read_text()) or {}
     return tpl.read_text(), defaults
 
 
@@ -155,6 +167,86 @@ def test_generated_template_is_renderable(tmp_path, fmt, name, body):
     _render_jinja(template_text, defaults)
 
 
+# --- JSON object-key injection ------------------------------------------------
+#
+# The JSON handler copies the text *between* scalar values (object keys,
+# punctuation) verbatim. A key is never a value placeholder, so Jinja markup in a
+# key can only come from attacker-influenced source text. The output gate
+# (verify_no_live_jinja_in_json_keys) must fail closed on it -- including the
+# "benign-looking name" form (e.g. ``{{ ansible_hostname }}``) that the generic
+# allowlist would otherwise accept as an ordinary variable reference, and which
+# could leak an in-scope variable's value into the rendered config at apply time.
+
+JSON_KEY_INJECTION_BODIES = [
+    # benign-looking variable reference (the residual bypass: passes the generic
+    # allowlist but must still be rejected in *key* position)
+    '{ "{{ ansible_hostname }}": "v" }',
+    # dotted reference (e.g. dumping another host's vars)
+    '{ "{{ hostvars.localhost }}": 1 }',
+    # self-referencing a sibling-derived variable name
+    '{ "{{ role_port }}": "x", "port": 8080 }',
+    # classic gadget (already rejected historically; kept as a guard)
+    '{ "{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__ }}": 1 }',
+    # statement injection in a key
+    '{ "{% for x in y %}k{% endfor %}": 1 }',
+    # nested object key
+    '{ "ok": { "{{ ansible_hostname }}": 2 } }',
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("body", JSON_KEY_INJECTION_BODIES)
+def test_json_key_injection_fails_closed_cli(tmp_path, body):
+    src = tmp_path / "evil.json"
+    src.write_text(body, encoding="utf-8")
+    out = tmp_path / "out.j2"
+    res = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            "-m",
+            "jinjaturtle.cli",
+            str(src),
+            "-f",
+            "json",
+            "--role-name",
+            "role",
+            "-t",
+            str(out),
+        ],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    assert res.returncode == 2, f"expected fail-closed, got rc={res.returncode}"
+    assert "refusing to generate unsafe template" in res.stderr
+    assert not out.exists(), "no template may be written when the gate refuses"
+
+
+def test_json_benign_keys_still_generate(tmp_path):
+    src = tmp_path / "ok.json"
+    src.write_text('{ "host": "localhost", "port": 8080 }', encoding="utf-8")
+    out = tmp_path / "out.j2"
+    res = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            "-m",
+            "jinjaturtle.cli",
+            str(src),
+            "-f",
+            "json",
+            "--role-name",
+            "demo",
+            "-t",
+            str(out),
+        ],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    assert res.returncode == 0, res.stderr
+    template_text = out.read_text()
+    # Keys stay literal; values become placeholders.
+    assert '"host":' in template_text
+    assert "demo_host" in template_text
+
+
 # --- Unit-level guarantees for the escaper itself ---------------------------
 
 SSTI_PAYLOADS = [
@@ -233,43 +325,3 @@ def test_endraw_whitespace_control_cannot_break_out(endraw):
     rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(boom=_Boom())
     assert TRIP not in rendered
     assert rendered == payload
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize(
-    "payload",
-    [
-        "<%= system('id') %>",
-        "<% require 'open3' %>",
-        "text <%= 1+1 %> more",
-        "-%> orphan <%",
-    ],
-)
-def test_escape_erb_literal_removes_executable_tags(payload):
-    escaped = escape_erb_literal(payload)
-    # No raw executable ERB tag should survive that contains the original code.
-    live = re.findall(r"<%[-=#]?(.*?)-?%>", escaped, re.S)
-    for chunk in live:
-        assert "system" not in chunk
-        assert "require" not in chunk
-        # Numeric/expression payloads must be reduced to literal-string prints.
-
-
-def test_escape_literal_dispatches_by_engine():
-    """The public ``escape_literal`` wrapper routes to the right engine."""
-    payload = "{{ 7*7 }}"
-    # Default engine is Jinja2.
-    assert escape_literal(payload) == escape_jinja_literal(payload)
-    assert escape_literal(payload, engine="jinja2") == escape_jinja_literal(payload)
-    # An unknown engine falls back to the safer Jinja2 escaping.
-    assert escape_literal(payload, engine="nonsense") == escape_jinja_literal(payload)
-    # ERB routing.
-    erb_payload = "<%= system('id') %>"
-    assert escape_literal(erb_payload, engine="erb") == escape_erb_literal(erb_payload)
-
-
-def test_escape_literal_jinja_output_is_inert():
-    """End-to-end: text routed through escape_literal does not execute."""
-    escaped = escape_literal("{{ boom.run('x') }}")
-    env = jinja2.Environment(undefined=jinja2.ChainableUndefined)
-    rendered = env.from_string(escaped).render(boom=_Boom())
-    assert TRIP not in rendered

tests/test_security_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import os
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+from defusedxml.common import EntitiesForbidden
+
+from jinjaturtle import cli
+from jinjaturtle.core import generate_ansible_yaml, parse_config, flatten_config
+from jinjaturtle.multi import is_supported_file, iter_supported_files, process_directory
+from jinjaturtle.output_safety import OutputPathError, write_text_safely
+
+
+class UnsafeAwareLoader(yaml.SafeLoader):
+    pass
+
+
+def _unsafe(loader: UnsafeAwareLoader, node: yaml.Node):
+    return loader.construct_scalar(node)
+
+
+UnsafeAwareLoader.add_constructor("!unsafe", _unsafe)
+
+
+def test_jinja_values_are_emitted_as_ansible_unsafe(tmp_path: Path):
+    src = tmp_path / "app.ini"
+    src.write_text("[main]\ncmd = {{ lookup('pipe','id') }}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    fmt, parsed = parse_config(src)
+    defaults_yaml = generate_ansible_yaml("role", flatten_config(fmt, parsed))
+
+    assert "role_main_cmd: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml
+    assert "{{ lookup(''pipe'',''id'') }}" in defaults_yaml
+    loaded = yaml.load(defaults_yaml, Loader=UnsafeAwareLoader)
+    assert loaded["role_main_cmd"] == "{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}"
+
+
+def test_folder_mode_marks_nested_jinja_values_and_ids_unsafe(tmp_path: Path):
+    src = tmp_path / "src"
+    src.mkdir()
+    # Filename ids are source-derived values too.
+    (src / "{{ bad }}.yaml").write_text(
+        "message: \"{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}\"\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+
+    defaults_yaml, _outputs = process_directory(
+        src, recursive=False, role_prefix="role"
+    )
+
+    assert "id: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml
+    assert "role_message: !unsafe" in defaults_yaml
+    loaded = yaml.load(defaults_yaml, Loader=UnsafeAwareLoader)
+    assert loaded["role_items"][0]["id"] == "{{ bad }}.yaml"
+    assert loaded["role_items"][0]["role_message"] == "{{ lookup('pipe','id') }}"
+
+
+def test_xml_parser_rejects_entities_when_called_as_library(tmp_path: Path):
+    src = tmp_path / "bad.xml"
+    src.write_text(
+        "<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'>]><root>&xxe;</root>",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(EntitiesForbidden):
+        parse_config(src, "xml")
+
+
+def test_folder_mode_does_not_follow_symlinked_files(tmp_path: Path):
+    real = tmp_path / "secret.ini"
+    real.write_text("[main]\nsecret=yes\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    root = tmp_path / "root"
+    root.mkdir()
+    link = root / "link.ini"
+    link.symlink_to(real)
+
+    assert not is_supported_file(link)
+    assert iter_supported_files(root, recursive=False) == []
+    assert iter_supported_files(root, recursive=True) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.skipif(not hasattr(os, "symlink"), reason="symlinks unavailable")
+def test_cli_refuses_to_write_through_final_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
+    target = tmp_path / "target.txt"
+    target.write_text("keep\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    link = tmp_path / "out.yml"
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OutputPathError):
+        write_text_safely(link, "replace\n")
+
+    assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep\n"
+    assert link.is_symlink()
+
+
+def test_cli_refuses_symlinked_output_parent(tmp_path: Path):
+    real_dir = tmp_path / "real"
+    real_dir.mkdir()
+    link_dir = tmp_path / "linkdir"
+    link_dir.symlink_to(real_dir, target_is_directory=True)
+
+    with pytest.raises(OutputPathError):
+        write_text_safely(link_dir / "out.yml", "data\n")
+
+    assert not (real_dir / "out.yml").exists()
+
+
+def test_cli_reports_unsafe_output_path_without_overwriting_symlink(tmp_path: Path):
+    cfg = tmp_path / "app.ini"
+    cfg.write_text("[main]\nname = ok\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    target = tmp_path / "target.yml"
+    target.write_text("keep\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    link = tmp_path / "defaults.yml"
+    link.symlink_to(target)
+
+    exit_code = cli._main([str(cfg), "--defaults-output", str(link)])
+
+    assert exit_code == 2
+    assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep\n"

tests/test_yaml_handler.py

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ from jinjaturtle.core import (
     analyze_loops,
     flatten_config,
     generate_ansible_yaml,
-    generate_erb_template,
     generate_jinja2_template,
 )
 from jinjaturtle.handlers.yaml import YamlHandler
@@ -205,16 +204,6 @@ def test_yaml_loop_preserves_blank_separator_after_list(tmp_path: Path):
         rendered = Template(template).render(**defaults)
         assert rendered_expected in rendered
 
-        erb_template = generate_erb_template(
-            fmt,
-            parsed,
-            "role",
-            original_text=text,
-            loop_candidates=loop_candidates,
-            flat_items=flat_items,
-        )
-        assert erb_expected in erb_template
-
 
 def test_yaml_loop_preserves_following_top_level_comments(tmp_path: Path):
     from jinja2 import Environment, Template